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* What about patients who suffer from Broca's aphasia?
to:
* What about patients who suffer from Broca's aphasia? The patient's speech and writing are affected but full understanding of spoken and written language is retained.
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@@@es... ah... Monday... er... Dad and Peter H... (his own name), and Dad.... er... hospital... and ah... Wednesday... Wednesday, nine o'clock... and oh... Thursday... ten o'clock, ah doctors... two... an' doctors... and er... teeth... yah [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broca%27s_area#cite_note-7|source]]@@@
to:
@@@Yes... ah... Monday... er... Dad and Peter H... (his own name), and Dad.... er... hospital... and ah... Wednesday... Wednesday, nine o'clock... and oh... Thursday... ten o'clock, ah doctors... two... an' doctors... and er... teeth... yah [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broca%27s_area#cite_note-7|source]]@@@
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to:
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!!Other issues
to:
** Presumably Ludlow would have to say that we think in interpreted [=LFs=] - logical forms supplemented by lexical entries and contextually supplied information.
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* The [[Sapir Whorf]] Hypothesis
to:
* What about patients who suffer from Broca's aphasia?
@@@es... ah... Monday... er... Dad and Peter H... (his own name), and Dad.... er... hospital... and ah... Wednesday... Wednesday, nine o'clock... and oh... Thursday... ten o'clock, ah doctors... two... an' doctors... and er... teeth... yah [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broca%27s_area#cite_note-7|source]]@@@
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to:
Changed lines 1-2 from:
to:
!Medium of thought
!!Readings
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to:
!!Different theories about the medium of thought
Added line 15:
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to:
!!Do we think in natural languages?
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!Is LOT a natural language?
!!Position #1 : LOT is a natural language
to:
!!!Is the language of thought (LOT) a natural language?
Position #1 : LOT is a natural language
Changed lines 37-38 from:
!!Position #2 : LOT is not a natural language?
to:
Position #2 : LOT is not a natural language?
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!Jackendoff's intermediate level theory of awareness
to:
!!Jackendoff's intermediate level theory of awareness
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Changed lines 57-58 from:
to:
Changed lines 80-92 from:
!Two alternative theories
to:
!!!An objection
# There is a difference in subjective feeling between having a thought with content, and simply reciting in our minds a nonsensical sentence that we do not understand.
# The difference in feeling shows that we are conscious of the content of a thought.
Discussion
* Maybe we have a feeling corresponding to ''having meaning''?
* What about cases where we are entertaining two thoughts with distinct contents?
** Feeling of congruence or dissimilarity?
!!Two alternative theories
Changed lines 94-95 from:
# We have a conceptual representation system (language of thought) which is distinct from LF (although it might have similar syntactic properties). (Jackendoff, Steven Pinker)
to:
# We have a conceptual representation system (LOT) which is distinct from LF (although it might have similar syntactic properties). (Jackendoff, Steven Pinker)
Changed lines 85-87 from:
Maybe we can modify theory 1 :
# We think in interpreted [=LFs=] - logical forms supplemented by lexical entries and contextually supplied information.
to:
* Presumably Ludlow would have to say that we think in interpreted [=LFs=] - logical forms supplemented by lexical entries and contextually supplied information.
Deleted lines 64-65:
* Binocular Rivalry - media:binocular-rivalry.jpg
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* A supporting piece of data (?) - Tip of the tongue phenomenon = thought without imagery.
to:
* A supporting piece of data? - Tip of the tongue phenomenon = thought without imagery.
** We are conscious of ''having a thought'', but we are not conscious of the ''contents'' of the thought.
** Cases where our thoughts are about our conscious experiences.
Changed lines 62-63 from:
to:
* Binocular Rivalry - media:binocular-rivalry.jpg
Changed lines 61-62 from:
to:
* A supporting piece of data (?) - Tip of the tongue phenomenon = thought without imagery.
