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Socrates has tried to reduce Thrasymachus' position to the relatively trivial claims that rulers rule in their own interest, and that morality is obeying rulers. Thrasymachus therefore changes his formulation, but not his tack. The important thing about morality being to someone else's advantage, he says, is that it shows that morality is a bad thing, and weak, and unprofitable to its possessor. Socrates' inability (or possibly artificial refusal) to distinguish higher-order arts from lower-order ones (see p. 8) results in the strange position that profit-making is a separate art, so that (again) no art—or at least no art other than profit-making—seeks the profit or advantage of the artisan.

Once we'd reached this point in the discussion, it was perfectly clear to everyone that the definition of morality had been turned upside down. Thrasymachus didn't respond to my last remarks, but instead said, "Tell me, Socrates, do you have a nurse?" 343a

"What?" I asked. "Shouldn't you come up with some response rather than this question?"

"The point is," he said, "that she takes no notice of your runny nose and lets it dribble on when it needs wiping, when you can't even tell her the difference between sheep and shepherd."

"I haven't the faintest idea what you're getting at," I said.

b 'What I'm getting at is your notion that shepherds or cowherds consider what is good for their sheep or their cows, and fatten them up and look after them, with any aim in mind other than what is good for their masters and for themselves; and also at your supposition that the attitude which people with political authority—who are the real rulers*—have towards their subjects differs in the slightest from how one might feel about sheep, and that what they consider day and night is anything other than their own advantage and how

c to gain it. You're so far off understanding right and wrong, and morality and immorality, that you don't even realize that morality and right are actually good for someone else—they are the advantage of the stronger party, the ruler—and bad for the underling at the receiving end of the orders. Nor do you realize that the opposite is true for immorality: the wrongdoer lords it over those moral simpletons—that's what they are, really—while his subjects do what is to his advantage, since he is stronger, and make him happy by doing his bidding, but don't further their own happiness in the slightest.

d 'You fool, Socrates, don't you see? In any and every situation, a moral person is worse off than an immoral one. Suppose, for instance, that they're doing some business together, which involves one of them entering into association with the other: by the time the association is dissolved, you'll never find the moral person up on the immoral one—he'll be worse off. Or again, in civic matters, if there's a tax on property,* then a moral person pays more tax than an immoral one even when they're both equally well off; and if there's a hand-out, then the one gets nothing, while the other makes a lot. And when each of them holds political office,* even if a moral person loses out financially in no other way, his personal affairs deteriorate through neglect, while his morality stops him making any profit from public funds, and moreover his family and friends fall out with him over his refusal to help them out in unfair ways; in all these respects, however, an immoral person's experience is the opposite.

344a 'I'm talking about the person I described a short while ago, the one with the power to secure huge advantages for himself. This is the person you should consider, if you want to assess the extent to which immorality rather than morality is person-

ally advantageous—and this is something you'll appreciate most easily if you look at immorality in its most perfect form, and see how it enhances a wrongdoer's life beyond measure, but ruins the lives of his victims, who haven't the stomach for crime, to the same degree. It's dictatorship I mean, because whether it takes stealth or overt violence, a dictator steals what doesn't belong to him—consecrated and unconsecrated objects, private possessions, and public property—and does so not on a small scale, but comprehensively. Anyone who is caught committing the merest fraction of these crimes is not only punished, but thoroughly stigmatized as well: small-scale criminals who commit these kinds of crimes are called temple-robbers,* kidnappers, burglars, thieves, and robbers. On the other hand, when someone appropriates the assets of the citizen body and then goes on to rob them of their very freedom and enslave them, then denigration gives way to congratulation, and it isn't only his fellow citizens who call him happy, but anyone else who hears about his consummate wrongdoing does so as well. The point is that immorality has a bad name because people are afraid of being at the receiving end of it, not of doing it.

'So you see, Socrates, immorality—if practised on a large enough scale—has more power, licence, and authority than morality. And as I said at the beginning, morality is really the advantage of the stronger party, while immorality is profitable and advantageous to oneself.'

After flooding our ears, like an attendant in the baths, with this torrential gush of words, Thrasymachus was thinking of leaving. No one there would let him go, however: they forced him to stay and justify what he'd been saying. I myself was particularly insistent. 'My dear Thrasymachus,' I said, 'you surely aren't thinking of leaving? You can't just pelt us with words, so to speak, and then leave before adequately demonstrating—or before finding out yourself—whether or not they're true. Or do you think that what you're attempting to define is a trivial matter, and not[†] how anyone can live his life in the most rewarding manner?'

'Am I disagreeing with you?' Thrasymachus protested.

'You do give that impression,' I replied, 'unless it's just us

[†] An obelisk indicates a textual note in the section starting on p. 460.

you don't care about in the slightest, and you don't spare a thought for whether our ignorance of what you're claiming to know will make us live better or worse lives. No, Thrasymachus, please do your best to enlighten us too: it won't turn out badly for you to do so many of us a favour. I'll tell you my position: I'm not convinced. I do not think that immorality is more profitable than morality, not even if it is given free rein and never prevented from getting its own way; and even if I grant you your immoral person, Thrasymachus, with the power to do wrong either by stealth or by brute force, for my part I'm still not convinced that it is more profitable than morality. It's possible that someone else here feels the same, and that I'm not alone; so, Thrasymachus, you must come up with a good enough argument to convince us that rating morality higher than immorality is a mistake.

'How do you expect me to do that?' he asked. 'If what I've just been saying doesn't convince you, what else can I do? Do you want me to spoonfeed the argument into your mind?'

'No, I certainly don't want you to do that,' I said. 'Above all, I'd like you to be consistent; or if you do change your mind, I'd like you to do so openly, without trying to deceive us. What's happening, you see, Thrasymachus—I mean, we haven't completed our investigation of what you were saying before—is that although you started by trying to define the true doctor, you didn't maintain the same level of precision when you subsequently turned to the true shepherd. You don't think that the reason a shepherd, in his capacity as shepherd, herds sheep[†] is what is best for the sheep; you think he's like a dinner-guest when a meal is due, and is interested only in indulging himself—or alternatively that he behaves like a businessman rather than a shepherd, and is interested only in making money. But of course the sole concern of shepherding is to procure the best for what is in its charge, since its own best state has been sufficiently procured, as we know,* as long as it wholly and entirely is shepherding. The same reasoning, I thought, was what compelled us not long ago to conclude that all authority (whether political or non-political), *qua* authority, considers what is best for nothing except its subjects, its wards. But do you think that people with political authority—the "real" rulers—exercise authority willingly?'

'I most definitely do not *think* so,' he replied. 'I'm absolutely certain of it!'

'But, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'don't you realize that no other form of authority is willingly exercised by its holder? People demand wages, on the grounds that the power isn't going to benefit *them*, but those who are in their charge. I mean, tell me this: when we want to distinguish one branch of expertise from another, don't we do so by distinguishing what it is capable of doing? And please, Thrasymachus, make sure that your reply expresses what you really believe; otherwise, we won't make any progress.'

'Yes, that's how we distinguish it,' he said.

'And doesn't every branch of expertise have its own particular benefit to bestow as well, rather than one which it shares with other branches of expertise? For instance, medicine confers health, naval captaincy confers safety at sea, and so on.'

'Yes.'

'And isn't an income conferred by expertise at earning money? I mean, this is what it is capable of doing. You surely don't identify medicine and captaincy, do you? We must do as you suggested and make precise distinctions, so if a ship's captain recovers from illness because seafaring is good for him, does this lead you to call what he does medicine?'

'Of course not,' he said.

'Nor, I imagine, if someone recovers from illness while earning money, do you describe moneymaking skill as medical skill.'

'Of course not.'

'Well, suppose someone earns money while restoring health? Does this make you describe medicine as moneymaking?'

'No.'

'We've agreed that every branch of expertise has its own particular benefit to bestow, haven't we?'

'Yes, I grant you that,' he said.

'So if there's any benefit which the practitioners of every branch of expertise share, then obviously this benefit must come from something which is the same for all of them, and which they all equally make use of, over and above making use of their own particular expertise.'

'I suppose so,' he said.

'And it's our view that practitioners of branches of expertise

benefit by earning money because they make use of the skill of moneymaking in addition to their own particular skill.'

He reluctantly agreed.

d 'It follows that no one benefits, in the sense of earning money, as a result of practising his own branch of expertise. Instead, given that our enquiry has to be conducted with precision, we should say that medicine creates health, while moneymaking creates an income, and that building creates a house, while moneymaking may accompany building and create an income, and so on for the other branches of expertise: each of them has its own job to do and benefits what is in its charge. But leaving wages aside, is there any benefit which a practitioner gains from his expertise?'

'Apparently not,' he said.

e 'And what about when he works for free? Does he in fact fail to confer any benefit at that time?'

'No, I think he does.'

'So, Thrasymachus, it's now clear that no branch of expertise or form of authority procures benefit for itself; as we were saying some time ago, it procures and enjoins benefit for its subject. It considers the advantage of its subject, the weaker party, not that of the stronger party. That, my dear Thrasymachus, is why I was proposing just now that no one willingly chooses authority and the task of righting other
347a people's wrongs; they ask to be paid for it, because anyone who works properly with his expertise consistently fails to work for his own welfare, and also fails to legislate for his own welfare when he gives instructions as a professional. It isn't *his* welfare, but that of his subject, which is his concern. This presumably explains why it is necessary to pay people with money or prestige before they are prepared to hold authority, or to punish them if they refuse.'

'What do you mean, Socrates?' asked Glaucon. 'I recognize your two modes of payment, but I don't know what punishment you are referring to and how it replaces payment.'

b 'Then you don't know what kind of payment is needed to induce truly excellent people to be prepared to rule,' I said. 'Don't you realize that to say that someone is interested in prestige or money is thought—and rightly thought—to be insulting?'

'Yes, I know that,' he said.

'Well,' I explained, 'that's why neither money nor prestige tempts good people to accept power. You see, if they overtly require money for being in charge, they'll be called hired hands, and if they covertly make money for themselves out of the possession of power, they'll be called thieves; and they don't want either of these alternatives. On the other hand, they won't do it for prestige either, since they aren't ambitious. So one has to pressurize them and threaten them with punishment, otherwise they'll never assume power; and this is probably the origin of the conventional view that it's shameful to *want* to take power on, rather than waiting until one has no choice. The ultimate punishment for being unwilling to assume authority oneself is to be governed by a worse person, and it is fear of this happening, I think, which prompts good men to assume power occasionally.* On these occasions, they don't embark upon government with the expectation of gaining some advantage or benefit from it: their attitude is that they have no choice in the matter, in the sense that they haven't been able to find people better than themselves, or even their equals, to whom they might entrust the task. The chances are that were a community of good men to exist, the competition to avoid power* would be just as fierce as the competition for power is under current circumstances. In such a community, it would be glaringly obvious that any genuine ruler really is incapable of considering his own welfare, rather than that of his subject, and the consequence would be that anyone with any sense would prefer receiving benefit to all the problems that go with conferring it. So anyway, I utterly disagree with Thrasymachus' assertion that morality is the advantage of the stronger party; e but we've examined that topic enough for the time being.'

Thrasymachus has also claimed that immorality is more rewarding than morality. Socrates now attacks this claim, which is also the target of much of the rest of Republic. In an argument which is rather too clever for its own good, Socrates first argues that an immoral person's behaviour resembles that of bad, stupid people in other areas of expertise, rather than that of good, intelligent people. The argument exploits an ambiguity in superiority, which can mean 'doing better than' or 'having more than'; and, by means of the analogy between

morality and skill, it assumes that an immoral person is a failure where a moral person succeeds. In fact, however, moral and immoral people have different goals.

'Thrasymachus' current claim, however, is that a life of crime is better than a life of integrity, and this seems to me to be a far more important assertion. Do you have a preference, Glaucon?' I asked. 'Which view do you think is closer to the truth?'

'I think a moral life is more rewarding.'

348a 'Did you hear Thrasymachus' recent long list of the advantages of an immoral life?' I asked.

'I did,' he answered, 'but I'm not convinced.'

'Shall we try to convince him, then, if we possibly can, of the falsehood of his claim?'

'Yes, of course, let's,' he said.

'Well,' I said, 'if we counter his claim by drawing up an alternative list of all the advantages of morality, and then he responds to that, and we respond to his response, we'll find ourselves in the position of having to add up advantages and b measure the lengths of our respective lists, and before we know it we'll need jurors to adjudicate for us. On the other hand, if we conduct the investigation as we did just now, by trying to win each other's consent, then we'll be our own jurors and claimants.'

'Quite so,' he said.

'Which plan do you like, then?' I asked.

'The latter,' he said.

'All right, then, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'let's go back to the beginning. Could you please confirm for us that your claim is that perfect immorality is more profitable than perfect morality?'

c 'Yes, that's my claim,' he said, 'and I've explained why too.'

'And here's another question about them: do you think that one of them is a good state and the other is a bad one?'

'Of course.'

'That is, morality is a good state, and immorality a bad one?'

