Topic: Lycan's "inner sense" theory is that consciousness is internal monitoring. There are (at least) two ways of criticizing the theory. First, it might be argued that internal monitoring is not sufficient for consciousness. Or it might also be argued that internal monitoring is not necessary for consciousness. Write an essay that discusses one of these two lines of criticisms, and reply to these criticisms on Lycan's behalf.
This essay focuses on the line of criticism that "internal monitoring" is not sufficient for consciousness. I will list two objections and reply to them on Lycan's behalf.
The objection is from Georges Rey and it is reconstructed by Lycan in his paper[1]. It is argued that if mere internal monitoring is sufficient for consciousness, it creates absurdity and hence it cannot be sufficient:
Objection 1:
a) A system is conscious when its states are internally monitored.
b) Within a computer, numerous states are monitored by the computer.
c) Such states are conscious and hence the computer is conscious.
d) (c) is absurd.
e) Therefore, internal monitoring is not sufficient for consciousness.
If Lycan's theory is true, it entails that the computer must be conscious. The problem is that, as in (d), it certainly violates our use of the word "consciousness". Any sensible person would not call those machines conscious; certainly there is a difference between human beings and a computer. Internal monitoring cannot account for the consciousness of human beings. Therefore, it is not sufficient for consciousness.
Reply 1 Lycan would reply to objection 1 by saying that (d) does not entail conclusion (e). It might be true that it sounds absurd to grant computers consciousness; but it does not mean that it is impossible. Lycan suggests that consciousness is a matter of degree: there are different degrees of consciousness[2]. Our consciousness is "higher" than those of the computers. It is only because we can only think of the "consciousness" to which we can attend that we fail to imagine the consciousness of a computer[3]. Therefore, it does not rule out the possibility that the computers are indeed conscious to a very low degree. Lycan thinks that the degree of consciousness is measured by the quantity and efficiency of internal monitoring[4]. The better the internal monitoring contributes to functioning, the "fuller" the consciousness. He justifies his theory by giving an example of an extremely ill patient[5]. It is implausible to grant such patient either full consciousness or none at all; but most likely he is something in between, or "semi-conscious" as Lycan put it[6]. Therefore, internal monitoring is sufficient for consciousness (even of a very low degree).
The Objection 2 is a stronger version of the Objection 1. It argues that internal monitoring is not sufficient for "consciousness of human's degree".
Objection 2: f) Consciousness is a matter of degree and it is measured by quantity and efficiency of monitoring.
g) The national missile defence system monitors more and better for functioning than human's consciousness.
h) Such system is of a higher degree of consciousness than that of human.
i) (h) is absurd.
j) Therefore, internal monitoring is not sufficient for "consciousness of human's degree".
Using the criteria suggested by Lycan, such system certainly performs a higher level of internal monitoring than human beings do. If internal monitoring is the sole factor for consciousness, such system is fuller conscious than human beings. And it is absurd; internal monitoring is not sufficient for human's consciousness.
Lycan might say (h) is not absurd and accept it. He might suggest it is not problematic. Consciousness is all about internal monitoring and nothing more. What set us apart from machines is not consciousness, but other things such as emotion, aging, complicated psychology, etc.
He might reply that the system is worse than human beings that our internal monitoring is more complex than a national missile defence system. The vast "size" of the system is still no match for the sophisticated mind. But, I think it is hardly convincing until the "sophistication" is well explained.
He might admit that internal monitoring is not sufficient for "consciousness of human's degree". It is possible that "concept of the self" is needed to attain human's consciousness. And it is also possible that self-consciousness is fundamentally different from consciousness. After all, it does not hinder his thesis that internal monitoring is sufficient for consciousness. In order to go further than just normal consciousness, internal monitoring seems insufficient.
Conclusion In conclusion, Lycan uses the word consciousness in a special way and sometimes it defies commonsense, though Lycan can defend his thesis that internal monitoring is sufficient for consciousness. Yet, it is still an open question as to whether internal monitoring is sufficient for self- consciousness and our perception of human's consciousness. (733 words)
William G. Lycan (1997). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Eds.). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press, 755-771. Retrieved on 8 October, 2006, from web site: http://www.nd.edu/~lstubenb/Lycan.html
[1] William G. Lycan (1997). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Eds.). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press, 755-771. Retrieved on 8 October, 2006, from web site: http://www.nd.edu/~lstubenb/Lycan.html/ It is the objection raised by Georges Rey and reconstructed in Lycan's article. See p.765.
[2] Ibid. P.766
[3] Ibid. P.768
[4] Ibid. P.767
[5] Ibid. P.768
[6] Ibid. P.768