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** What about ambiguous terms? "What a tart." Are lexical entries part of LF?
to:
** What about ambiguous terms? "What a tart." "Meet me at the bank." Are lexical entries part of LF?
Changed lines 87-88 from:
* The [[Sapir Whorf Hypothesis]]
to:
* The [[Sapir Whorf]] Hypothesis
Changed line 79 from:
** Are lexical entries part of LF?
to:
** What about ambiguous terms? "What a tart." Are lexical entries part of LF?
Changed line 78 from:
** What about [=LFs=] involving demonstratives? "That is not the same as that."
to:
** What about [=LFs=] involving demonstratives and pronouns? "That is not the same as that.", "He hit him."
Changed lines 87-88 from:
to:
* The [[Sapir Whorf Hypothesis]]
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* What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
to:
* What about [[animal cognition]]? Do animals have LF?
Deleted line 76:
* What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
Changed lines 83-84 from:
# We think in interpreted [=LFs=] - supplemented by lexical entries and contextually supplied information.
to:
# We think in interpreted [=LFs=] - logical forms supplemented by lexical entries and contextually supplied information.
!!Other issues
* What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
Changed lines 84-85 from:
# We think in a pragmatically interpreted [=LFs=], contextually enriched by information from other sources.
to:
# We think in interpreted [=LFs=] - supplemented by lexical entries and contextually supplied information.
Changed lines 80-82 from:
to:
** Are lexical entries part of LF?
@@@[-Lexical entry for a word = A database in the mind containing grammatical and semantic information about the word. e.g. cat : [countable noun] [a small mammal with four legs that purrs, usually with a tail and soft fur.] -]@@@
Changed lines 79-80 from:
** What about LFs involving demonstratives? "That is not the same as that."
to:
** What about [=LFs=] involving demonstratives? "That is not the same as that."
Changed lines 82-83 from:
# We think in a pragmatically interpreted LFs, contextually enriched by information from other sources.
to:
# We think in a pragmatically interpreted [=LFs=], contextually enriched by information from other sources.
Changed lines 72-79 from:
!Further discussion
* Are thoughts composed of LF representations?
**Yes according to Ludlow. No according to Jackendoff and Pinker.
** What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
** Thoughts can enter into reasoning and stand in logical relations to each other. What about LF?
** What about perceptual concepts?
to:
!Two alternative theories
# We think in LF. (Peter Ludlow)
# We have a conceptual representation system (language of thought) which is distinct from LF (although it might have similar syntactic properties). (Jackendoff, Steven Pinker)
!!Issues to discuss
* What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
* Can the same LF correspond to different thoughts?
** What about LFs involving demonstratives? "That is not the same as that."
Maybe we can modify theory 1 :
# We think in a pragmatically interpreted LFs, contextually enriched by information from other sources.
Changed lines 66-67 from:
* Syntactic ambiguity is resolved at the level of LF.
to:
* Although syntactic ambiguity is resolved at the level of LF, syntactic properties do not
seem to be part of the phenomenology of thinking.
Added lines 10-17:
!Medium of thought
Thoughts = certain types of mental representations. But what are they like?
# We think in pictorial representations (images, maps).
# We think in a natural language.
# We think in a language of thought that is not a natural language.
# We think in some other medium that is neither pictorial nor language-like.
Changed line 30 from:
* Pre-linguistic infants - If we grant that pre-linguistic infants (or for that matter, animals) can think, then it is likely that there is some thinking that does not rely on natural language. How can we learn a NL if there is no thinking without NL?
to:
* Pre-linguistic infants and animals - If they can think, then it is likely that there is some thinking that does not rely on natural language. How can we learn a NL if there is no thinking without NL?
