Main.LiarStatements History
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Changed lines 5-6 from:
* Goldstein, L. (1992). 'This statement is not true' is not true. ''Analysis''. 52.1, 1-5.
to:
* Goldstein, L. (1992). 'This statement is not true' is not true. ''Analysis''. 52.1, 1-5. [[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638%28199201%2952%3A1%3C1%3A%27SINTI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 |link]]
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# Samesaying principle - if A says the same thing as B, and A is true (false), then B is also true (false).
to:
# Samesaying principle - if A says the same thing as B, and A is true (false), then B is also true (false). Rejecting the samesaying principle makes it unclear how truth is to be explained. (The truth of a statement depends on what is said and the facts.)
Changed lines 5-6 from:
* Goldstein, L. (1992). 'This statement is not true' is not true. ''Analysis;;. 52.1, 1-5.
to:
* Goldstein, L. (1992). 'This statement is not true' is not true. ''Analysis''. 52.1, 1-5.
Added lines 3-6:
!!Readings
* Goldstein, L. (1992). 'This statement is not true' is not true. ''Analysis;;. 52.1, 1-5.
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!!Comments
* Why is it that one token expresses a statement whereas the other one does not?
* One would have thought that a statement is expressed if the speaker succeeds in referring to something and succeeds in attributing a property to that which he has referred to.
* A property divides things into two classes : those that have the property and others that do not. Likewise one might divide things in the world into those that express statements (group A) and those that do not (group B).
* So in uttering L5 it seems plausible to say that one does refer to something (L5) and is attributing a property to it.
* Samesaying principle - if A says the same thing as B, and A is true (false), then B is also true (false).
* Is it possible to use the proper grounding requirement to deal with this objection?
to:
!!Three objections - L5 does express a statement
# Why is it that one token expresses a statement whereas the other one does not? Normal explanations of expressive failures do not seem to apply here, e.g. referential failure.
# A subject-predicate sentence ''Fa'' expresses a statement if ''a'' ("L5") succeeds in denoting an object and ''F'' ("does not express a true statement") expresses a property. This applies to L5.
# Samesaying principle - if A says the same thing as B, and A is true (false), then B is also true (false).
Changed line 16 from:
* The same sentence might express a statement in one context but fails to do so in another context.
to:
* The same sentence might express a statement in one context but fails to do so in another context. "That man is a pervert."
Added lines 19-20:
@@@(L6) Sentence L5 does not express a true statement.@@@
Changed lines 27-28 from:
* Is it possible to use the proper grounding requirement to deal with this objection?
to:
* Samesaying principle - if A says the same thing as B, and A is true (false), then B is also true (false).
* Is it possible to use the proper grounding requirement to deal with this objection?
Changed lines 1-2 from:
!Sentences and statements
to:
!Liar - Sentences and statements
Changed line 11 from:
@@@(L3) Sentence L3 expresses a false statement.@@@
to:
@@@(L4) Sentence L4 expresses a false statement.@@@
Changed lines 13-14 from:
@@@(L4) Sentence L4 does not express a true statement.@@@
to:
@@@(L5) Sentence L5 does not express a true statement.@@@
Changed lines 17-19 from:
* So one might argue that although L4 does not express a true statement, one can report that fact using the very same sentence type and succeeds in making a true statement.
But why should this be accepted?
* No argument is given as to why one token expresses a statement whereas the other does not.
to:
* So one might argue that although L5 does not express a true statement, one can report that fact using the very same sentence type and succeeds in making a true statement.
!!Comments
* Why is it that one token expresses a statement whereas the other one does not?
Changed line 24 from:
* So in uttering L4 it seems plausible to say that one does refer to something (L4) and is attributing a property to it.
to:
* So in uttering L5 it seems plausible to say that one does refer to something (L5) and is attributing a property to it.
Changed line 4 from:
to:
Changed lines 8-9 from:
* The Liar paradox has to be reformulated :
to:
!!Modified versions of the Liar sentences
Changed lines 15-23 from:
* Why is this supposed to help?
** The same sentence might express a statement in one context but fails to do so in another context.
** So one might argue that although L4 does not express a true statement, one can report that fact using the very same sentence type and succeeds in making a true statement.
* But why should this be accepted?
** No argument is given as to why one token expresses a statement whereas the other does not.
** One would have thought that a statement is expressed if the speaker succeeds in referring to something and succeeds in attributing a property to that which he has referred to.
** A property divides things into two classes : those that have the property and others that do not. Likewise one might divide things in the world into those that express statements (group A) and those that do not (group B).