'Don't be so naïve, Socrates,' he said. 'Would I say that when I'm claiming that it's immorality which is profitable, not morality?'

'What is your position, then?'

'The opposite of what you said,' he replied.

'That morality is bad?'

'No, it's sheer simplicity.'

'So you're saying that immorality is duplicity, are you?' d

'No, it's sound judgement,' he said.

'Do you really think that criminals are clever, good people, Thrasymachus?'

'Yes, if their criminality is able to manifest in a perfect form and they are capable of dominating countries and nations. I suppose you think I was talking about pickpockets. Actually,' he added, 'activities like that are rewarding too, if you can get away with them, but they're insignificant—unlike the ones I've just mentioned.'

'Yes, I see what you mean,' I said. 'But I'm surprised you e count immorality as a form of goodness and cleverness, and morality as the opposite.'

'Nevertheless, that's exactly what I do.'

'You've come up with a rather intractable idea this time,' I commented. 'It's not easy to know how to respond to it.* If you were proposing that immorality is profitable, but also conceding (as others do)* that it's contemptible and bad, then our conversation could proceed against a background of convention. However, since you've made the enterprising suggestion that it's to be classified along with goodness and cleverness, you're obviously going to say that it is a fine, effective quality, and will attribute to it all the other properties which we tend to ascribe to morality.' 349a

'Your prophecy couldn't be more accurate,' he said.

'All the same,' I said, 'I mustn't be put off. I must continue with the discussion and carry on with the investigation, as long as I feel that you're speaking your mind. I mean, I get the impression, Thrasymachus, that now you aren't toying with us in the slightest, but are expressing your beliefs about the way things truly are.'

'What does it matter to you whether or not it's what I believe?' he said. 'Why don't you just tackle what I'm saying?'

'It doesn't matter to me at all,' I said. 'But here's another b question I'd like you to try to answer, over and above what you've already said. Do you think a moral person would wish to set himself up as superior to another moral person?'

'Of course he wouldn't,' he replied. 'Otherwise he wouldn't be the civilized simpleton he is.'

'Well, would he want to set himself up as superior to moral behaviour?'

'Again, no,' he replied.

'Would he, or would he not, want and intend to set himself up as superior to an immoral person?'

'He would intend to,' he replied, 'but he wouldn't be able to.'

'I'm not asking whether he'd be able to do it,' I said. 'My question is: isn't it the case that a moral person does not intend or wish to set himself up as superior to another moral person, but only to an immoral person?'

'That's correct,' he said.

'What about an immoral person? Does he want to set himself up as superior to a moral person and to moral behaviour?'

'Of course,' he replied. 'He wants to gain the upper hand in everything.'

'So will an immoral person also try to set himself up as superior to another immoral person and to immoral behaviour? In short, will he struggle to gain the upper hand over everyone else in everything?'

'Yes.'

'Let's put it this way,' I said. 'A moral person doesn't set himself up as superior to people who are like him, but only to people who are unlike him; an immoral person, on the other hand, sets himself up as superior to people who are like him as well as to people who are unlike him.'

'You couldn't have put it better,' he said.

'Now, an immoral person is clever and good, and a moral person is neither clever nor good. Isn't that right?'

'Yes, you've put that well too,' he said.

'So is it the case that an immoral person also *resembles* a clever, good person, while a moral person does not?' I asked.

'Naturally,' he replied. 'Since that's the type of person he is, then of course he resembles others of the same type; and of course a moral person does not resemble them.'

'Fine. So each of them is of the same type as people he resembles?'

'That goes without saying,' he said.

'All right, Thrasymachus. Do you acknowledge that some people are musical and some aren't?'

'I do.'

'Which ones are clever and which aren't?'

'The musical ones are clever, of course, and the unmusical ones aren't.'

'And if someone is clever at something, isn't he also good at it, and bad at it if he isn't clever at it?'

'Yes.'

'And doesn't the same apply to medicine?'

'Yes.'

'Do you think, then, Thrasymachus, that when a musical person is tuning a lyre—tightening and slackening the strings—he would want to set himself up as superior to, and gain the upper hand over, another musical person?'

'No, I don't think so.'

'As superior to an unmusical person, then?'

'Inevitably,' he said.

'And what about a doctor? Do you think that in dietary matters he would have the slightest desire to set himself up as superior to another doctor or to medical practice?'

'Of course not.'

'But as superior to non-medical people and practice?'

'Yes.'

'Consider any instance of knowledge or ignorance. Do you think that the actions or words of anyone who is knowledgeable in anything are motivated by a desire to surpass the actions or words of another person with the same knowledge? Don't you think that his actions and words would be identical to those of someone like him in the same circumstances?'

'Yes, I suppose that's bound to be the case,' he said.

'What about an ignoramus? Wouldn't he try to set himself up as superior to knowledgeable people and to ignorant people equally?'

'I suppose so.'

'A knowledgeable person is clever, isn't he?'

'Yes.'

'And a clever person is good?'

'Yes.'

'So it's if someone is good and clever that he won't want to set himself up as superior to people who are like him, but only to people who are unlike him and have nothing in common with him.'

'So it seems.'

'If someone is bad and ignorant, however, he'll want to set himself up as superior to people who are like him as well as to people who are unlike him.'

'I suppose so.'

'Well, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'we found that it was an immoral person who sets himself up as superior to people who are like him as well as to people who are unlike him, didn't we? Isn't that what you said?'

'I did,' he replied.

c 'And a moral person won't set himself up as superior to people who are like him, but only to people who are unlike him?'

'Yes.'

'It follows,' I said, 'that it is a moral person who resembles a clever, good person, and an immoral person who resembles a bad, ignorant person.'

'It looks that way.'

'And we agreed that each of them is of the same type as people he is like.'

'Yes, we did.'

'We've proved, then, that it is a moral person who is good and clever, whereas an immoral person is ignorant and bad.'

Socrates launches an attack on the effectiveness of immoral behaviour. Criminals fall out with one another, and therefore cannot act in concert; an immoral individual, such as Thrasymachus' dictator, falls out with himself. Thrasymachus meekly accepts this idea (which prefigures the psychology and the definition of morality which will occur later in Republic) because he accepts that immorality is essentially destructive of concord.

d Now, although Thrasymachus did concede all these points, it wasn't as easy as I'm making it sound by describing it: he was hauled along with great reluctance, sweating profusely (since it was the hot season). And I also saw then something I'd never seen before—a red-faced Thrasymachus.*

So anyway, we agreed that morality was a good state and was knowledge, and that immorality was a bad state and was ignorance. Next I said, 'All right. We may have settled that

issue, but we also have before us the claim* that immorality is effective. Do you remember, Thrasymachus?'

'Yes, I remember,' he replied. 'But I'm not satisfied with the statements you've just been making. I could address them, but I'm sure that if I did, you'd claim that I was holding forth like an orator. So either let me say what I want and for as long as I want, or go on with your questions, if you insist on doing that, and I'll go on saying "All right" and nodding and shaking my head as if I were listening to old women telling stories.'

'But you must never go against what you actually believe,' I said.

'Why shouldn't I?' he said. 'It makes you happy. You won't let me speak—do you want more from me than that?'

'No, not at all,' I replied. 'If you'll do what you said, that's fine, and I'll ask the questions.'

'Go ahead, then.'

'Well, here's the question I was getting at just now; I think it's the logical next one for our investigation. When morality is compared with immorality, what do we learn about morality? I mean, the suggestion was made that immorality is more powerful and more effective than morality; but the fact that we've now established that morality is a good state and is knowledge will make it easy to prove, I think, that it's also more effective than immorality, given that immorality is ignorance, as everyone knows by now. However, I don't want our investigation to be couched in such abstract terms, Thrasymachus, but rather as follows: would you agree that it is wrong for a community to undertake the domination of other communities, to deprive other communities of their freedom, and to keep a number of other communities subservient to itself?'

'Of course it is,' he said. 'And the better the community—the more perfectly immoral—the more it will act in exactly that way.'

'I appreciate that this is your position,' I said, 'but what I'm doing is exploring an aspect of it and asking whether a community which is stronger than another community will retain its power if it doesn't have morality, or whether it can do so only if it has morality.'

'If your recent assertion was correct,' he replied, 'that morality

Chapter 2

The Challenge to Socrates

Glaucon and Adeimantus (Plato's brothers) now become Socrates' interlocutors for the rest of the book. Socrates has claimed (352d–354a) that morality enables us to prosper; they demand a full justification of this claim. Instead of the more usual views that morality is (a) not good, but a lesser evil (Glaucon), and (b) valued only for its external rewards (Adeimantus), they challenge Socrates to prove that morality is intrinsically good and rewarding, and that it contributes towards a moral person's happiness.

357a At this point, I thought I'd be exempt from further talking, but apparently that was only the preamble. You see, it's not in Glaucon's nature to cut and run from anything, and on this occasion he refused to accept Thrasymachus' capitulation, but said, 'Socrates, do you want us *really* to be convinced that in all b circumstances morality is better than immorality or merely to pretend to be?'

'If it were up to me,' I replied, 'I'd prefer your conviction to be genuine.'

'Well,' he remarked, 'your behaviour is at odds with your wishes, then. I mean, here's a question for you. Don't you describe as good something which is welcomed for its own sake, rather than because its consequences are desired? Enjoyment, for instance, and all those pleasures which are harmless and whose future consequences are only enjoyable?'

'Yes,' I agreed, "'good" seems to me the right description for that situation.'

c 'And what about things which are welcome not just for their own sakes, but also for their consequences? Intelligence, sight, and health, for instance, are evidently welcomed for both reasons.'

'Yes,' I said.

'And isn't there, in your experience,' he asked, 'a third category of good things—the category in which we find

exercise, medical treatment, and any moneymaking job like being a doctor? All these things are regarded as nuisances, but beneficial, and are not welcomed for their own sakes, but for their financial rewards and other consequences.'

'Yes,' I agreed, 'there is this third category as well. What of it?'

'To which category do you think morality belongs?' he asked.

'In my opinion,' I replied, 'it belongs in the best category—the category which anyone who expects to be happy should welcome both for its own sake and for its consequences.*'

'That's not the usual view,' he said, 'which consigns morality to the nuisance category of things which have to be done for the sake of financial reward and for the prospect of making a good impression, but which, taken in isolation, are so trying that one should avoid them.'

'I'm aware of this view,' I said, 'and it's the reason why Thrasymachus has been running morality down all this time, and praising immorality. But I'm slow on the uptake, apparently.'

'All right, then,' he said, 'listen to what I have to say too, and see if you agree with me. The point is that Thrasymachus gave up too soon, in my opinion: you charmed him into docility as if he were a snake. The arguments that have been offered about both morality and immorality leave *me* unsatisfied, however, in the sense that I still want to hear a definition of them both, and to be told what the effect is of the occurrence of each of them in the mind—each of them in isolation, without taking into consideration financial reward or any other consequence they might have.*'

'So if it's all right with you, what I'll do is revive Thrasymachus' position. First, I'll explain the usual view of the nature and origin of morality; second, I'll claim that it is only ever practised reluctantly, as something necessary, but not good; third, I'll claim that this behaviour is reasonable, because people are right to think that an immoral person's life is much better than a moral person's life.'

'Now, I don't agree with any of this, Socrates, but I don't know what to think. My ears are ringing from listening to Thrasymachus and countless others, but I've never yet heard

d the kind of support for morality, as being preferable to immorality, that I'd like to hear, which is a hymn to the virtues it possesses in and of itself. If I can get this from anyone, it'll be you, I think. That is why I'll speak at some length in praise of the immoral life; by doing so, I'll be showing you the kind of rejoinder I want you to develop when you criticize immorality and commend morality. What do you think of this plan?

'I thoroughly approve,' I replied. 'I mean, I can't think of another topic which any thinking person would more gladly see cropping up again and again in his conversations.'

e 'That's wonderful,' he said. 'Well, I promised I'd talk first about the nature and origin of morality, so here goes. The idea is that although it's a fact of nature that doing wrong is good and having wrong done to one is bad, nevertheless the disadvantages of having it done to one outweigh the benefits of doing it. Consequently, once people have experienced both committing wrong and being at the receiving end of it, they see that the disadvantages are unavoidable and the benefits are unattainable; so they decide that the most profitable course is, 359a for them to enter into a contract with one another, guaranteeing that no wrong will be committed or received. They then set about making laws and decrees, and from then on they use the terms "legal" and "right" to describe anything which is enjoined by their code. So that's the origin and nature of morality, on this view: it is a compromise between the ideal of doing wrong without having to pay for it, and the worst situation, which is having wrong done to one while lacking the means of exacting compensation. Since morality is a compromise, it is endorsed because, while it may not be good, it does gain value by preventing people from doing wrong. The point is that any real man with the ability to do wrong would b never enter into a contract to avoid both wronging and being wronged: he wouldn't be so crazy. Anyway, Socrates, that is what this view has to say about the nature and origin of morality and so on.*

c 'As for the fact that morality is only ever practised reluctantly, by people who lack the ability to do wrong—this would become particularly obvious if we performed the following thought-experiment. Suppose we grant both types of people—moral and immoral—the scope to do whatever they want, and

we then keep an eye on them to see where their wishes lead them. We'll catch our moral person red-handed: his desire for superiority will point him in the same direction as the immoral person, towards a destination which every creature naturally regards as good and (aims for, except that people are compelled by convention to deviate from this path and respect equality.