Changed line 7 from:
* Carruthers (2002). The cognitive functions of language. ''In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6''. Online draft version at http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
to:
* Carruthers (2002). The cognitive functions of language. ''In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6''. Online draft version at http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
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* Fine-grained perceptual concepts - We can have thoughts about certain perceptual magnitudes which we do not know how to express in natural languages ("the color of the wall is *that* shade of blue"). Think of knowing by sight the colour or size of an object.
to:
* Fine-grained perceptual concepts - We can have thoughts about certain perceptual magnitudes which we do not know how to express in natural languages ("I can still remember ''that'' taste"). Think of knowing by sight the colour or size of an object.
Deleted lines 61-64:
!!Are thoughts composed of LF representations?
Yes according to Ludlow. No according to Jackendoff (& Pinker?).
Changed lines 64-67 from:
* What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
* Thoughts can enter into reasoning and stand in logical relations to each other. What about LF?
* What about perceptual concepts?
to:
* Are thoughts composed of LF representations?
**Yes according to Ludlow. No according to Jackendoff and Pinker.
** What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
** Thoughts can enter into reasoning and stand in logical relations to each other. What about LF?
** What about perceptual concepts?
Changed lines 5-6 from:
* Jackendoff, R. (2003). ''Foundations of Language'' Oxford University Press. isbn:0199264376
* Jackendoff, R. (1996). ''The Architecture of the Language Faculty'' MIT Press. isbn:0262600250
to:
* Jackendoff, R. (2003). ''Foundations of Language''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. isbn:0199264376
* Jackendoff, R. (1996). ''The Architecture of the Language Faculty''. Cambridge: MIT Press. isbn:0262600250
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Added lines 5-6:
* Jackendoff, R. (2003). ''Foundations of Language'' Oxford University Press. isbn:0199264376
* Jackendoff, R. (1996). ''The Architecture of the Language Faculty'' MIT Press. isbn:0262600250
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[-From Jackendoff's Foundations of Language isbn:0199264376-]
to:
[-From Jackendoff (2003)-]
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[-From Jackendoff's Architecture of Language Faculty isbn:0262600250-]
to:
[-From Jackendoff (1996)-]
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!!The intermediate level theory of awareness
Position #2 is more plausible. But we want a theory that can explain the introspective evidence.
to:
Position #2 is more plausible. But we also want a theory that can explain the introspective evidence.
!Jackendoff's intermediate level theory of awareness
* We are never directly conscious of our thoughts.
* But thoughts can be ''projected'' to conscious mental imagery.
* We seem to think in a language because thoughts can be projected to linguistic imagery.
!!PF and LF
Deleted line 56:
* Main implication - We are never directly conscious of our thoughts. We are aware of them only indirectly through their expression in various forms of imagery.
Changed lines 30-35 from:
- "We shall discuss violence on TV."
- Applies to imagery as well. Think about Wittgenstein's old man example in PI:
->I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. - How? Might it not have looked just the same had he been sliding downhill in the position?
to:
** "We shall discuss violence on TV."
** Applies to imagery as well. Think about Wittgenstein's old man example in ''Philosophical Investigations'':
@@@I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. - How? Might it not have looked just the same had he been sliding downhill in the position?@@@
Changed lines 3-7 from:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999). Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
* [Required] Section 14.2 of Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990) Consciousness and the Computational Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
* Carruthers (2002) The cognitive functions of language. In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
* Chapter 6 of Fodor (1998) Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. In In Critical Condition : Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
to:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999). ''Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language''. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
* [Required] Section 14.2 of Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990). ''Consciousness and the Computational Mind''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
* Carruthers (2002). The cognitive functions of language. ''In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6''. Online draft version at http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
* Chapter 6 of Fodor (1998) Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. In ''In Critical Condition : Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind''. Cambridge: MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
Deleted lines 51-52:
* In the case of deaf people this might take the form of motor imagery (sign language gestures).
* So we are never directly conscious of our thoughts but indirectly through their expression in various forms of imagery.
Deleted line 52:
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to:
* Main implication - We are never directly conscious of our thoughts. We are aware of them only indirectly through their expression in various forms of imagery.
* In the case of deaf people this might take the form of motor imagery (sign language gestures).
