Main.DualismSubstance History
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# The soul is an emergency backup system - normally functions as a memory backup, but activates when you die.
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# The soul is an emergency backup system - normally functions as a memory backup, but activates when you die. (see ConsciousnessBuddhismLevels)
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** [[http://joelau.wordpress.com/2008/02/20/controlling-computers-by-thoughts/|controlling computers by thoughts]]
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* PhineasGage
* BrainReading
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** PhineasGage
** BrainReading
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** [[http://joelau.wordpress.com/2008/02/20/controlling-computers-by-thoughts/|controlling computers by thoughts]]
** Gage
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* [Required] Chapter 7 on dualism. In Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=] [[http://www.hku.hk/local/philodep/readings/20problems-dualism.pdf|preprint version on HKU intranet]]
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* Chapter 7 on dualism. In Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=] [[http://www.hku.hk/local/philodep/readings/20problems-dualism.pdf|preprint version on HKU intranet]]
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* Chapter 7 on dualism. In Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=]
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* Chapter 7 on dualism. In Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=] [[http://www.hku.hk/local/philodep/readings/20problems-dualism.pdf|preprint version on HKU intranet]]
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!!!Inference to the best explanation
# We should choose the theory that provides the best explanation.
# Physicalism provides a better explanation of the mind than SD.
# Therefore we should accept SD.
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# Our best physical theories are non-deterministic, and so allows scope for non-physical causal interaction.
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!!!Inference to the best explanation
# We should choose the theory that provides the best explanation.
# Physicalism provides a better explanation of the mind than SD.
# Therefore we should not accept SD.
What needs to be explained:
* Causal interaction between the mind and the world.
* Localization of brain functions - language, emotions, memory, personality, visual perception, facial recognition ...
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# The mind as a distributed system - mental activities take place mainly in the brain, but some still occur in the soul.
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# The mind as a distributed system - mental activities take place mainly in the brain, but some still occur in the soul. (But which ones?)
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# Idealism - The "physical" world is a mental simulation, a product of consciousness.
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# Idealism - The "physical" world is a mental simulation, a product of consciousness (but whose?).
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# The soul as an emergency backup system - backup memories normally, and activated when you are dead.
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# The soul is an emergency backup system - normally functions as a memory backup, but activates when you die.
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* Section on dualism in chapter 2 of Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind'' MIT Press. Online preview at amazon. [[hkulib:b2586266~S6|HKU ebook]]
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* [required] Section on dualism in chapter 2 of Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind'' MIT Press. Online preview at amazon. [[hkulib:b2586266~S6|HKU ebook]]
* William Lycan (forthcoming) [[http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/Du.htm|"Giving dualism its due"]]
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* Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind'' MIT Press.
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* Section on dualism in chapter 2 of Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind'' MIT Press. Online preview at amazon. [[hkulib:b2586266~S6|HKU ebook]]
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!!!The argument from animal minds
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# Whether a creature has a soul is an all-or-nothing matter.
# Whether a creature has a mind is not an all-or-nothing matter.
# Having a mind is not the same as having a soul.
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* Chapter 7 on dualism. Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=]
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* Chapter 7 on dualism. In Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=]
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* Chapter 7 on dualism. Ming, Thomas; Wong, Ching Wa; Leung, Danny; Yung, Lawrence; Lau, Yen Fong (2006) ''Twenty Problems in Philosophy'' [=McGraw-hill=]
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!!Mutations of SD
What positions can a modern-day dualist retreat to?
# The mind as a distributed system - mental activities take place mainly in the brain, but some still occur in the soul.
# The soul as an emergency backup system - backup memories normally, and activated when you are dead.
# Idealism - The "physical" world is a mental simulation, a product of consciousness.
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Comments
* Is the mind really indivisible?
* "Descartes cannot distinguish in himself any parts" => "Descartes does not have any parts"?
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Compare: "Tomas is tall. Thomas is not tall. So Tomas is not the same as Thomas."
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* Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind"" MIT Press.
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* Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind'' MIT Press.
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!!Readings
* Paul M. Churchland (1984) ''Matter and consciousness : a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind"" MIT Press.
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Replies
# Parallelism - the mental and the physical do not interact.
# Explanatory failure does not imply falsity. Brute fact?
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Descartes, René. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, trans. In The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.196.
@@@When I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire.@@@
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Examples of X: testimonies of people seeing ghosts, communicating with the dead through a medium, out of body experiences
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Examples of X: testimonies of people seeing ghosts, communicating with the dead through a medium, [[Out-of-bodyExperiences|out of body experiences]]
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!Substance dualism (SD)
!!Arguments in support of SD
!!!The argument from doubt
# I cannot doubt that I exist.
# I can doubt that my body / brain exists.
# Therefore, I am distinct from my body / brain.
Intensional context : A predicate P(x) creates an intensional context iff it is possible that P(a) and P(b) have distinct truth-values even though a=b.
* Not intensional: "x is tall"
* Intensional: "Tom believes that x is tall"
!!!The argument from indivisibility
# My mind is not divisible.
# My body / brain is divisible.
# Therefore, my mind is distinct from the body / brain.
!!!Arguments based upon paranormal phenomena
# Phenomenon X has been observed.
# X is best explained by SD.
# Therefore, SD is true.
Examples of X: testimonies of people seeing ghosts, communicating with the dead through a medium, out of body experiences
!!Arguments against SD
!!!The argument from causal interaction
# The mind causally interacts with the physical world.
# SD cannot explain this causal interaction.
# Therefore SD is false.
!!!Inference to the best explanation
# We should choose the theory that provides the best explanation.
# Physicalism provides a better explanation of the mind than SD.
# Therefore we should accept SD.
!!!Empirical objections
* SD violates physical laws such as the conservation of energy. See Main/DualismEnergy.
[[Category/Mind]]