'They'd have the scope I'm talking about especially if they acquired the kind of power which, we hear, an ancestor of Gyges of Lydia* once acquired. He was a shepherd in the service of the Lydian ruler of the time, when a heavy rainstorm occurred and an earthquake cracked open the land to a certain extent,* and a chasm appeared in the region where he was pasturing his flocks. He was fascinated by the sight, and went down into the chasm and saw there, as the story goes, among other artefacts, a bronze horse, which was hollow and had windows set in it; he stooped and looked in through the windows and saw a corpse inside, which seemed to be that of a giant. The corpse was naked, but had a golden ring on one finger; he took the ring off the finger and left.† Now, the e shepherds used to meet once a month to keep the king informed about his flocks; and our protagonist came to the meeting wearing the ring. He was sitting down among the others, and happened to twist the ring's bezel in the direction of his body, towards the inner part of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to his neighbours, and to his astonishment 360a they talked about him as if he'd left. While he was fiddling about with the ring again, he turned the bezel outwards, and became visible. He thought about this and experimented to see if it was the ring which had this power; in this way he eventually found that turning the bezel inwards made him invisible and turning it outwards made him visible. As soon as he realized this, he arranged to be one of the delegates to the king; once he was inside the palace, he seduced the king's wife b and with her help assaulted and killed the king, and so took possession of the throne.

'Suppose there were two such rings, then—one worn by our moral person, the other by the immoral person. There is no one, on this view, who is iron-willed enough to maintain his morality and find the strength of purpose to keep his hands off what doesn't belong to him, when he is able to take whatever

he wants from the market-stalls without fear of being discovered, to enter houses and sleep with whomever he chooses, to kill and to release from prison anyone he wants, and generally to act like a god among men. His behaviour would be identical to that of the other person: both of them would be heading in the same direction.

'Now this is substantial evidence, it would be claimed, that morality is never freely chosen. People do wrong whenever they think they can, so they act morally only if they're forced to, because they regard morality as something which isn't good for one personally. The point is that everyone thinks the rewards of immorality far outweigh those of morality—and they're right, according to the proponent of this view. The sight of someone with that kind of scope refusing all those opportunities for wrongdoing and never laying a finger on things that didn't belong to him would lead people to think that he was in an extremely bad way, and was a first-class fool as well—even though their fear of being wronged might make them attempt to mislead others by singing his praises to them in public.

'That's all I have to say on this. As for actually assessing the lives of the people we're talking about, we'll be able to do that correctly if we make the gap between a moral person and an immoral person as wide as possible. That's the only way to make a proper assessment. And we should set them apart from each other by leaving their respective immorality and morality absolutely intact, so that we make each of them a consummate professional. In other words, our immoral person must be a true expert. A top-notch ship's captain, for instance, or doctor, recognizes the limits of his branch of expertise and undertakes what is possible while ignoring what is impossible; moreover, if he makes a mistake, he has the competence to correct it. Equally, our immoral person must get away with any crimes he undertakes in the proper fashion, if he is to be outstandingly immoral; getting caught must be taken to be a sign of incompetence, since the acme of immorality is to give an impression of morality while actually being immoral. So we must attribute consummate immorality to our consummate criminal, and if we are to leave it intact, we should have him equipped with a colossal reputation for morality even though he is a colossal criminal. He should be capable of correcting any mistakes he

makes. He must have the ability to argue plausibly, in case any of his crimes are ever found out, and to use force wherever necessary, by making use of his courage and strength and by drawing on his fund of friends and his financial resources.

'Now that we've come up with this sketch of an immoral person, we must conceive of a moral person to stand beside him—someone who is straightforward and principled, and who, as Aeschylus says, wants genuine goodness rather than merely an aura of goodness.* So we must deprive him of any such aura, since if others think him moral, this reputation will gain him privileges and rewards, and it will become unclear whether it is morality or the rewards and privileges which might be motivating him (to be what he is). We should strip him of everything except morality, then, and our portrait should be of someone in the opposite situation to the one we imagined before. I mean, even though he does no wrong at all, he must have a colossal reputation for immorality, so that his morality can be tested by seeing whether or not he is impervious to a bad reputation and its consequences; he must unswervingly follow his path until he dies—a saint with a lifelong reputation as a sinner. When they can both go no further in morality and immorality respectively, we can decide which of them is the happier.'

'My dear Glaucon,' I said, 'I'm very impressed at how industriously you're ridding each of them of defects and getting them ready for assessment. It's as if you were working on statues.'

'I'm doing the best I can,' he replied. 'And now that we've established what the two of them are like, I'm sure we won't find it difficult to specify what sort of life is in store for either of them. That's what I must do, then—and if my words are rather coarse, Socrates, please remember that the argument is not mine, but stems from those who prefer immorality to morality.'

'Here's what they'll say: for a moral person in the situation I've described, the future holds flogging, torture on the rack, imprisonment in chains, having his eyes burnt out, and every ordeal in the book, up to and including being impaled on a stake. Then at last he'll realize that one's goal should be not actual morality, but the appearance of morality. In fact, that

phrase of Aeschylus' has far more relevance for an immoral person, in the sense that, as they will claim, it is really an immoral person who wants genuine immorality rather than merely an aura of immorality, because his occupation takes account of the way things are and his life is not concerned with appearances. He is the one who "reaps the harvest of wise plans which grow in his mind's deep furrow"*—and what he plans is first to use his reputation for morality to gain control over his country, and then to marry a woman from any family he wants, to have his children marry whomever he wants, to deal and do business with whomever he wants, and, over and above all this, to secure his own benefit by ensuring that his lack of distaste for crime makes him a financial profit. If he's challenged privately or publicly, he wins the day and comes off better than his enemies; because he gains the upper hand, he gets rich; he therefore does good to his friends and harm to his enemies, and the religious rites he performs and the offerings he makes to the gods are not just adequate but magnificent; his service to the gods and to the men he favours is far better than a moral person's; and consequently it is more appropriate for the gods to smile on him rather than on a moral person, and more likely that they will. And this, Socrates, is why both gods and men provide a better life for an immoral person than for a moral person, according to this view.

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^d After Glaucon's speech, I was intending to make some reply to what he'd been saying, but his brother Adeimantus asked, 'Surely you don't consider that an adequate treatment of the issue, do you, Socrates?'

'Why shouldn't I?' I said.

'It's precisely the most important point which has been omitted,' he said.

'Well,' I said, 'as the saying goes, a man and his brother should stick together. So if Glaucon here has left anything out, you should back him up. As far as I'm concerned, however, even what he's already said is enough to floor me and make me a totally ineffective ally of morality.'

^e 'Rubbish,' he said. 'But don't let that stop you listening to what I have to say as well. In order to clarify Glaucon's meaning, we also have to go into the arguments for the opposite of his point—the arguments in favour of morality and against immorality. As you know, fathers point out to their

sons the importance of morality and impress it upon them (as every guardian impresses it upon his ward) by singing the praises not of morality itself but of the good reputation it brings. The inducement they offer is that power, good marriage, and all the things Glaucon mentioned a moment ago come to someone who is thought to be moral as a result of this reputation: if a moral person gets them, it is because he is well thought of. 363a

'They have more to say about the consequences of reputation. They adduce being well thought of by the gods, and then they have benefits galore to talk of, all the ones the gods are said to award to just people. There are, for instance, the statements of noble Hesiod and of Homer. Hesiod says* that the gods make "oaks bear acorns on their outsides and bees in their centres" for moral people; and he says that "their woolly sheep are weighed down by their fleeces", and that they gain many other advantages. Homer makes very similar claims:* "As of some righteous king," he says, "who pleases the gods by upholding justice, and the dark earth bears wheat and barley, the trees hang heavy with fruit, the sheep steadily give birth, and the sea-waters yield fish." b

'Musaeus and his son* claim that the gods give moral people even more exciting advantages. Once they've transported them, in their account, to Hades and got them reclining on couches for the party they've laid on for just people, they next have them spending eternity wearing chaplets on their heads and drinking, on the assumption that the best possible reward for goodness is perpetual intoxication. Others* have the gods' rewards for morality lasting even longer: they say that the legacy left behind by a person who is just and keeps his promises is that his children's children are better people.† c

'These, and others like them, are the glowing terms in which they speak of morality. As for unjust and immoral people, they bury them in Hades in a kind of mud* and force them to carry water in sieves,* and they make sure that while they remain alive they are thought badly of; and they claim that all the punishments which Glaucon specified for people who, despite being moral, are thought to be immoral are destined for immoral people. They have no novel punishments to add to this list, however. d

'Anyway, that's how morality is commended and immorality

condemned. But there's also another point for you to take into consideration, Socrates. It's the sort of thing ordinary people say to one another about morality and immorality, but it occurs in the poets as well. They all unanimously go on and on about how self-discipline and morality may be commendable, but are also difficult and troublesome, whereas self-indulgence and immorality are enjoyable and easily gained, and it's only in people's minds and in convention that they are contemptible. They also say that, on the whole, immorality is more rewarding than morality; and whereas they're perfectly ready to admire bad men, if they're affluent and powerful in other respects as well, and to award them political office and personal prestige, they have disrespect and look down on people who are in any way powerless or are poor, even while admitting their moral superiority to the others.

The most astonishing thing of all, however, is what gets said about the gods and goodness—that the gods often assign misfortune and a terrible life to good people, and the opposite to the other type of person.* Beggar-priests and soothsayers knock on the doors of wealthy households and try to persuade the owners that (as long as there's some enjoyable feasting involved) the gods have granted them the power to use rituals and spells to expiate any sin committed by a person or by any of his ancestors, and that if anyone has an enemy he'd like to hurt, then it'll cost hardly anything to injure him—and it makes no difference whether the target is a moral or an immoral person—by means of certain incantations and formulae, since they can persuade the gods, they say, to do their bidding.

The poets are called on to support all these claims. Some people concede that vice involves nothing arduous, on the grounds that "There's no difficulty in choosing vice in abundance: the road is smooth and it's hardly any distance to where it lives. But the gods have put sweat in the way of goodness",* and a long, rough, steep road. Others cite Homer in support of the idea that humans can influence the gods, pointing out that he too said,* "Even the gods themselves can be moved by entreaty: men appeal to them by means of rites and softly spoken prayers, libations and sacrifices, and influence them, when a crime has been committed and a wrong has been done." They come up with a noisy mob of books written by

Musaeus and Orpheus (who are descended from the Moon and the Muses, they say), which are source-books for their rituals; and they convince whole countries as well as individuals that there are in fact ways to be free and cleansed of sin. While we remain on earth, this involves rituals and enjoyable diversions, which also work for us after we have died and which they call initiations.* These initiations, they say, free us from all the terrors of the other world, but ghastly things await anyone who didn't take part in the rituals.

"This, my dear Socrates," he went on, "is the kind of thing that gets said—and at this kind of length—about how highly gods and men regard virtue and vice. Can we tell what the effect of being exposed to all this is on a young mind which is naturally gifted and is capable of working out, as a result of flitting (so to speak) from one idea to another and dipping into them all, what type of person he has to be and what road he has to take to have as good a life as possible? He would probably follow Pindar* and ask himself, "Is it honesty or crooked deceit that enables me to scale the higher wall' and so live my life surrounded by secure defences? What I hear is people telling me that, unless I also gain a reputation for morality, my actually being moral will do me no good, but will be a source of private troubles and public punishments. On the other hand, an immoral person who has managed to get a reputation for morality is said to have a wonderful life. Therefore, since the experts tell me that 'Appearance overpowers reality'* and is responsible for happiness, I must wholeheartedly devote myself to appearance. I must surround myself with an illusion of goodness. This must be my front, what people see of me, but behind me I must have on a leash that cunning, subtle fox of which Archilochus,* the greatest of all experts, speaks. Someone might object, 'But it's not easy to cloak one's badness for ever.' That's because no important project is easy, we shall reply; nevertheless, everything we hear marks this as the road to take if we are to be happy. To help us with our disguise, we shall form clubs and pressure-groups,* and we can acquire skill at political and forensic speaking from teachers of the art of persuasion. Consequently, by a combination of persuasion and brute force, we shall dominate others without being punished for it."

“But you can’t hide from the gods, or overpower them.”*
 “Well, suppose there are no gods, or suppose they aren’t
 bothered in the slightest about human affairs: then why should
 we in our turn bother about hiding from them? On the other
 e hand, if the gods do exist, and do care for us, then our only
 sources of knowledge and information about them are tradition
 and the poets who have described their lineage.* And these are
 precisely the people who are telling us that the gods can be
 persuaded and influenced by ‘rites and softly spoken prayers’
 and offerings. Their credibility in one respect stands or falls
 with their credibility in the other respect. So if we listen to
 them, our course is to do wrong and then make offerings to
 the gods from the proceeds of our crimes. The point is that if
 366a we behave morally, then the most that we’ll avoid is being
 punished by the gods, but we’ll also pass up the opportunity
 for making a profit from our immorality; if we are immoral,
 however, we’ll not only get rich, we’ll win the gods over
 with our entreaties and get off scot-free, for all the crimes we
 commit and wrong we do.”