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!Natural language and LOT
to:
!Is LOT a natural language?
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||border=0 cellspacing=8
||||* Natural language - the languages we use in ordinary social communication and which are learnt naturally - Cantonese, Japanese, German, etc.||
||* As opposed to artificial languages in computer programming and logic - propositional calculus, predicate logic, HTML, BASIC, C++, etc.. ||media:perl-code.jpg||
to:
media:sanskrit.jpg
* Natural language - the languages we use in ordinary social communication and which are learnt naturally - Cantonese, Japanese, German, etc.
media:perl-code.jpg
* As opposed to artificial languages in computer programming and logic - propositional calculus, predicate logic, HTML, BASIC, C++, etc..
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to:
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||media:perl-code.jpg||* As opposed to artificial languages in computer programming and logic - propositional calculus, predicate logic, HTML, BASIC, C++, etc.. ||
to:
||* As opposed to artificial languages in computer programming and logic - propositional calculus, predicate logic, HTML, BASIC, C++, etc.. ||media:perl-code.jpg||
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media:sanskrit.jpg media:perl-code.jpg
* Natural language - the languages we use in ordinary social communication and which are learnt naturally - Cantonese, Japanese, German, etc.
to:
||border=0
||media:sanskrit.jpg||* Natural language - the languages we use in ordinary social communication and which are learnt naturally - Cantonese, Japanese, German, etc.||
||media:perl-code.jpg||* As opposed to artificial languages in computer programming and logic - propositional calculus, predicate logic, HTML, BASIC, C++, etc.. ||
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to:
media:sanskrit.jpg media:perl-code.jpg
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* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999) Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
* [Required] Section 14.2 of Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990) Consciousness and the Computational Mind Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
* Carruthers (2002) "The cognitive functions of language" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
* Chapter 6 "Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers" in Fodor (1998) In Critical Condition : Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind Representation and Mind MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com]
to:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999). Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
* [Required] Section 14.2 of Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990) Consciousness and the Computational Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
* Carruthers (2002) The cognitive functions of language. In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
* Chapter 6 of Fodor (1998) Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. In In Critical Condition : Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
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!!The intermediate level theory of awareness - How to reconcile position #2 with the introspective evidence
to:
!!The intermediate level theory of awareness
Position #2 is more plausible. But we want a theory that can explain the introspective evidence.
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!Position #1 : LOT is a natural language
to:
!Natural language and LOT
!!Position #1 : LOT is a natural language
Changed lines 19-20 from:
!Position #2 : LOT is not a natural language?
to:
!!Position #2 : LOT is not a natural language?
Changed lines 29-32 from:
I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. - How? Might it not have looked just the same had he been sliding downhill in the position?
!How to reconcile position #2 with the introspective evidence
to:
->I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. - How? Might it not have looked just the same had he been sliding downhill in the position?
!!The intermediate level theory of awareness - How to reconcile position #2 with the introspective evidence
Deleted lines 44-45:
!The intermediate level theory of awareness
Changed lines 51-52 from:
Are thoughts composed of LF representations?
to:
!!Are thoughts composed of LF representations?
Changed lines 55-56 from:
to:
Changed line 45 from:
* In the case of deaf people this might take the form of sign language imagery.
to:
* In the case of deaf people this might take the form of motor imagery (sign language gestures).
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[-From Jackendoff's Foundations of Language-]
to:
[-From Jackendoff's Foundations of Language isbn:0199264376-]
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to:
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media:jackendoff.jpg [-From Jackendoff's Foundations of Language-]
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media:jackendoff.jpg
[-From Jackendoff's Foundations of Language-]
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media:intermediatelevel.jpg [-From Jackendoff's Architecture of Language Faculty isbn:0262600250-]
to:
media:intermediatelevel.jpg
[-From Jackendoff's Architecture of Language Faculty isbn:0262600250-]
Changed lines 33-36 from:
example (Jackendoff Foundations of Language)
* Conscious thinking is associated with mental imagery. We have visual imagery, motor imagery, etc. The experience of talking to oneself is the result of our thoughts being expressed in verbal imagery, the contents of the imagery being determined by the appropriate PF. (See Jackendoff)
to:
media:jackendoff.jpg [-From Jackendoff's Foundations of Language-]
* Conscious thinking is associated with mental imagery. We have visual imagery, motor imagery, etc. The experience of talking to oneself is the result of our thoughts being expressed in verbal imagery, the contents of the imagery being determined by the appropriate PF.