** So in uttering L4 it seems plausible to say that one does refer to something (L4) and is attributing a property to it.
** Is it possible to use the proper grounding requirement to deal with this objection?
to:
Why is this supposed to help?
* The same sentence might express a statement in one context but fails to do so in another context.
* So one might argue that although L4 does not express a true statement, one can report that fact using the very same sentence type and succeeds in making a true statement.
But why should this be accepted?
* No argument is given as to why one token expresses a statement whereas the other does not.
* One would have thought that a statement is expressed if the speaker succeeds in referring to something and succeeds in attributing a property to that which he has referred to.
* A property divides things into two classes : those that have the property and others that do not. Likewise one might divide things in the world into those that express statements (group A) and those that do not (group B).
* So in uttering L4 it seems plausible to say that one does refer to something (L4) and is attributing a property to it.
* Is it possible to use the proper grounding requirement to deal with this objection?
Changed lines 4-5 from:
@@@哲學提高學生的分析能力//Philosophy improves the analytical abilities of students.@@@
to:
@@@哲學提高學生的分析能力//
Philosophy improves the analytical abilities of students.@@@
Changed lines 3-5 from:
* Drawing a distinction between sentences and statements / propositions.
to:
!!Distinguishing between between sentences and statements / propositions.
@@@哲學提高學生的分析能力//Philosophy improves the analytical abilities of students.@@@
Changed lines 1-8 from:
* Issue : Is it possible to solve the liar paradox by :
* Drawing a distinction between sentences and
statements / propositions.
* Taking statements and not sentences as truth-bearers.
to:
!Sentences and statements
* Drawing a distinction between sentences and statements / propositions.
* Taking statements and not sentences as truth-bearers.
Changed lines 7-11 from:
* L3 : "Sentence L3 expresses a false statement."
* L4 : "Sentence L4 does not express a true statement."
(The corresponding version of the strengthened liar)
to:
@@@(L3) Sentence L3 expresses a false statement.@@@
The corresponding version of the strengthened liar:
@@@(L4) Sentence L4 does not express a true statement.@@@
Changed lines 12-20 from:
* The same sentence might express a statement in one
context but fails to do so in another
* So one might argue that although L4 does not
express a true statement, one can report that fact
using the very same sentence type and succeeds in
making a true
to:
** The same sentence might express a statement in one context but fails to do so in another context.
** So one might argue that although L4 does not express a true statement, one can report that fact using the very same sentence type and succeeds in making a true statement.
Changed lines 15-35 from:
* No argument is given as to why one token expresses
a statement whereas the other does
* One would have thought that a statement is
expressed if the speaker succeeds in referring to
something and succeeds in attributing a property
that which he has referred to.
* A property divides things into two classes :
have the property and others that do
not. Likewise one might divide things in the
world into those that express statements (group
A) and those that do not (group B).
* So in uttering L4 it seems plausible to say that
one does refer to something (L4) and is
attributing a property to it.
* Is it possible to use the proper grounding
requirement to deal with this objection?
to:
** No argument is given as to why one token expresses a statement whereas the other does not.
** One would have thought that a statement is expressed if the speaker succeeds in referring to something and succeeds in attributing a property to that which he has referred to.
** A property divides things into two classes : those that have the property and others that do not. Likewise one might divide things in the world into those that express statements (group A) and those that do not (group B).
** So in uttering L4 it seems plausible to say that one does refer to something (L4) and is attributing a property to it.
** Is it possible to use the proper grounding requirement to deal with this objection?
Added lines 1-47:
* Issue : Is it possible to solve the liar paradox by :
* Drawing a distinction between sentences and
statements / propositions.
* Taking statements and not sentences as truth-bearers.
* The Liar paradox has to be reformulated :
* L3 : "Sentence L3 expresses a false statement."
* L4 : "Sentence L4 does not express a true statement."
(The corresponding version of the strengthened liar)
* Why is this supposed to help?
* The same sentence might express a statement in one
context but fails to do so in another context.
* So one might argue that although L4 does not
express a true statement, one can report that fact
using the very same sentence type and succeeds in
making a true statement.
* But why should this be accepted?
* No argument is given as to why one token expresses
a statement whereas the other does not.
* One would have thought that a statement is
expressed if the speaker succeeds in referring to
something and succeeds in attributing a property to
that which he has referred to.
* A property divides things into two classes :
those that have the property and others that do
not. Likewise one might divide things in the
world into those that express statements (group
A) and those that do not (group B).
* So in uttering L4 it seems plausible to say that
one does refer to something (L4) and is
attributing a property to it.
* Is it possible to use the proper grounding
requirement to deal with this objection?