“But we’ll pay in Hades for the crimes we’ve committed
 here on earth—or if we don’t ourselves, then our children’s
 children will.” He’ll think about it and then reply, “No, my
 friend, we won’t. Initiations are very effective and the gods
 whose domain is exoneration have a great deal of power: that
 is the message we are given by very important countries and by
 b the offspring of the gods, who have become poets and the gods’
 interpreters, and who reveal that this is so.”

“Is there any argument left, then, which might persuade us
 not to choose out-and-out immorality, but to prefer morality?
 I mean, if we combine immorality with a fraudulent, but
 specious, façade, then we can do as we please in this world and
 in the next, in the presence of both gods and men. This is what
 both ordinary people and outstanding people are telling us. So
 c after all these arguments, Socrates, is there any strategy to
 enable someone with potential—whether it is due to mental
 attributes or wealth or physique or lineage—to be prepared to
 rate morality highly, rather than laugh when he hears it being
 praised?”

“I tell you, if there’s anyone who can not only refute the
 arguments I’ve been stating, but is also secure in his knowledge

that morality is best, then what he feels for immoral people is
 not anger but a large measure of forgiveness. He knows that
 people abstain from wrong either because, by divine dispensa-
 tion, they instinctively find it distasteful, or because of some
 realization they’ve come to, and that otherwise no one chooses
 d to be moral, although people find fault with immorality when
 cowardice or old age or some other form of weakness prevents
 them from doing wrong. This is obviously the case: the first of
 these people to gain power is the first to behave immorally—
 and as immorally as he possibly can.

“One thing is responsible for all this, and it is the same thing
 which constituted the starting-point of this whole discussion.
 Both Glaucon and I, Socrates, are saying to you, “My friend,
 we can start with those original heroes whose writings are
 e extant and end with our contemporaries, but we find that not a
 single one of you self-styled supporters of morality has ever
 found fault with immorality or commended morality except in
 terms of the reputation, status, and rewards which follow from
 them. What each of them does on its own, however, and what
 the effect is of its occurrence in someone’s mind, where it is
 hidden from the eyes of both gods and men, has never been
 adequately explained either in poetry or in everyday conver-
 sation; nor has it ever been proven that the worst possible thing
 that can occur in the mind is immorality, and that morality is
 the best. If this is how all of you had approached the matter
 367a from the outset, and if you had started trying to convince us
 when we were young, then we wouldn’t now be defending
 ourselves against one another’s wrongdoing, but everyone
 would be his own best defender, since he’d be afraid that if he
 did wrong he’d be opening his doors to the worst of all possible
 residents.”

“That, Socrates, is what Thrasymachus—though he’s not the
 only one, of course—might say on the subject of morality and
 immorality, and he’d probably have even more to add.* Now, I
 think he’s crudely misrepresenting their functions, but the
 reason I’ve taken his argument as far as I can is, to be perfectly
 candid, because I want to hear you making the opposite claims. b
 It’s not enough just to demonstrate that morality is better than
 immorality. Why does one of them, in and of itself, make
 anyone who possesses it bad, while the other one, in and of

itself, makes him good? And, as Glaucon suggested,* don't bring reputation into it. You see, if you leave them with reputations which genuinely reflect their natures, and don't attribute to each of them reputations which fail to do justice to them, then we'll accuse you of praising a reputation for morality rather than morality itself, and of criticizing a reputation for immorality rather than immorality itself; and we'll claim that what you're recommending is being immoral and getting away with it, and that you actually agree with Thrasymachus that morality is good for someone else—that it is the advantage of the stronger party—while it is immorality that is to one's own advantage and profit, but is disadvantageous to the weaker party.

So, since it is your expressed opinion that morality is one of those paramount good things which are worth having not just for their consequences, but also and especially for themselves (like sight, hearing, intelligence—health, of course—and any other good things which are not just thought to be worth while,[†] but are inherently so), then this is the aspect of morality which you should pay tribute to. You should show how morality is worth while in and of itself for anyone who possesses it and how immorality harms him, and leave others to praise rewards and reputations. I mean, I can accept the fact that others praise morality and criticize immorality in these terms, by eulogizing or abusing their reputations and rewards, but I won't put up with that from you (unless you insist), because this and this alone is what you've spent your whole life investigating. So it's not enough just to demonstrate that morality is better than immorality: show us why one of them, in and of itself, makes anyone who possesses it good, whether or not it is hidden from the eyes of gods and men, while the other one, in and of itself, and whether or not it is hidden from the eyes of gods and men, makes him bad.'

Chapter 3

Fundamentals of Inner Politics

In order to meet the challenge issued in the last chapter, Plato begins to imagine the constitution of a community which will correspond to human psychology and make it easier to understand morality. On this analogy and its implications, see pp. xvii–xx. The first community consists of workers alone living a life of rude and primitive health, each with a single talent and therefore a single job, responding cooperatively to one another's selfish needs. In political terms, economics underpins society; in psychological terms, our desires or needs are fundamental.

Now, I've always admired Glaucon's and Adeimantus' temperaments, but I was particularly delighted with them on this occasion, once I'd heard what they had to say. 'Like father, like sons,' I remarked. 'The first line of the elegiac poem which Glaucon's lover composed when you distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara wasn't wrong in addressing you as "sons of Ariston, godlike offspring of an eminent sire".* I think this is quite right: "godlike" is certainly the word for your state, if you can speak like that in support of immorality, and yet remain unconvinced that it is better than morality.* I do think that you really are unconvinced; my evidence is what I know of your characters from other occasions. If I'd had to judge from your words alone, I would have doubted it. But it's precisely because I don't doubt it that I'm in a quandary. On the one hand, I can't come to the assistance of morality, since I am incompetent—as is proven by the fact that although I thought the points I'd made to Thrasymachus had shown that morality was better than immorality, you weren't satisfied. On the other hand, I can't not come to morality's assistance, since I'm afraid that it might actually be sacrilegious to stand idly by while morality is being denigrated and not try to assist as long as one has breath in one's body and a voice to protest with.'

Anyway, the best thing is for me to offer it whatever help I can.'

Glaucou and the others begged me to do everything I could to help; they implored me not to abandon the discussion, but to make a thorough enquiry into the nature of both morality and immorality, and to search out the truth about their expediency. I told them what occurred to me: 'We're undertaking an investigation which, in my opinion, requires care and sharp eyesight. Now, we're not experts,' I pointed out, 'so I suggest we conduct the investigation as follows. Suppose we were rather short-sighted and had been told to read small writing from a long way off, and then one of us noticed the same letters written elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface: I'm sure we'd regard this as a godsend and would read them there before examining the smaller ones, to see if they were really identical.'*

'Of course we would,' said Adeimantus. 'But how is this analogous to our investigation into morality, Socrates, in your view?'

'I'll tell you,' I replied. 'Wouldn't we say that morality can be a property of whole communities as well as of individuals?'

'Yes,' he said.

'And a community is larger than a single person?'

'Yes,' he said.

'It's not impossible, then, that morality might exist on a larger scale in the larger entity and be easier to discern. So, if you have no objection, why don't we start by trying to see what morality is like in communities? And then we can examine individuals too, to see if the larger entity is reflected in the features of the smaller entity.'

'I think that's an excellent idea,' he said.

'Well,' I said, 'the theoretical observation of a community in the process of formation would enable us to see its morality and immorality forming too, wouldn't it?'

'I should think so,' he said.

'And once the process is complete, we could expect to see more easily what we're looking for?'

'Yes, much more easily.'

'Are we agreed, then, on the necessity of trying to see this plan through? I'm asking because I think it'll take a lot of work. So are you sure?'

'Yes, we are,' said Adeimantus, 'proposing.'

'Well,' I said, 'a community starts to be formed, I suppose, when individual human beings find that they aren't self-sufficient, but that each of them has plenty of requirements which he can't fulfil on his own. Do you have an alternative suggestion as to why communities are founded?'

'No,' he said.

'So people become involved with various other people to fulfil various needs, and we have lots of needs, so we gather lots of people together and get them to live in a single district as our associates and assistants. And then we call this living together a community. Is that right?'

'Yes.'

'And people trade goods with one another, because they think they'll be better off if each gives or receives something in exchange,* don't they?'

'Yes.'

'All right, then,' I said. 'Let's construct our theoretical community from scratch. Apparently, its cause is our neediness.'

'Of course.'

'And the most basic and most important of our needs is that we are provided with enough food for existence and for life.'

'Absolutely.'

'The second most important is our need for somewhere to live, and the third is our need for clothing and so on.'

'True.'

'All right,' I said. 'How will our community cope with all this provisioning? Mustn't one member of it be a farmer, another a builder, and another a weaver? Is that all the people we need to look after our bodily needs? Shall we add a shoemaker to it as well?'

'Yes.'

'And there we'd have our community. Reduced to its bare essentials, it would consist of four or five people.'

'So it seems.'

'Well now, should each of them make what he produces publicly available for everyone? For instance, although the farmer is only one person, should he supply all four people with food? Should he spend four times as long and work four times as hard on supplying food and share it out, or should he

ignore everyone else and spend a quarter of his time producing only a quarter of this amount of food for himself, and divide the other three-quarters between getting a house and clothes and shoes for himself, and not have all the bother of associating with other people, but look after his own affairs on his own?"

Adeimantus said, 'It looks as though the first alternative is simpler, Socrates.'

'That's not surprising, of course,' I said. 'I mean, it occurred to me while you were speaking that, in the first place, different people are inherently suitable for different activities, since people are not particularly similar to one another, but have a wide variety of natures. Don't you agree?'

'I do.'

'And is success a more likely consequence of an individual working at several jobs or specializing in only one?'

'Of his specializing in only one,' he said.

'Now, here's another obvious point, I'm sure—that missing the critical opportunity has a deleterious effect.'

'Yes, obviously.'

'The reason being that the work isn't prepared to wait for the worker to make time for it. No, it's crucial for the worker to fall in with the work and not try to fit it into his spare time.'

'Yes, that's crucial.'

'So it follows that productivity is increased, the quality of the products is improved, and the process is simplified when an individual sets aside his other pursuits, does the one thing for which he is naturally suited, and does it at the opportune moment.'

'Absolutely.'

'We need more than four citizens, then, Adeimantus, to supply the needs we mentioned. I mean, if the farmer's going to have a good plough, he will apparently not be making it himself, and the same goes for his hoe and all the rest of his farming implements. Moreover, the builder won't be making his own tools either, and he too needs plenty of them; nor, by the same token, will the weaver and the shoemaker. True?'

'True.'

'So plenty of other craftsmen—joiners, metalworkers, and so on—will join our little settlement and swell its population.'

'Yes.'

'It still won't be very big, though, even when we've added shepherds and other herdsmen—who are also needed, otherwise the farmers won't have oxen to plough with, and there'll be no draught-animals for them and the builders to use for pulling things, and no leather or wool for the weavers and shoemakers.'

'No,' he said, 'but it won't be small either with all that lot.'

'Now, it's practically impossible to build the actual community in a place where it will have no need of imports,' I pointed out.

'Yes, that's too much to expect.'

'Then they'll need more people, to bring in what it needs from elsewhere.'

'Yes.'

'But if their man goes empty-handed, in the sense of taking nothing with him which satisfies the requirements of the people from whom they're trying to get what they need, then he'll depart empty-handed, won't he?'

'I should say so.'

'Then their home production must not only be enough to satisfy their own requirements, but must also be of a type and a quantity which satisfies the requirements of the people they need.'

'Yes, it must.'

'So our community had better increase the number of its farmers and other craftsmen.'

'Yes.'

'And also the number of its workers, I suppose, who import and export all the different kinds of goods—which is to say, merchants. Don't you agree?'

'Yes.'

'We'll need merchants too, then.'

'Certainly.'

'And if they deal with overseas countries, then a great many other people will be needed—experts in all sea-related work.'

'Yes, we'll certainly need a lot of them.'

'Now, within the actual community, how will people trade their produce with one another? I mean, that was why we established an association and founded a community in the first place.'

'They'll trade by buying and selling, obviously,' he said.

'Then a consequence of this is that we'll have a market-place and coinage as a system of trading.'

'Yes.'

c 'So if a farmer or one of the other producers brings some of his produce to the market-place, but doesn't arrive at the same time as the people who want to trade with him, won't he be sitting in the market-place neglecting his own work?'

'No,' he replied, 'because there are people who notice the situation and take it on themselves to supply this service; in properly organized communities, they tend to be those who are physically the weakest and who are therefore unsuited for any other kind of work. Their job is to stay there in the market-
d place and to give people who want to sell something money in exchange for their goods, and then to give goods in exchange for money to people who want to buy something.'

