I aim at discussing the point that Lycan's theory is not sufficient for consciousness. There are examples which have the property of self- monitoring but are not related to conscious. Thus, they can show Lycan's theory is not sufficient for consciousness. The examples in this essay would mainly concentrate on the consciousness which we can introspect in order to have a clear understanding of consciousness.
I would start by an example of dreaming. When one is dreaming, he may do certain normal activities as in real life such as walking, running, eating, and so on. The mental states walking, running and eating are monitored by him in the dream. By definition (Lycan, 1997), they are all conscious because they are monitored by a higher mental state. However, we all know that what happened in a dream is not real and it seems strange that we are conscious while dreaming.
Lycan (1997) may reply the states themselves are conscious states since they are monitored by a higher mental state. Although it is strange to say that we are conscious of something which does not happen at all, Lycan (1997) says it is possible according to the inner sense theory. Therefore, we can attend to them and the states are conscious.
Using the same example, I would ask if we are self-conscious while we are dreaming. We do not know we are dreaming when we are in the dream, we can only discover that after we are waken up. In the other way, we actually do not know what we are doing in dream.
Lycan (1997) says the ability of thinking oneself as oneself means self- consciousness. Since we are not able to think why and what we are doing in the dream until we are not in the dream, we are not self-conscious in the dream. The alternative reply is that we are just barely-conscious in the dream. As described by Lycan (1997), consciousness is not just an on-off affair, it comes in degree. Although we do not know we are dreaming, we can still perform normal actions and monitor the lower mental state such as walking, running in the dream. As a result, we are barely conscious since we can monitor simple actions.
The next example is the mechanism which maintains the blood glucose level in our body. The liver controls the concentration of glucose in blood according to our body's need. By definition, the mechanism is a conscious state because it is monitored by a higher-level object, the liver. However, on the other hand, the mechanism has no relation to our feeling. No matter how hard we try, we cannot attend to the mechanism. In this case, the mechanism is not conscious with respect to our attention. This example shows that a state can be both conscious and unconscious at the same time. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept such a theory since it is contradictory.
It is easy to reply the unconsciousness with respect to our attention. Since we cannot attend to it, it is not conscious. For the consciousness with respect to liver, Lycan (1997) may reply that for a state to be conscious, it must be mental states. It means it is neither the physical state nor physiological state which makes the state itself conscious ( Lycan, 1997). It is the subject who attending to the state makes it becomes mental, and this can make it to be a conscious state ( Lycan, 1997). We cannot change the mechanism to something mental. Therefore, the mechanism is not conscious for both of the situation. However, the basis of mental states is only human's attention but other creature's attention is not included. The explanation does not exclude the probability that other creature has its own attention and they can make physical or physiological state to be its mental state. As a result, the mechanism can be conscious with respect to liver since we do not know what liver is 'thinking'.
To conclude, most of the consciousness have the feature of a higher level state monitoring a lower one. However, having the feature does not entail consciousness. Lycan would explain a state is needed to be mental for making it conscious, but he did not give good explanation of mental states. His reply cannot defend his theory against the objection of the mechanism of liver monitoring blood glucose level. (728 words)
Lycan, W. G. (1997). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. Retrieved September 22, 2006, from University of Notre Dame, Department of Philosophy Web site: http://www.nd.edu/~lstubenb/Lycan.html