media:intermediatelevel.jpg [-From Jackendoff's Architecture of Language Faculty isbn:0262600250-]
Changed lines 3-4 from:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999) Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
* Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990) Consciousness and the Computational Mind Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com]
to:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999) Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
* [Required] Section 14.2 of Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990) Consciousness and the Computational Mind Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from NetLibrary]
Changed line 3 from:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999) Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com]
to:
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999) Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com, also intranet:ludlow-lot.htm]
Added lines 1-51:
!Readings
* [Required] Appendix P1 of Ludlow, Peter (1999) Semantics, Tense, and Time : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com]
* Jackendoff, Ray S. (1990) Consciousness and the Computational Mind Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com]
* Carruthers (2002) "The cognitive functions of language" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25:6. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
* Chapter 6 "Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers" in Fodor (1998) In Critical Condition : Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind Representation and Mind MIT Press. [accessible from netlibrary.com]
!Natural languages
* Natural language - the languages we use in ordinary social communication and which are learnt naturally - Cantonese, Japanese, German, etc.
* As opposed to artificial languages in computer programming and logic - propositional calculus, predicate logic, HTML, BASIC, C++, etc..
!Position #1 : LOT is a natural language
* Introspective evidence - Subjectively, the experience of thinking is like internal speech, couched in natural languages. We think that the question "which language do you think in?" makes sense.
!Position #2 : LOT is not a natural language?
* Mental images - Many people claim that they sometimes think with mental images. It is true that mental images might still be made up of some kind of mental language, but probably not any natural language.
* Fine-grained perceptual concepts - We can have thoughts about certain perceptual magnitudes which we do not know how to express in natural languages ("the color of the wall is *that* shade of blue"). Think of knowing by sight the colour or size of an object.
* Pre-linguistic infants - If we grant that pre-linguistic infants (or for that matter, animals) can think, then it is likely that there is some thinking that does not rely on natural language. How can we learn a NL if there is no thinking without NL?
* Ambiguity - Sentences can be (syntactically, lexically, referentially) ambiguous when the thoughts expressed by the sentences are not.
- "We shall discuss violence on TV."
- Applies to imagery as well. Think about Wittgenstein's old man example in PI:
I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. - How? Might it not have looked just the same had he been sliding downhill in the position?
!How to reconcile position #2 with the introspective evidence
* Our innate language faculty ("I-language" according to Chomsky) contains two and only two syntactic levels of representation, Logical Form (LF) and Phonological Form (PF). LF interfaces with the conceptual- intention system. PF interfaces with the articulatory-perceptual system (speech).
example (Jackendoff Foundations of Language)
* Conscious thinking is associated with mental imagery. We have visual imagery, motor imagery, etc. The experience of talking to oneself is the result of our thoughts being expressed in verbal imagery, the contents of the imagery being determined by the appropriate PF. (See Jackendoff)
!The intermediate level theory of awareness
* In the case of deaf people this might take the form of sign language imagery.
* So we are never directly conscious of our thoughts but indirectly through their expression in various forms of imagery.
* Syntactic ambiguity is resolved at the level of LF.
Are thoughts composed of LF representations?
Yes according to Ludlow. No according to Jackendoff (& Pinker?).
Relevant issues :
* What about animal cognition? Do animals have LF?
* Thoughts can enter into reasoning and stand in logical relations to each other. What about LF?
* What about perceptual concepts?