'So this need', I said, 'gives rise to stallholders in our community. I mean, aren't people who stay put in a market-place and do the job of buying and selling called "stallholders", as distinct from those who travel from community to community, who are called "merchants"?''

'Yes, that's right.'

e 'I think there's another category of worker too, consisting of people who don't really deserve to join our community for their mental abilities, but who are physically strong enough to undertake hard labour. They sell the use of their strength, "pay" is the name of the reward they get for this, and that is why they're called "paid hands", I suppose, don't you?'

'Yes.'

'With paid hands as well, then, our community has reached its limit, I should think.'

'I agree.'

'Well, Adeimantus, our community has certainly grown. Is it now just right?'

'I suppose so.'

'Does it contain morality and immorality, then? If so, where and thanks to which of the people we've considered?'

372a 'I've no idea, Socrates,' he said, 'unless it has something to do with how these people treat one another.'

'You might be right,' I said. 'We must look into your idea: it

deserves to be taken seriously. Let's start by considering how people who've been provided for like this will live. Surely they'll spend their time producing food, wine, clothes, and shoes, won't they? Once they've built their houses, they'll turn to production, which they'll invariably work at in the summer naked and with bare feet, and in the winter with adequate protective clothing and footwear. Their food will be barley-meal and wheat-meal, which will sometimes be cooked and sometimes pulped, and the resulting honest fare of barley-cakes and wheat-cakes will be served up on reeds or on clean leaves, as they and their children, wearing chaplets and singing hymns to the gods, recline on carpets of bryony and myrtle and eat their fill, while drinking wine. They'll enjoy having sex, except that concern about poverty or war* will stop them procreating
b beyond their means.' c

At this point Glaucon interrupted and said, 'This diet you're giving them dispenses with savouries,* apparently.'

'You're right,' I said. 'I was forgetting that they'll also have savouries—salt, obviously, and olives and cheese—and they'll boil up the kinds of roots and vegetables which country stews are made of. We'll serve them with desserts too, I suppose, of figs, chick-peas, and beans; and they'll roast myrtle-berries and acorns in the fire as they sip their drinks. And so, it seems, their
d life will pass in peace and good health, and at their death in old age they will pass on a similar way of life to their offspring.'

'Socrates,' he remarked, 'isn't this exactly the fodder you'd lay on if you were devising a community for pigs?'

'What would you suggest, then, Glaucon?' I asked.

'Nothing abnormal,' he replied. 'I think they should recline on couches, if they're to be comfortable, and eat from tables, and have the kinds of savouries and desserts which are in
e current usage.'

Realistically, there is more to human life than the first community can provide—more to the human psyche than mere needs. The community is expanded to include non-necessary needs, until it threatens the integrity of others with which it comes into contact, and is itself threatened in the same way. It therefore needs guardians to protect its integrity. The job of protection requires passion and love of knowledge.

'All right,' I said. 'I see. We're not just investigating the origins of a community, apparently, but of an indulgent community. Well, that may not be wrong: if we extend our enquiry like that, we might perhaps see how morality and immorality take root in communities.* Now, I think that the true community—the one in a healthy condition, as it were—is the one we've described;* but if you want us to inspect an inflamed community as well, so be it. There's no reason not to. I mean, some people apparently won't be satisfied with the provisions and the lifestyle we've described, but will have all sorts of furniture like couches and tables, and a wide selection of savouries, perfumes, incense, prostitutes, and pastries. Moreover, the essential requirements can no longer be restricted to the houses and clothing and shoes we originally mentioned; no, we have to invent painting and ornamentation, and get hold of gold and ivory and so on. Don't you agree?'

b 'Yes,' he said.
 'So we have to increase the size of our community once again. That healthy community will no longer do; it must become bloated and distended with occupations which leave the essential requirements of a community behind—for instance, with all kinds of hunters and imitators.* Among the latter will be hordes of people concerned with shapes and colours, and further hordes concerned with music (poets and their dependants—rhapsodes,* actors, dancers, producers), and manufacturers of all kinds of contraptions and all sorts of things, especially women's cosmetics. Furthermore, we'll need a larger number of workers—don't you think?—such as children's attendants,* nurses, nannies, hairdressers, barbers, and savoury-cooks and meat-cooks too. And that's not the end of it: we'll need pig-farmers as well—a job which didn't exist in our previous community, since there was no need of it, but which will be needed in the present one—and huge numbers of cows and sheep, if they are to be eaten, won't we?'

'Of course.'
 d 'And with this lifestyle won't we be in far greater need of doctors than we were before?'
 'Yes.'
 'And, of course, although the inhabitants of our former community could live off the produce of the land, the land will be too small now, don't you think?'

'I agree.'
 'So we'll have to take a chunk of our neighbours' land, if we're going to have enough for our herds and our crops, won't we? And suppose they too have stopped limiting themselves to necessities and have gone in for the uncontrolled acquisition of innumerable possessions: then they'll have to take a chunk of our land too, won't they?'

'That's more or less inevitable, Socrates,' he replied.
 'And the next step will be war, Glaucon, don't you think?'
 'I agree,' he said.

'Now, let's not commit ourselves yet to a view on whether the effects of war are good or bad,' I said. 'All we're saying at the moment is that we've now discovered the origin of war. It is caused by those factors whose occurrence is the major cause of a community's troubles, whether it's the community as a whole which is afflicted or any individual member of it.'

'Yes.'
 'We need another sizeable increase in our community, then, Glaucon—an army-sized increase. We need an army to go out and defend all the community's property and all the people we were talking about a moment ago against invaders.'

'But can't the inhabitants do this themselves?' he asked.
 'No,' I replied. 'At any rate, they can't if the proposition we all—including you—agreed to when we were forming our community was correct. The proposition was, if you remember, that it is impossible for one person to work properly at more than one area of expertise.'

'You're right.'
 'Well,' I said, 'don't you think that warfare requires expertise?'

'I certainly do,' he answered.
 'So should we take more trouble over our shoemakers than we do over our soldiers?'

'Not at all.'
 'Well now, we prohibited a shoemaker from simultaneously undertaking farming or weaving or building, but had him concentrating exclusively on shoemaking, to ensure quality achievements in shoemaking; and we similarly allotted every single person just one job—the one for which he was naturally suited, and which he was to work at all his life, setting aside his other pursuits, so as not to miss the opportunities which are critical for quality achievement. Isn't it crucial, however,

that the achievements of warfare are of a high standard? Or is soldiering so easy that someone can be expert at it while carrying on with his farming or shoemaking or whatever his profession might be, despite the fact that no one could even become a competent backgammon-player or dice-player if he took it up only in his spare time and didn't concentrate on it for years, starting when he was a young man? Does someone just have to pick up a shield (or whatever military implement or instrument it may be) and he instantaneously becomes a competent fighter in a heavy infantry engagement (or in whatever form of armed conflict it may be)? This would be unique, since no other implement makes a person a craftsman or an athlete if he just holds it, and no other implement is the slightest good to anyone unless he's acquired the knowledge of how to use it and has devoted sufficient attention to it.

'Yes,' he said, 'if tools could do that, they'd be highly prized.'

'Now,' I said, 'the amount of time allotted just to it, and also the degree of professionalism and training, should reflect the supreme importance of the guardians' work.'

'I certainly think so,' he said.

'And a natural talent for the job would help too, wouldn't it?'

'Of course.'

'Our job, then, if we're up to it, would seem to be to select which people and what types of person have a natural gift for protecting our community.'

'Yes, it is.'

'We've certainly taken on an awesome task, then,' I said. 'Still, we mustn't be intimidated; we must do the best we can.'

375a 'I agree.'

'Well,' I went on, 'do you think there's any difference, as far as suitability for guarding is concerned, between the nature of the best type of dog and that of a well-born young man?'

'What are you getting at?'

'That both of them have to be acutely perceptive, quick on their feet (so as to chase after anything they do perceive) and strong as well, in case they have to fight someone they've cornered.'

'Yes,' he said, 'they need all these qualities.'

'And a good fighter must be brave, of course.'

'That goes without saying.'

'Now, you'll never find courage without passion, in a horse or a dog or any other creature, will you? I mean, you must have noticed how indomitable and invincible passion is. It always takes passion in a mind to make it capable of facing any b situation without fear and without yielding, doesn't it?'

'Yes.'

'It's obvious what physical attributes a guardian must have, then.'

'Yes.'

'And the importance of a passionate temperament is also clear.'

'Again, yes.'

'Well, aren't people of this type bound to behave like brutes to one another and to the rest of their fellow citizens, Glaucon?' I asked.

'Yes, it certainly won't be easy to stop them,' he replied.

'However, they should really behave with civilized gentleness c towards their friends and neighbours and with ferocity towards their enemies. Otherwise, it won't be a question of waiting for others to come and destroy them: they'll do the job first themselves!'

'True,' he said.

'What shall we do, then?' I asked. 'Where are we going to find a character that is simultaneously gentle and high-spirited, } when gentleness and passion are opposites?'

'Yes, they do seem to be mutually exclusive.'

'And yet if a guardian is deprived of either of them he can't be a good guardian. We seem to be faced with an impasse; it turns out that a good guardian is an impossibility.' d

'I suppose so.'

I was stuck. I surveyed the course of the discussion and then said, 'We deserve to be stuck, Glaucon. We haven't kept to the analogy we proposed.'

'What do you mean?'

'We've overlooked the fact that the supposedly impossible type of character, which contains these opposite qualities, does exist.'

'Where?'

'In animals. You could find the combination primarily—'

e though not exclusively—in the animal we used as an analogy for our guardian. I mean, as I'm sure you know, there's no creature more gentle towards people it knows and recognizes, and no creature more savage towards strangers, than the best type of dog; and this is due to its innate character.

'Yes, I'm aware of that.'

'So it is a possibility, then,' I said. 'We're not looking for something unnatural in looking for a guardian of this type.'

'No, I suppose not.'

'Now, don't you think there's another quality which a would-be guardian needs as well? Don't you think that in addition to being naturally passionate he should also have a philosopher's love of knowledge?'

376a 'Why?' he asked. 'I don't see why.'

'Take dogs again,' I said. 'It's noticeable that they have a remarkable feature.'

'What?'

'They get fierce with strangers even before the slightest harm has been done them, and they welcome familiar people even if they've never been benefited by them. Has this never struck you as surprising?'

'I hadn't really thought about it until now,' he said. 'But yes, they do clearly do that.'

'But don't you think that this feature shows how naturally smart they are and how genuinely they love knowledge?'

'How?'

'Because,' I explained, 'their sole criterion for the friendliness or hostility of what they see is whether or not they have learnt to recognize it. Now, anything that relies on familiarity and unfamiliarity to define what is congenial and what is alien must prize learning, mustn't it?'

'Yes,' he said, 'inevitably.'

'Well,' I went on, 'isn't loving learning the same thing as loving knowledge?'

'Yes, it is,' he said.

'So why don't we stick our necks out and suggest that the same goes for a human being too—that if he's going to be gentle with his friends and acquaintances, he must be an innate lover of knowledge and learning?'

'All right,' he said.

'Anyone who is going to be a truly good guardian of our community, then, will have a philosopher's love of knowledge, and will be passionate, quick on his feet, and strong.'

'Absolutely,' he said.

'Yes,' he said, 'these words certainly are really unfamiliar and odd when used as the names of diseases.'*

'And I don't think they were used like that in Asclepius' time,' I said. 'The reason I think this is because when Eurypylos was wounded at Troy* and was treated with Pramnian wine which had lots of pearl barley and grated cheese stirred in it 406a (which is supposed to be an inflammatory brew), Asclepius' sons didn't tick the woman off for giving it him to drink, and didn't criticize Patroclus' treatment of him either.'

'Well, it *was* an odd drink for someone in his condition,' he remarked.

'Not if you bear in mind the fact that doctors didn't use this modern medical technique of pampering illness until Herodicus' time,' I said. 'Herodicus was a physical-education instructor who became chronically ill and combined the arts of physical exercise and medicine into a means of tormenting first b and foremost himself, and then subsequently a lot of other people.'

'How?' he asked.

'By prolonging his death,' I answered. 'Although he danced attendance on his illness, it was terminal, and there was no way he could cure himself, of course. He was so busy doctoring himself that for the rest of his life he had no time for anything else and suffered torments every time he deviated in the slightest from his usual regimen; thanks to his cleverness he reached old age, but had one foot constantly in the grave.'

'His expertise earned him a fine reward, then!' he said.

c 'A suitable one for someone who didn't realize that Asclepius' omission of this type of medical method in the art he invented and handed down to his successors was not due to his being ignorant and unaware of it,' I said. 'It was because he knew that every citizen of a well-regulated community is assigned a single job which he has to do, and that no one has the time to spend his life ill and doctoring himself. Ridiculously enough, it is noticeable today that while the working class conform to this principle, people who are rich and supposedly happy do not.'

