Courses.StudyQuestionsHempelEmpiricistMeaning History
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# Which are the two main theses of "contemporary logical empiricism".
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# Which are the two main theses of "contemporary logical empiricism"?
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# With regard to Hempel's final version of the criterion of cognitive important (end of section 4), can we object to it by arguing that the thing-language might include the sentence "the absolute is perfect and water boils at 100C". In that case the sentence "the absolute is perfect" Canbe translated into the thing language and so becomes cognitively meaningful?
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# Consider this objection to Hempel's final version of the criterion of cognitive important (end of section 4). The thing-language might include the sentence "the absolute is perfect and water boils at 100C". In that case the sentence "the absolute is perfect" can be translated into the thing language and so becomes cognitively meaningful.
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# Reading this page on definitions: http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/meaning/def.php
Which kind of definition is the definition of the empiricist criterion of meaning supposed to be?
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# Reading this page on definitions: http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/meaning/def.php Which kind of definition is the definition of the empiricist criterion of meaning supposed to be?
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!Study questions on Hempel
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Carl G. Hempel. (1950). Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. 11 ''Rev. Intern. de Philos.'' 41, 41-63.
Study questions
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# Which are the two main theses of "contemporary logical empiricism".
# What is analytic knowledge?
# Whatever the "telefinalist hypothesis" is supposed to be, if it is a pseudo-hypotheses, is it true or false according to "contemporary logical empiricism"?
# What is an observation sentence?
# Give your own example that illustrates the problem in (2.1)(a).
# Can you use formal logic to formulate the problem mentioned in (2.3) similar to the presentation in (2.1)(b)?
# Hempel says in (3) "I think it is useless to continue the search for an adequate criterion of testability in terms of deductive relationships to observation sentences." Does he have any in-principle arguments supporting his pessimism?
# What is the difference between the material interpretation and the counterfactual interpretation of "if ... then ..."?
# The discussion about temperature concerns partial definitions. A normal (complete) definition provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term to be defined, e.g. "bachelor = unmarried man". What about partial definitions? Can you give an example of your own? How are these two types of definitions related to "empirical constructs"?
# End of section 5 : "In other words, the cognitive meaning of a statement in an empiricist language is reflected in the totality of its logical relationships to all other statements in that language and not to the observation sentences alone." What would happen to the meaning if some of the statements have been changed?
# With regard to Hempel's final version of the criterion of cognitive important (end of section 4), can we object to it by arguing that the thing-language might include the sentence "the absolute is perfect and water boils at 100C". In that case the sentence "the absolute is perfect" Canbe translated into the thing language and so becomes cognitively meaningful?
# Can you come up with your own examples of the use of subsidiary empirical hypotheses?
# Reading this page on definitions: http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/meaning/def.php
Which kind of definition is the definition of the empiricist criterion of meaning supposed to be?
# Identify the two purposes that the definition is supposed to serve. Is it possible that they might come into conflict?