Main.NagelOnSplitBrain History

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November 27, 2015, at 08:56 AM by 61.238.62.121 -
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** How can the existence of phenomenology be a matter of degree? Either there is a point of view or not.
November 27, 2015, at 08:55 AM by 61.238.62.121 -
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* Followup question - why does the existence of the self require coherence?
to:
* Followup questions
** Why
does the existence of the self require coherence?
** A coherence theory of the self seems to rule out the possibility of a single self with multiple identities.

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* A coherence theory of the self seems to rule out the possibility of a single self adopting multiple identities.
to:
November 27, 2015, at 08:54 AM by 61.238.62.121 -
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youtube:ZMLzP1VCANo

November 27, 2015, at 08:53 AM by 61.238.62.121 -
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* Gazzaniga (2005) Forty-five years of split-brain research and still going strong. Nat Rev Neurosci. 6(8):653-9.
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* Gazzaniga (2005) [[http://people.psych.ucsb.edu/gazzaniga/PDF/Forty-five%20years%20of%20split-brain%20research%20and%20still%20going%20strong.pdf|Forty-five years of split-brain research and still going strong]]. Nat Rev Neurosci. 6(8):653-9.
November 27, 2015, at 08:53 AM by 61.238.62.121 -
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* Gazzaniga (2005) Forty-five years of split-brain research and still going strong. Nat Rev Neurosci. 6(8):653-9.
November 26, 2015, at 08:37 PM by 61.238.62.121 -
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* [[http://vvi.virage.com/cgi-bin/visearch?user=pbs-saf&template=template.html&query=brain&category=0&viKeyword=brain&submit=Search&page=19|Scientific American video]]
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November 26, 2015, at 08:00 PM by 61.238.62.121 -
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* [Required] Thomas Nagel (1991). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. See chapter 11. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. [[http://tinyurl.com/5tx7sy|Google bk preview]] intranet:nagel71.pdf
to:
* Thomas Nagel (1991). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. See chapter 11. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. [[http://tinyurl.com/5tx7sy|Google bk preview]] intranet:nagel71.pdf
April 04, 2011, at 10:54 AM by 1.64.174.170 -
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* Tim Bayne (2008). The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6).
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# Both sides make one mind with dissociated contents. (Charles E. Marks?)
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# Both sides make one mind with dissociated contents. (Bayne?)
April 04, 2011, at 10:49 AM by 1.64.174.170 -
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# Both sides make one mind with dissociated contents. (Charles E. Marks)
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# Both sides make one mind with dissociated contents. (Charles E. Marks?)
April 04, 2011, at 10:39 AM by 1.64.174.170 -
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* Charles E. Marks (1981) ''Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind'' MIT Press.
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# Both sides make one mind with dissociated contents.
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# Both sides make one mind with dissociated contents. (Charles E. Marks)
November 13, 2008, at 09:10 AM by 147.8.231.178 -
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* The word "pen" is shown to the left visual field, and "knife" to the right. Patient says that he sees only "knife", but right hand writes down "pen" slowly.
to:
* The word "pen" is shown to the left visual field, and "knife" to the right. Patient says that he sees only "knife", but left hand writes down "pen" slowly.
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* Followup question - why does the existence of the self require coherence?
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* [Required] Thomas Nagel (1991). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. See chapter 11. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. [[http://tinyurl.com/5tx7sy|Google bk preview]]
to:
* [Required] Thomas Nagel (1991). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. See chapter 11. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. [[http://tinyurl.com/5tx7sy|Google bk preview]] intranet:nagel71.pdf
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* A coherence theory of the self seems to rule the possibility of a single self adopting multiple identities.
to:
* A coherence theory of the self seems to rule out the possibility of a single self adopting multiple identities.
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* Is it possible to understand DID as failure to integrate behavioral dispositions and autobiographical memory? A coherence theory of the self seems to rule this out by definition.
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* DID might be a condition where a single subject fails to integrate behavioral dispositions and autobiographical memory.
*
A coherence theory of the self seems to rule the possibility of a single self adopting multiple identities.
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!Some possible interpretations
to:
!!Some possible interpretations
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!!Case #1

* Argument:
Subject denies denies contents of right hemisphere.
to:
!!Comments on these possibilities

!!!Case #1

* Argument for
: Subject denies denies contents of right hemisphere.
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!!Case #2

Sperry: "two freewills in one cranial vault".
Roland Puccetti (1973) - Normal people also have
two minds!
 
* Argument against: general remarkable integration with no obvious difference in normal situations.

!!Case #3

* If there is just one subject, how should we describe
the beliefs and experiences of the subject? What is it like for the subject to perceive incompatible visual stimuli?

!!Case
#4

* Nagel
to:
!!!Case #2

* Argument for: each hemisphere seems to have its own sphere of control.
** Sperry: "
two freewills in one cranial vault".
** Roland Puccetti (1973) - Normal people also have two minds
!
* Argument against: In normal situations, there is remarkable integration between the disconnected hemispheres and the subject is no different than a normal person. The two hemispheres do not operate independently of each other.

!!!Case
#3

* Argument against: If there is just one subject, how should we describe the beliefs and experiences of the subject? What is it like for the subject to perceive incompatible visual stimuli?

!!!Case #4

* According to
Nagel
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!!Nagel's conclusions
to:
!!!Nagel's conclusions
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!!A self as emergent coherence

* Vertical and horizontal
coherence, narrative centre
* A matter of degree
* Dennett: The self is like the centre of gravity of an object
.
to:
!!Reply to Nagel - A self as emergent coherence

* The existence of a self depends on the coherence of mental states.
** Vertical coherence - higher-level goals, action intentions, bodily movements
** horizontal coherence - consistency of beliefs, coordination of actions
* Coherence is a matter of degree.
** Whether the self exists is a matter of degree
.
Deleted lines 39-41:
Sperry: "two freewills in one cranial vault".
Roland Puccetti (1973) - Normal people also have two minds!

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Sperry: "two freewills in one cranial vault".
Roland Puccetti (1973) - Normal people also have two minds!
August 27, 2008, at 10:02 PM by 219.78.21.219 -
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* Not clear how incompatible perceptions can belong to one mind - what is it like for the subject to perceive incompatible visual stimuli?
to:
* If there is just one subject, how should we describe the beliefs and experiences of the subject? What is it like for the subject to perceive incompatible visual stimuli?
August 27, 2008, at 10:00 PM by 219.78.21.219 -
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!!Case 3

* Argument against: (a) integration, (b) not clear how incompatible perceptions can belong to one mind - what is it like for the subject to perceive incompatible visual stimuli?
to:
!!Case #3

* Not clear how incompatible perceptions can belong to one mind - what is it like for the subject to perceive incompatible visual stimuli?
August 25, 2008, at 10:41 PM by 219.78.21.219 -
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** Carries information about touch around the head and the neck.
** No problem in verbalizing the pointing to the location of tactile stimulus on the neck or the face.
August 25, 2008, at 10:38 PM by 219.78.21.219 -
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* The two hemispheres are still linked by sub-cortical pathways.
** When pornography is shown only to the right hemisphere, the subject reports feeling differently, and one patient says "That's quite a machine you have got there."

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* The two hemispheres are still linked by sub-cortical pathways.
** When pornography is shown only to the right hemisphere, the subject reports feeling differently, and one patient says "That's quite a machine you have got there."