'What do you mean?' he asked.

d 'If a joiner gets ill,' I explained, 'what he expects from his doctor is an emetic drug to drink to vomit up the illness, or an aperient for his bowels, or to resort to cautery or surgery to get

rid of the affliction. If he's prescribed a long course of treatment, and told to wrap his head in dressings and so on, then his immediate response is to say that he has no time to be ill, and that this way of life, which involves concentrating on his illness and neglecting the work he's been set, holds no rewards for him. Then he takes his leave of this type of doctor, returns to e his usual regimen, regains his health, and lives performing his proper function; alternatively, if his body isn't up to surviving, he gets rid of his troubles by dying.'

'That's the right way for an artisan to approach medical science, I think,' he said.

'Isn't that because he has a job to do,' I asked, 'and because 407a if he doesn't do it, his life is unrewarding?'

'Obviously,' he said.

'But a rich person, by definition, has no job assigned to him such that if he were forced to abstain from it his life would become intolerable.'

'He isn't said to, anyway.'

'If you say that, then you haven't heard what Phocylides said about how as soon as one's livelihood is secure, one should practise goodness.'

'I think one should do so even earlier,' he said.

'Let's not quarrel with him about this,' I said. 'Let's be our own teachers, and find out whether a rich person ought to practise what Phocylides says and whether life becomes intolerable for a rich person if he doesn't practise it. Let's see whether despite the fact that pampering an illness prevents a b person applying himself to joinery and all the other branches of expertise, it is no impediment to anyone carrying out Phocylides' injunction.'

'Of course it is,' he exclaimed. 'It's hard to think of any impediment greater than this excessive attention to the body, this attempt to improve on physical exercise. It's a nuisance in the context of estate-management, of military service, and of sedentary political office too.'

'Its worst aspect, however, is that it makes it difficult to study anything and to think and concentrate, since one is c constantly worried about headaches and dizziness, and blaming philosophy* for their occurrence. So if you're practising this philosophical type of goodness, then excessive attention to the

'As for thirst, then,' I said, 'don't you think it finds its 439a
essential place among relative things? And what it essentially is,
of course, is thirst...'

'... for drink,' he said. 'Yes, I agree.'

'So for drink of a particular kind there is also thirst of a
particular kind; but thirst in itself is not thirst for a lot of drink
or a little drink, or a beneficial drink or a harmful drink, or in
short for drink of any particular kind. Thirst in itself is essen-
tially just thirst for drink in itself.'*

'Absolutely.'

'When someone is thirsty, then, the only thing—in so far as
he is thirsty—that his mind wants is to drink. This is what it
longs for and strives for.'

'Clearly.'

'So imagine an occasion when something is making it resist
the pull of its thirst: isn't this bound to be a different part of it
from the thirsty part, which is impelling it towards drink as if it
were an animal? I mean, we've already agreed that the same
one thing cannot thanks to the same part of itself simultaneously
have opposite effects in the same context.'*

'No, it can't.'

'As an analogy, it isn't in my opinion right to say that an
archer's hands are simultaneously pushing the bow away and
pulling it closer. Strictly, one hand is pushing it away and the
other is pulling it close.'

'I quite agree,' he said.

'Now, do we know of cases where thirsty people are unwilling
to drink?'

'Certainly,' he said. 'It's a common occurrence.'

'What could be the explanation for these cases?' I asked. 'Don't we have to say that their mind contains a part which is telling them to drink, and a part which is telling them not to drink, and that this is a different part and overcomes the part which is telling them to drink?'

'I think so,' he said.

'And those occasions when thirst and so on are countermanded occur thanks to rationality, whereas the pulls and impulses occur thanks to afflictions and diseased states, don't they?'

'I suppose so.'

'So it wouldn't be irrational of us to expect that these are two separate parts,' I said, 'one of which we can describe as rational, and the other as irrational and desirous. The first is responsible for the mind's capacity to think rationally, and the second—which is an ally of certain satisfactions and pleasures*—for its capacity to feel lust, hunger, and thirst, and in general to be stirred by desire.'

'No, it wouldn't be irrational,' he said. 'This would be a perfectly reasonable view for us to hold.'

'Let's have these, then,' I said, 'as two distinct aspects of our minds.* What about the passionate part, however, which is responsible for the mind's capacity for passion? Is it a third part, or might it be interchangeable with one of the other two?'

'I suppose it might be the same as the desirous part,' he said.

'But there's a story I once heard which seems to me to be reliable,' I said, 'about how Leontius the son of Aglaeon was coming up from the Piraeus, outside the North Wall but close to it, when he saw some corpses with the public executioner standing near by.* On the one hand, he experienced the desire to see them, but at the same time he felt disgust and averted his gaze. For a while, he struggled and kept his hands over his eyes, but finally he was overcome by the desire; he opened his eyes wide, ran up to the corpses, and said, "There you are, you wretches! What a lovely sight! I hope you feel satisfied!"'

'Yes, I've heard the story too,' he said.

'Now, what it suggests,' I said, 'is that it's possible for anger to be at odds with the desires, as if they were different things.'

'Yes, it does,' he agreed.

'And that's far from being an isolated case, isn't it?' I asked. 'It's not at all uncommon to find a person's desires compelling him to go against his reason, and to see him cursing himself and venting his passion on the source of the compulsion within him. It's as if there were two warring factions, with passion fighting on the side of reason. But I'm sure you wouldn't claim that you had ever, in yourself or in anyone else, met a case of passion siding with the desires against the rational mind, when the rational mind prohibits resistance.'

'No, I certainly haven't,' he said.

'And what about when you feel you're in the wrong?' I asked. 'If someone who in your opinion has a right to do so retaliates by inflicting on you hunger and cold and so on, then isn't it the case that, in proportion to your goodness of character, you are incapable of getting angry at this treatment and your passion, as I say, has no inclination to get worked up against him?'

'True,' he said.

'But suppose you feel you're being wronged. Under these circumstances, your passion boils and rages, and fights for what you regard as right. Then hunger, cold, and other sufferings make you stand firm and conquer them,† and only success or death can stop it fighting the good fight, unless it is recalled by your rational mind and calmed down, as a dog is by a shepherd.'

'That's a very good simile,' he said. 'And in fact the part we've got the auxiliaries to play in our community is just like that of dogs, with their masters being the rulers, who are, as it were, the shepherds of the community.'

'Yes, you've got it,' I said. 'That's exactly what I mean. But there's something else here too, and I wonder if you've noticed it as well.'

'What is it?'

'That we're getting the opposite impression of the passionate part from what we did before. Previously, we were thinking that it was an aspect of the desirous part, but now that seems to be way off the mark, and we're saying that when there's mental conflict, it is far more likely to fight alongside reason.'

'Absolutely,' he said.

'Is it different from the rational part, then, or is it a version

of it, in which case there are two, not three, mental categories—the rational and the desirous? Or will the analogy with the community hold good? Three classes constituted the community—the one which works for a living, the auxiliaries, and the policy-makers—so is there in the mind as well a third part, the passionate part, which is an auxiliary of the rational part, unless it is corrupted by bad upbringing?

‘It must be a third part,’ he said.

‘Yes,’ I said, ‘if we find that it’s as distinct from the rational part as it is from the desirous part.’

‘But that’s easy,’ he said. ‘Just look at children. It’s evident that from the moment of their birth they have a copious supply of passion, but I’m not convinced that some of them ever acquire reason, and it takes quite a time for most of them to do so.’

‘Yes, you’ve certainly put that well,’ I said. ‘And animals provide further evidence of the truth of what you’re saying. Moreover, we can adduce the passage from Homer we quoted earlier: “He struck his breast and spoke sternly to his heart.”* Clearly, Homer here has one distinct part rebuking another distinct part—the part which has thought rationally about what is better and worse rebuking the part whose passion is irrationally becoming aroused.’

‘You’re absolutely right,’ he said.

‘It’s not been easy,’ I said, ‘but we’ve made it to the other shore: we’ve reached the reasonable conclusion that the constituent categories of a community and of any individual’s mind are identical in nature and number.’

‘Yes, they are.’

Since the three mental parts are precisely analogous to the three social classes of Plato’s community, Plato now analyses individual wisdom, courage, self-discipline, and morality in ways which precisely parallel his analysis of their civic manifestations. Morality, then, is an inner state and has little to do with external appearances. It is harmony between the parts of a person’s mind under the leadership of his or her intellect; immorality is anarchy and civil war between the parts. For some discussion of this analysis see pp. xxxix–xlii. The remaining question, whether morality or immorality is rewarding, is raised, but then deferred to Chapter II.

‘Isn’t it bound to follow that the manner and cause of a community’s and an individual’s wisdom are identical?’

‘Naturally.’

‘And that the manner and cause of a community’s and an individual’s courage are identical, and that the same goes for every other factor which contributes in both cases towards goodness?’

‘Inevitably.’

‘So no doubt, Glaucon, we’ll also be claiming that human morality is the same in kind as a community’s morality.’

‘Yes, that’s absolutely inevitable too.’

‘We can’t have forgotten, however, that a community’s morality consists in each of its three constituent classes doing its own job.’

‘No, I’m sure we haven’t,’ he said.

‘So we should impress upon our minds the idea that the same goes for human beings as well. Where each of the constituent parts of an individual does its own job, the individual will be moral and will do *his* own job.’

‘Yes, we certainly should do that,’ he said.

‘Since the rational part is wise and looks out for the whole of the mind, isn’t it right for it to rule, and for the passionate part to be its subordinate and its ally?’

‘Yes.’

‘Now—to repeat*—isn’t it the combination of culture and exercise which will make them attuned to each other? The two combined provide fine discussions and studies to stretch and educate the rational part, and music and rhythm to relax, calm, and soothe the passionate part.’

‘Absolutely.’

‘And once these two parts have received this education and have been trained and conditioned in their true work, then they are to be put in charge of the desirous part, which is the major constituent of an individual’s mind and is naturally insatiably greedy for things. So they have to watch over it and make sure that it doesn’t get so saturated with physical pleasures (as they are called) that in its bloated and strengthened state it stops doing its own job, and tries to dominate and rule over things which it is not equipped by its hereditary status to rule over, and so plunges the whole of everyone’s life into chaos.’

'Yes, indeed,' he said.

'Moreover, these two are perfect for guarding the entire mind and the body against external enemies, aren't they?' I asked. 'The rational part will do the planning, and the passionate part the fighting. The passionate part will obey the ruling part and employ its courage to carry out the plans.'

'True.'

'I imagine, then, that it is the passionate part of a person c which we are taking into consideration when we describe him as courageous: we're saying that neither pain nor pleasure stops his passionate part retaining the pronouncements of reason about what is and is not to be feared.'

'That's right,' he agreed.

'And the part we take into consideration when we call him wise is that little part—his internal ruler, which made these pronouncements—which knows what is advantageous for each of the three parts and for their joint unity.'

'Yes.'

'And don't we call him self-disciplined when there's concord and attunement between these same parts—that is, when the ruler and its two subjects unanimously agree on the necessity of d the rational part being the ruler and when they don't rebel against it?'

'Yes, that's exactly what self-discipline is, in both a community and an individual,' he said.

'And we're not changing our minds about the manner and cause of morality.'

'Absolutely not.'

'Well,' I said, 'have we blunted the edge of our notion of morality in any way? Do we have any grounds for thinking that our conclusions about its nature in a community don't apply in this context?'

'I don't think so,' he replied.

'If there's still any doubt in our minds,' I said, 'we can e eradicate it completely by checking our conclusion against everyday cases.'

'What cases?'

'Take this community of ours and a person who resembles it by virtue of both his nature and his upbringing, and suppose, for instance, we had to state whether, in our opinion, a person

of this type would steal money which had been deposited with him. Is it conceivable to you that anyone would think our man capable of this, rather than any other type of person?'

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'No one could think that,' he said.

'And he could have nothing to do with temple-robbery,* theft, and betrayal either of his personal friends or, on a public scale, of his country, could he?'

'No, he couldn't.'

'Moreover, nothing could induce him to break an oath or any other kind of agreement.'

'No, nothing.'

'And he's the last person you'd expect to find committing adultery, neglecting his parents, and failing to worship the gods.'

'Yes, of course,' he said.

'And isn't the reason for all of this the fact that each of his b constituent parts does its own job as ruler or subject?'

'Yes, that's the only reason.'

'Do you need to look any further for morality, then? Don't you think it can only be the capacity we've come up with, which enables both people and communities to be like this?'

'I for one certainly don't need to look any further,' he said.

'Our dream has finally come true, then. We said* we had a vague impression that we had probably—with the help of some god—stumbled across the origin and some kind of outline of c morality right at the start of our foundation of the community.'

'Absolutely.'

'It turns out, then, Glaucon—and this is why it was so useful†—that the idea that a person who has been equipped by nature to be a shoemaker or a joiner or whatever should make shoes or do joinery or whatever was a dreamt image of morality.'

'So it seems.'

