In Lycan's Inner Sense theory, Lycan equates consciousness to the internal monitoring of first-order mental states. However, in his theory he postulates no other component necessary for consciousness and implies that internal monitoring alone is sufficient. I plan to raise objections to this implication by providing examples of situations where internal monitoring exists where consciousness does not.
My first objection concerns the human peripheral nervous system (PNS), the branch of the nervous system considered unconscious. It is responsible for the "fight or flight" response to stressful environmental conditions. Certainly internal monitoring exists in this system. Suppose a situation where you see a man concealing a gun on the airplane. You're visual system sees the weapon and, unbeknownst to you, activates your PNS to initiate the "fight or flight" response. The system notices that in your current state you are not prepared to survive such an encounter and therefore begins a series of adjustments: dilating your pupils, constricting blood vessels, etc; all of which are occurring unknowingly and without voluntary control. It would be inefficient if it were necessary for humans to be conscious and to actively cause the cascade of physiological events that occur when their lives are at risk.
Lycan's response might state that the PNS does exhibit some degree of consciousness but to a more deprived state compared to our central nervous system (CNS), which is responsible for awareness (Lycan 1997, 766). This response seems plausible since the PNS is more primitive in that its actions are preset and less flexible than those of the CNS. Furthermore, the complexity of the PNS monitors and wiring may also be impoverished. It is difficult to counter Lycan's matter-of-degree thesis because he believes that the presence of even a single monitor predicates the presence of "some" consciousness. Assuming the PNS is conscious, Lycan could state that it's possible for two consciences to exist in the same body (Lycan 1997, 765). Stephen White would support this claim by noting the difference between conscious and self-conscious and claiming the major difference between the consciences of the PNS and CNS is that the CNS is self- conscious (Lycan 1997, 765).
My second example of internal monitoring lacking consciousness considers our mental state during sleep. We are unconscious during sleep in that we are not attentive. However, our internal monitors are not turned off. Here I will prove that internal monitors are still functional during sleep. First of all, our sensory systems are still active. For instance if the temperature of the room gradually increases while you are asleep, temperature receptors in your skin still send signals to your brain which makes sure your body temperature is within bearable limits. Furthermore, the function of internal monitors during sleep is important for survival. There must exist a threshold for these sensors that, once exceeded, will send signals that wake you up and return you to a conscious state. For example, consider the different magnitudes of sensation when your pressure/vibration sensors detect a feather falling on your chest and when an earthquake occurs. During both encounters your nerves signal your brain, but it may not be until they are stimulated to the magnitude of the earthquake that they inform you to wake up.
Lycan can be expected to counter by stating that consciousness is not an on-off switch and that we do not go from fully conscious to unconscious when we sleep (Lycan 1997, 765). He would again argue for his matter-of- degree thesis and claim that when we sleep we are in a "lower level" of consciousness.
Lycan's Inner Sense theory, and more specifically, his matter-of- degree thesis seems to call more systems conscious than most people would like to accept. The PNS and sleeping state are generally viewed as systems that are unconscious, yet Lycan's theory makes them conscious to a low degree. It seems that any presentation of a system with internal monitors allows Lycan to respond with this argument and the only way to show that internal monitoring isn't sufficient for consciousness is by disproving the matter-of-degree thesis. However, it's difficult to disprove (as well as prove) the matter-of-degree thesis because humans have only experienced one form of consciousness and are presently unable to imagine what lower levels of consciousness are like (Lycan 1997, 767). To assuage these complications either the matter-of-degree thesis must be modified or disproved or we must adopt it and change our preconceptions of the phenomena argued above.
Lycan, William G. (1997). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. In Ned block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere: The Nature of Consciousness Philosophical Debates (pp. 755-771). MIT Press
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