'And we've found that in real life morality is the same kind of property, apparently, though not in the field of external activities. Its sphere is a person's inner activity: it is really a matter of oneself and the parts of oneself. Once he has stopped d his mental constituents doing any job which is not their own or intruding on one another's work;* once he has set his own house in order, which is what he really should be concerned

with; once he is his own ruler, and is well regulated, and has internal concord; once he has treated the three factors as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—low, high, and middle—and has created a harmony out of them and however many notes there may be in between; once he has bound all the factors together and made himself a perfect unity instead of a plurality, self-disciplined and internally attuned: then and only then does he act—if he acts—to acquire property or look after his body or play a role in government or do some private business. In the course of this activity, it is conduct which preserves and promotes this inner condition of his that he regards as moral and describes as fine,* and it is the knowledge which oversees this conduct that he regards as wisdom; however, it is any conduct which disperses this condition that he regards as immoral, and the thinking which oversees this conduct that he regards as stupidity.'

'You're absolutely right, Socrates,' he said.

'All right,' I said. 'I imagine that we'd regard as no more than the truth the claim that we had found out what it is to be a moral person and a moral community, and had discovered what morality actually is when it occurs in them.'

'Yes, we certainly would,' he said.

'Shall we make the claim, then?'

'Yes.'

'So be it,' I said. 'Next, I suppose, we should consider immorality.'

'Obviously.'

b 'Isn't it bound to involve these three factors being in conflict, intruding into one another's work, and exchanging roles, and one part rebelling against the mind as a whole in an improper attempt to usurp rulership—improper because its natural function is to be dominated unless it belongs to the ruling class?† Our position, I'm sure, will be that it is disruption and disorder of the three parts along these lines that constitutes not only immorality, but also indiscipline, cowardice, and stupidity—in a word, badness of any kind.'

'Precisely,' he said.

c 'Now that morality and immorality are in plain view, doesn't that mean that wrongdoing and immoral conduct, and right conduct too, are as well?' I asked.

'Why?'

'Because their role in the mind happens to be identical to that of healthy or unhealthy factors in the body,' I said.*

'In what sense?'

'Healthy factors engender health, and unhealthy ones illness.'

'Yes.'

'Well, doesn't moral behaviour engender morality, while immoral behaviour engenders immorality?'

'Inevitably.'

'But you create health by making the components of a body control and be controlled as nature intended, and you create disease by subverting this natural order.'

'Yes.'

'Doesn't it follow,' I said, 'that you create morality by making the components of a mind control and be controlled as nature intended, and immorality by subverting this natural order?'

'Absolutely,' he said.

'Goodness, then, is apparently a state of mental health, bloom, and vitality; badness is a state of mental sickness, deformity, and infirmity.'

'That's right.'

admit that they share these assumptions. Thrasymachus, however, is making Socratic claims about *immorality!*

- 348e *as others do*: for example, Polus in *Gorgias* 474c ff.
- 350d *red-faced Thrasymachus*: Socrates chooses to interpret Thrasymachus' flushing as due to humiliation in the argument rather than to the weather.
- 350d *the claim*: 349a; cf. 344c.
- 351d *better chance of success*: all that Socrates can demonstrate from this line of argument, strictly speaking, is that morality within the gang is necessary for effective action, not that they need be moral to anyone else.
- 352d *postponed*: from 348b.
- 353d *a function of the mind*: Socrates' question could also be translated 'And what about life?' The Greek word for mind, *psukhē*, is also the word for soul or life-force. Thus Plato's concept of mind is rather closer in broadness to the Buddhist than to the rationalist Western usage.
- 353e *we agreed*: not in so many words, but see 335c, 350d.
- 354c *unhappy or happy*: the claim that you have to know or understand *x* before you can know any of its attributes, or even behave in an *x* fashion, is familiar from other dialogues. But it does not preclude acting on one's beliefs about *x*, or having beliefs about *x*'s attributes; it is, rather, a call for more precise knowledge than belief can supply.

Chapter 2

- 358a *and for its consequences*: in fact Plato spends very little time on morality's consequences, which are introduced only at 612b, as a kind of appendix. The whole of the rest of the book is concerned with morality 'for its own sake' (which I take to include non-external, intrinsic concomitants such as pleasure and happiness). Plato argues that morality, properly understood, fulfils one's true nature and therefore brings true pleasure and happiness. The Kantian or deontological objection that Plato takes too much account of the consequences of morality, and the utilitarian objection that he takes too little account, are both red herrings: they want morality to be located respectively in the first and the third categories. Plato wants it in the second.
- 358b *they might have*: it follows from the previous note that there is no substantial conflict between Glaucon's challenge to Socrates to

- praise morality in isolation and Adeimantus' request (367d) for praise of morality's benefits: 'benefits' should be read as another term for what I have called 'intrinsic concomitants' (previous note). For a delicate scholarly interpretation of this near inconsistency see C. A. Kirwan, 'Glaucón's Challenge', *Phronesis*, 10 (1965), 162-73; see also N. P. White, 'The Classification of Goods in Plato's *Republic*', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 22 (1984), 393-421.
- 359b *and so on*: Glaucón's account resonates with the fifth-century distinction (associated particularly with the sophistic movement) between nature and convention, and the preference for the competitive values of natural law rather than the co-operative values of conventional law. The cynicism of claiming that obedience to law is involuntary, rather than being precisely what we choose in forming and remaining in a society, is familiar in modern times. Glaucón's views are interestingly discussed and developed by R. E. Allen, 'The Speech of Glaucón: On Contract and the Common Good', in S. Panagiotou (ed.), *Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle* (Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987), 51-62.
- 359d *an ancestor of Gyges of Lydia*: this is the reading of the manuscripts, and it is confirmed by Proclus (a Platonist of the fifth century AD). Curiously, though, in Herodotus (1. 8-13) we read how Gyges himself took power by seducing the king's wife; and later sources assign Plato's ring story to Gyges, not some ancestor. To add to the confusion, Plato himself calls it simply 'Gyges' ring' at 612b. It looks as though there were two versions of the story, involving either an ancestor of Gyges or Gyges himself. Others prefer to emend the text: see most recently S. R. Slings, 'Critical Notes on Plato's *Politeia* II', *Mnemosyne*, 42 (1989), 380-97.
- 359d *to a certain extent*: in Greek science of Plato's time and earlier water—and heavy rainfall in particular—was thought to cause earthquakes (see Aristotle, *Meteorologica* 365^a-369^a). The association was pre-scientific, however: Poseidon was the god of both water and earthquakes.
- 361b *aura of goodness*: see Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 592.
- 362b *deep furrow*: Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 593-4—i.e. the two lines which follow the one paraphrased above.
- 363a *Hesiod says*: *Works and Days* 232-4.
- 363b *similar claims*: *Odyssey* 19. 109-13, minus 110.

- 363c *Musaeus and his son*: Eumolpus, legendary founder of the Eleusinian mysteries, was on one genealogy the son of Musaeus, an equally legendary bard and colleague of Orpheus. In associating the Orphic and Eleusinian mysteries with this phrase, Plato means little more than just 'the mystics'.
- 363d *Others*: the Delphic oracle given to Glaucus in Herodotus 6. 86, and Hesiod, *Works and Days* 285, both offer this reward specifically for avoiding perjury. But the trans-generational effects of both virtue and vice were common themes in Greek thought.
- 363d *a kind of mud*: evidence elsewhere too suggests that this was a feature of Orphic eschatology.
- 363d *water in sieves*: one of several familiar punishments by futile and endlessly repeated action which we find in Greek myth. This one was also attributed especially to the daughters of Danaus, for murdering their husbands on their wedding-night.
- 364b *the other type of person*: one explanation of this phenomenon, which is often remarked on by the Greek poets (e.g. Solon 4. 9 Diehl), is that good men are being punished by the gods for some misdeed committed by an ancestor. Hence the sequence of thought of this paragraph.
- 364d *in the way of goodness*: Hesiod, *Works and Days* 287-9.
- 364d *he too said*: *Iliad* 9. 497-501, minus 498.
- 365a *initiations*: the Greek preserves a piece of Orphic etymologizing which is impossible to capture in meaningful English: 'initiation' (*teletē*) is associated with 'death' (*teleutē*).
- 365b *follow Pindar*: part of fragment 213 Bergk.
- 365c *Appearance overpowers reality*: Simonides, fragment 76 Bergk.
- 365c *Archilochus*: cf. fragments 86-9 Bergk.
- 365d *clubs and pressure-groups*: a feature of Athenian politics towards the end of the fifth century. Since these cliques often restricted membership to the rich, they were (in a political context) largely designed to look after the interests of a ruling oligarchy, or to plan for such a government.
- 365d *overpower them*: Adeimantus continues with his series of imaginary objections and responses.
- 365e *their lineage*: especially Hesiod, in his *Theogony*.
- 367a *to add*: Adeimantus, like Glaucón (358b), claims to be supporting Thrasymachus. But they also both disclaim sincere adherence to Thrasymachus' position. This will make them more amenable interlocutors for Socrates: see second note on 368a.

367b *as Glaucon suggested*: at 361b-c. Since the brothers' challenge is what Socrates responds to in the rest of the dialogue, it is worth noticing how peculiar it is, in a way. They have urged a strong distinction between being moral and appearing moral; they have asked Socrates to explain morality as an inner psychological state, with no reference to its consequences. But this distinction is rather artificial, one may think. Since morality (as commonly understood) involves the performance and non-performance of certain actions, and since actions take place in the external world, then how can morality sensibly be discussed without *any* reference to the external world? Plato wants to talk about the psychological disposition for morality, rather than what is commonly understood by morality. For these and similar reflections see L. W. Beals, 'On Appearing Just and Being Unjust', *Journal of Philosophy*, 49 (1952), 607-14.

Chapter 3

- 368a *eminent sire*: the battle of Megara referred to took place in 409; therefore, since the dialogue is probably set c.420 (see note on 327a), Plato is allowing himself a slight anachronism, in order to josh his brothers. It is not known who Glaucon's lover was, but the word is masculine: homosexuality was an accepted aspect of life in upper-class levels of Athenian society at the time. See K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London: Duckworth, 1978).
- 368a *better than morality*: it is always important for Socratic argumentation to identify a tension such as this one. What follows in the next few chapters can then be seen as an extended piece of Socratic dialectic: you are claiming *x* and you are claiming *y*; but they clash; which of *x* and *y* will you drop?
- 368d *really identical*: 'If you have some letters set out at a distance from you just barely too great for them to be read, and you then have larger versions of the same letters set out at the same distance, you will discover that you suddenly can actually *see* what the smaller letters are... I do not know the explanation of this phenomenon' (White, *Companion*, 83).
- 368e *individuals*: the assumption that use of a single term points to a significant single something is open to criticism, but underpins Socrates' search for definitions, and Plato's theory of types. See also 435b and, more abstractly, 475e-476a, 507b, and 596a.
- 369a *wouldn't it?*: speculations about the origins of society and civilization were familiar from the fifth century. See G. B. Kerferd,

- The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 12.
- 369c *in exchange*: the principle affirmed in Socrates' last three contributions—that societies are formed because we are not self-sufficient and we have needs which others can satisfy—is quite general and need not apply only to the materialist needs of the first community, but to any community at all (J. R. S. Wilson, 'The Basis of Plato's Society', *Philosophy*, 52 (1977), 313-20). The selfishness of the first community lies not in its adherence to this principle, but in its restriction to physical needs—to equivalence to the desirous part of the mind.
- 370b *in only one*: compare the function argument of 352d ff. The idea of a *natural* function or talent is opaque, but never argued for by Plato, despite its importance later in the book. The idea here is that each of us has a particular contribution we ought to make towards the welfare of the whole. The notion that each of us has only one talent, at which we must work exclusively, is restrictive and artificial; the notion that we would be content to spend our whole lives within this kind of limitation is absurd. However, as throughout the book, Plato is developing political ideas with an eye on psychological implications: the notion that there are discrete mental faculties is plausible.
- 372c *or war*: because, as Plato is shortly to suggest, the cause of war is overpopulation.
- 372c *savouries*: Greek fare usually consisted of bread (the two main types of which—barley-cakes and wheat-cakes—have just been mentioned) plus something to give it taste, such as cheese, olives, fish, vegetables, and more rarely meat. These were collectively called *opson*, translated here as 'savouries'.
- 372e *in communities*: since morality is going to be found, by the end of Chapter 6, to be the control of desire and passion by reason, Plato needs to imagine a community where desires tend towards excess and therefore need controlling.
- 372e *the one we've described*: in calling this 'community fit for pigs' an ideal, Plato is only partly being ironic. Of course, it cannot be his ideal, since it consists of people satisfying their selfish desires, and there is no room in it for the ideal of the philosopher king. On the other hand, it represents the limited ideal of restrained desire, rather than desires which have got out of hand (see 399e).
- 373b *hunters and imitators*: a list of 'imitators' follows; a short list of 'hunters' is given at *Euthydemus* 290b-c. This was clearly a

familiar classification of occupations in Platonic circles. Hunters 'discover what's already there' (*Euthydemus*); imitators presumably copy what's already there: both are therefore dependent on what's already there and are not original or essential.

- 373b *rhapsodes*: professional public reciters (by heart) of epic poems, especially Homer's.
- 373c *attendants*: here and elsewhere this is used to translate *paidagōgos*. The institution of the *paidagōgos* is, however, peculiarly Greek: he was a slave whose job it was to take children to and from school, and at the same time to supervise certain aspects of their moral education.
- 375e *love of knowledge*: notice how Plato assimilates the contrast between passion and gentleness to that between passion and a philosophic nature: the assimilation will be justified at the end of the argument (410c ff.). Plato also conflates the love of *knowing*, which we automatically associate with a philosopher, with a dog's love of *the known*: again, the conflation is justifiable in the light of the portrait of the philosopher at 474c ff. as a kind of omnivore of knowledge.
- 376c *strong*: 'This passage contains in tight bud much of what will unfold into flower as the talk proceeds, when its full import will appear. Briefly, it implies that the perfect guardian is the perfect man, for his character must be a delicate balance of what will later be described in detail, the three main types of impulse in the *psyche*' (Guthrie, 450).

Chapter 4

- 376c *bring these people up*: 'these people' clearly refers to the guardians (more strictly, auxiliaries: see note on 414b). They are the sole focus of the discussion from beginning to end: they are mentioned at 378c, 383b, 387c, 388a, 394e, 395b-c, 398e, 401c, 402c, 403e, 410e, and 415d. Whenever the educational programme of this chapter is referred back to (as at 423e), it is clear that the guardians are being talked about. It has worried some commentators that there is no provision for educating the lowest class. But it is not clear that even in Athens, despite widespread literacy, there was widespread schooling: schoolteachers charged for their services, so most poorer children received the rudiments of education at home, before being apprenticed to a craft, usually their father's (see 456d). So if Plato does not provide for their education, he is not being outrageously elitist. It is commonly argued that Plato must have

allowed the workers to be educated, as a means for the guardians to spot which ones deserved promotion to other classes (415a-c). It emerges, however, that promotion and demotion are only remote possibilities (see note on 459e). Other contexts, such as warfare, would enable the guardians to decide when they are called for.

- 376e *for the mind*: nowadays we think of education, especially school education, in terms of information and skills above all. But it is important to realize that the kind of education Plato is offering here, which is primarily education of character (though reading, writing, and elementary arithmetic (see 536d) would be covered by the *grammatistēs*, the teacher responsible for literature, as it was in Athens), is *all* the education a contemporary Athenian child could expect: he would be taught by a *grammatistēs*, a *kitharistēs* (music and lyric poetry), and a *paidotribēs* (physical exercise). Higher (i.e. intellectual) education of any kind was a novelty, introduced by the sophists.
- 376e *true and false*: or 'non-fiction and fiction'.
- 377c *reject the others*: on the issue of censorship, see pp. xxiii-xxxiii.
- 377c *form their bodies*: see *Laws* 789d-e for the view that massaging infants strengthens and shapes their bodies.
- 378a *Cronus' revenge on Uranus*: cf. Hesiod, *Theogony* 154-210. Uranus (Heaven) hated his children and kept them packed in their mother Earth's womb, to her agony. One of the children, Cronus, was persuaded by Earth to castrate his father when he came to have sex with Earth. Cronus then became lord of creation.
- 378a *his son did to him*: cf. Hesiod, *Theogony* 453 ff. Cronus wanted to remain king, so he swallowed all his children in case one of them might take over some day. Their mother Rhea, however, hid one of them away on Crete and gave Cronus a rock to swallow instead. In due course the child, Zeus, overthrew Cronus and established himself as king of the gods.
- 378a *no mere piglet*: a pig or piglet was a standard small sacrifice and was usual before initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries.
- 378c *gods and giants*: e.g. Zeus' war against the Titans, who were his father's siblings; or Athena killing her father, the giant Pallas, for trying to rape her; or all the gods (with Heracles' help) repelling the invasion of the giants sent by Earth to overthrow them. This last episode was prominent on a ceremonial robe presented to the statue of Athena every year during her main festival in Athens: this gives particular point to Plato's mention of 'pictures', though it was no doubt a common theme for all kinds of artists.

367b *as Glaucon suggested*: at 361b-c. Since the brothers' challenge is what Socrates responds to in the rest of the dialogue, it is worth noticing how peculiar it is, in a way. They have urged a strong distinction between being moral and appearing moral; they have asked Socrates to explain morality as an inner psychological state, with no reference to its consequences. But this distinction is rather artificial, one may think. Since morality (as commonly understood) involves the performance and non-performance of certain actions, and since actions take place in the external world, then how can morality sensibly be discussed without *any* reference to the external world? Plato wants to talk about the psychological disposition for morality, rather than what is commonly understood by morality. For these and similar reflections see L. W. Beals, 'On Appearing Just and Being Unjust', *Journal of Philosophy*, 49 (1952), 607-14.

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- 435d *is needed*: at 504b-e Plato says that this 'longer approach' would involve the full further-educational programme of Chapter 10. Then one could see the mind as it is, rather than when it is deformed by association with the body (611c ff.).
- 436a *Phoenicians and Egyptians*: the three ethnic groups correspond to the three parts of the mind we are about to meet: they are respectively passionate, rational, and desirous or mercenary (Egyptians and Phoenicians are so characterized presumably because they were the main traders in the Mediterranean). This is not a coincidence. Plato is suggesting that these three impulses can only occur in a community as a result of their presence in the inhabitants. This is what motivates him, ostensibly (436a), to look for the same impulses within individuals that he has found in his imaginary community, exemplified in the three classes.
- The claim that traders form trading communities (or that people who prefer democracy form democratic communities—544d-e) is not the stronger claim that *all* properties of communities are due *only* to the properties of its dominant members: it is no more than the claim that the interests of the dominant class in a society form that society's interests (see J. P. Maguire, 'The Individual and the Class in Plato's *Republic*', *Classical Journal*, 60 (1965), 145-50). The stronger claim would be inconsistent with the community-individual analogy of Chapter 3 (of which we have just been reminded at 434d-435b), because it would make the individual prior to the state, whereas the analogy claims that they are isomorphic. For a discussion, and an alternative view, see B. A. O. Williams, 'The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*', in E. N. Lee *et al.* (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument (Phronesis suppl. 1, 1973)*, 196-206.
- 436c *more than one of them*: strict application of this principle to the issue of dividing the mind into parts would result in infinite parts of the mind—as many as there are conflicting whims (defined by the objects they desire). Plato uses it, however, to point to conflicting sources and types of motivation, rather than conflicts between objects.
- 437a *invalidated*: Plato's hesitancy here may be due to the idea, expressed at 611b-612a, that the mind is essentially unitary. But the idea as expressed there does not contradict the doctrine of the tripartite mind, which also recurs in other dialogues.
- 439a *drink in itself*: Plato has to say that thirst is desire for just drink, rather than for good drink, because it is arguably reason which adds attributes like 'good', and Plato is trying to drive a wedge

- between desire and reason. Elsewhere, however (in Chapter 11 especially), it is clear that the desirous part is rational, at least in the sense that it can work out how to achieve its aims (553d), which it describes as good (562b). But this apparent inconsistency is easily resolved: Plato is using thirst here as a clear example, and is making it wholly unreasoning in order to drive as wide a wedge as possible between these two parts of the mind. The wedge, more fully spelt out, is that the other parts seek their own good, whereas only reason seeks what is good for the whole person (see also note on 443b, and pp. xxxvi-xxxix).
- 439b *in the same context*: so Plato is claiming that wanting to drink and not wanting to drink are opposites, such that it is impossible for the same part of my mind to have both desires at the same time. A sophisticated critic might claim that it is possible to want and not want the same thing under different descriptions: Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta, but does not want to marry his own mother. But Plato is talking about real, non-opaque objects of want, such as the drink on the table in front of me. And then, given the stringency of the conditions Plato sets up, it is hard to refute his argument. Apparent counter-examples turn out to violate the conditions in some respect: they are not 'wanting and not wanting' exactly the same thing, or at exactly the same time.
- 439d *don't they?*: the kind of situation Plato is thinking of is one where the rational mind knows it would be better for the body, because of the particular illness it has, not to receive liquid.
- 439d *certain satisfactions and pleasures*: but not all: some pleasures are purely rational (see 585a ff.; *Philebus* 51b-52b).
- 439e *aspects of our minds*: Plato has been criticized for making a redundant move. If what he is wanting to explain is how I desire *x*, then has he gained anything by referring us to a desirous part? One can still ask how the desirous part desires *x*, and so on *ad infinitum*, potentially. In fact, however, since 'I' am more complex than just 'I-desiring', then as long as the desirous part is simpler than the whole, it does serve an explanatory function. The three parts are not themselves significantly subdivisible: they have only specialist roles to play. Another problem: if I contain these three parts, in what sense am I still a single person (apart from the fact that I have a single body)? Moline suggests, with some plausibility (pp. 77-8), 'Plato's answer is suggested in his famous hydraulic simile at *Republic* 485d-e. The parts of the psyche are like channels or tubes into which the flow of a single stream is divided. The total flowage is constant, so that what goes into one tube or

channel is lost to the others (*Republic* 485d, borne out at 588e–589b). Both the *Republic* and the *Symposium* suggest that this single source is *eros*, a primordial energy source powering not simply the stereotypically erotic activities, but all human activities whatever. . . . The parts of the psyche are one psyche in that they are but different ways of channeling one finite, personal stream of energy or desire.'

- 439e *near by*: the North and South Walls (completed c.455) formed a secure corridor between Athens and her vital seaport. Leontius' route would have taken him past the ravine where criminals' corpses were thrown by the executioner.
- 441b *sternly to his heart*: *Odyssey* 20. 17, previously quoted at 390d.
- 441e *to repeat*: see 411e–412a. However, the idea that psychic harmony is a result of the educational programme is somewhat promissory, since it is clear enough that the education so far—which is education by habituation (522a)—has been concerned predominantly with the passionate part of the mind (see note on 414b), rather than the rational part, whose training is described in Chapter 10. But then it is not clear how the education of Chapter 10, which is rigorously intellectual, equips the rational mind to look after the mind as a whole, which is the claim made here and again at (for instance) 586d–587a and 589a–b (see also notes on 484d and 520e). There are in fact different objectives for the two educational programmes. The later one is for philosophers, to enable them to work with the 'types' (which are never mentioned in Chapter 4) and ultimately to understand goodness; the one in Chapter 4 is for auxiliaries, to inculcate true belief (see e.g. 429b ff.). Philosophers gain knowledge of absolute goodness; auxiliaries work with what is good for themselves (442c).
- 443a *temple-robbery*: see note on 344b.
- 443b *as ruler or subject*: the implication is that it is our desirous part which impels us towards immoral acts (see also 571a ff., and 590a–c), and that in a moral person reason controls these desires. As the book progresses, we learn more about why it is correct and important for reason to rule, and wrong for either of the other parts to rule. In the first place, the other parts use coercion to direct the mind towards their ends (442a–b, 554a) and the rest of the mind is enslaved to them (553d, 573d), whereas reason uses education (548b–c, 554d) and achieves a harmonious mind in which there is agreement that it should rule (441e–442a, 442c–d, 443d–e). In the second place, only reason aims at the good of the whole and of each of the parts, rather than selfishly and divisively aiming for its own good alone (442c, 586c–d, 590c–e).

- 443b *We said*: see 432b ff., probably.
- 443d *one another's work*: there is an important gap in Plato's theory here, which we can fill by reference to passages later in the book. Mere formal marshalling of the mental parts may be necessary, but is not also sufficient for morality: an immoral person could marshal his parts to be a more effective criminal. In other words, the mere leadership and resourcefulness of the rational mind does not guarantee morality. However, we will later find that reason also inherently loves truth and goodness, and tries to realize such qualities. It then becomes more plausible to suggest that the rule of reason is morality.
- 443e *describes as fine*: Plato seems to be asserting (and no more than that, unfortunately) that actions commonly recognized as moral promote the mental harmony he is describing as morality—that is, as well as offering an analysis of inner morality, he is also implying an analysis of 'moral' as applied to actions (see also 590a–c). Since we are given no argument for this, there are important grey areas. Do all conventionally moral actions promote mental harmony, even when those actions are the result of luck or habit (as at 619c–d)? Are all conventionally moral actions the result of mental harmony (either as a permanent state or as temporarily acquired)? See further pp. xxxix–xlii.
- 444c *I said*: contemporary theories of health stressed the notion of balance or harmony between the bodily elements or humours; so for a Greek of the time the analogy between this and Plato's account of morality would have seemed natural. Since health belongs in the second category of goods (357c), which Socrates was challenged to show morality belonged to as well, then the analogy with health is tacitly forcing the issue (445a–b). Another tacit move is buried in Plato's emphasis here on morality as natural: Glaucon had claimed that it repressed human nature (Chapter 2). On the pervasiveness of the analogy with health, and more of its consequences, see Kenny.

Chapter 7

- 449c *friends share*: see 424a.
- 450b *cause us*: it is a bit unfair of Plato to have Socrates pretend that he had the proposals of this chapter in mind all along: during the last chapter he presented morality against the background of a normal social system, which he now dispenses with altogether (in the case of the guardians).