Main.NussbaumOnEmotions History
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** Disembodied agents with emotions?
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** Disembodied agents with emotions? "And the Lord's anger was kindled against Israel, and he made them wander in the wilderness for forty years." Numbers 32:13
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** Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion?
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** Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion? e.g. shivering from the cold, muscle spasm.
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# The packaging problem - Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion?
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# The packaging problem
** Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion?
** It does not seem to be the case that each type of emotion corresponds to a distinctive type of bodily feeling.
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* Typical objections
# Some emotions do not have objects, e.g. depression
# Emotional responses to imagination do not involve judgments, e.g. fiction
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!!!Typical objections
# Emotions should be studied empirically, not through conceptual analysis.
# Some emotions do not have objects, e.g. depression.
# Emotional responses to imagination do not involve judgments, e.g. fiction.
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* Distinguish between real judgments and near-judgments. (See [[visual illusions]])
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* Distinguish between real judgments and near-judgments. (See [[visual illusions]])
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## Disembodied agents with emotions?
## Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions.
### Reisenzein (1983)
### Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004). Effects of spinal cord injuries on the subjective component of emotions. ''Cognition and emotion'', 18, 2, 281-287. Abstract:
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** Disembodied agents with emotions?
** Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions.
*** Reisenzein (1983)
*** Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004). Effects of spinal cord injuries on the subjective component of emotions. ''Cognition and emotion'', 18, 2, 281-287. Abstract:
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# The packaging problem - Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion?
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** Disembodied agents with emotions?
** The packaging problem - Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion?
** Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions.
*** Reisenzein (1983)
*** Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004). Effects of spinal cord injuries on the subjective component of emotions. ''Cognition and emotion'', 18, 2, 281-287. Abstract:
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## Disembodied agents with emotions?
## Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions.
### Reisenzein (1983)
### Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004). Effects of spinal cord injuries on the subjective component of emotions. ''Cognition and emotion'', 18, 2, 281-287. Abstract:
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* Objection #1 - Seems to leave out the intentional elements of emotions. When I am angry and my heart beats, I am not angry at my heart.
* Objection #2 - Are bodily feelings necessary?
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@@@Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth.@@@
Objections
# Seems to leave out the intentional elements of emotions. When I am angry and my heart beats, I am not angry at my heart.
# Are bodily feelings necessary?
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* [Required] Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press. [[http://www.hku.hk/local/philodep/nussbaum-emotions.pdf|HKU intranet]]
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* [Required] Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press. [[http://www.hku.hk/local/philodep/readings/nussbaum-emotions.pdf|HKU intranet]]
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* [Required] Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
* Lau (2007). [[http://www.hku.hk/philodep/joelau/phil/nussbaum-preprint.pdf|The nature of emotions]] - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* [Required] Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press. [[http://www.hku.hk/local/philodep/nussbaum-emotions.pdf|HKU intranet]]
* [Required] Lau (2007). [[http://www.hku.hk/philodep/joelau/phil/nussbaum-preprint.pdf|The nature of emotions]] - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* Lau (2007). The nature of emotions - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* Lau (2007). [[http://www.hku.hk/philodep/joelau/phil/nussbaum-preprint.pdf|The nature of emotions]] - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* Lau (forthcoming). The nature of emotions - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* Lau (2007). The nature of emotions - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* More fine grained analysis of the cognitive states. (non-transparent object, oscillating judgments ...)
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* More fine grained analysis of the cognitive states. (non-transparent object, oscillating judgments ... e.g. [[http://www.dogfeathers.com/java/necker.html|Necker cube]])
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# [[http://www.amazon.com/When-Elephants-Weep-Emotional-Animals/dp/0385314280|Animals have emotions]], but are they capable of making judgments of the required kind?
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# Emotional responses to imagination do not involve judgments, e.g. fiction
# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments, e.g. grief, fear.
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# Emotional responses to imagination do not involve judgments, e.g. fiction
# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments, e.g. grief, fear.
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* Nussbaum's theory: Emotions are ''personal'' judgments of ''value''.
** judgment of value - that something is good / bad.
** personal judgment - these are judgments about values that I care about.
@@@I do not go about fearing any and every catastrophe anywhere in the world, nor (so it seems) do I fear any and every catastrophe that I know to be bad in important ways. What inspires fear is the thought of damages impending that cut to the heart of my own cherished relationships and projects.@@@
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* Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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* [Required] Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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* James Lange theory - emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. See EmotiomsJames.
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* James Lange theory - emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. See [[EmotionsJames|extract]].
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* James Lange theory - emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. James:
@@@My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, and angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequnce is incorrect ... and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.@@@
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* James Lange theory - emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. See EmotiomsJames.
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[-http://www.thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/i/i_04/i_04_cr/i_04_cr_peu/i_04_cr_peu.htm-]
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[-Image linked from http://www.thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/i/i_04/i_04_cr/i_04_cr_peu/i_04_cr_peu.htm-]
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[-http://www.thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/i/i_04/i_04_cr/i_04_cr_peu/i_04_cr_peu.htm-]
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* More fine grained analysis of the cognitive states.
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* More fine grained analysis of the cognitive states. (non-transparent object, oscillating judgments ...)
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments, e.g. gGrief, fear.
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments, e.g. grief, fear.
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments.
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments, e.g. gGrief, fear.
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* Distinguish between emotions and emotional feelings.
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments. ([[visual illusions]])
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments.
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* Distinguish between real judgments and near-judgments.
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* Distinguish between real judgments and near-judgments. (See [[visual illusions]])
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* Emotions are propositional attitudes - judgements, beliefs, cognitive evaluations.
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* Emotions are cognitive states / propositional attitudes - judgements, beliefs, cognitive evaluations.
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments.
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# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments. ([[visual illusions]])
!!!Replies to these objections
* More fine grained analysis of the cognitive states.
* Distinguish between higher and lower cognitive states.
* Distinguish between real judgments and near-judgments.
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** Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions. (Reisenzein (1983), Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004))
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** Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions.
*** Reisenzein (1983)
*** Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004). Effects of spinal cord injuries on the subjective component of emotions. ''Cognition and emotion'', 18, 2, 281-287. Abstract:
@@@Responses to a structured interview by 19 patients with spinal cord injuries (SCI) (7 women and 12 men) concerning their past (pre-injury) and present emotions were analysed and compared with responses by 19 SCI-free controls matched for sex, age, and education. In addition, subjects assessed the valence and arousal of 10 pleasant, 10 neutral, and 10 unpleasant pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System. The results indicate that there is no decrease in emotional experience among individuals with SCI compared with those without. For all the emotional scales (joy, love, sentimentalism, positive emotions as a whole, fear, anger, sadness, and negative emotions as a whole) the SCI group always showed either no change or an increase; this increase was significantly higher in SCI than in control subjects for sadness.@@@
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# Emotions without objects, e.g. depression
# Reflex emotions, e.g. fear
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# Some emotions do not have objects, e.g. depression
# Reflex emotions do not involve higher cognitive states, e.g. fear
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# Emotional responses to imagination, e.g. fiction
# Evaluations independent of feelings
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# Emotional responses to imagination do not involve judgments, e.g. fiction
# The intensity of emotions can be divorced from our evaluative judgments.
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* Objection #1 - Seems to leave out the intentional elements of emotions.
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* Objection #1 - Seems to leave out the intentional elements of emotions. When I am angry and my heart beats, I am not angry at my heart.
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* Lau (forthcoming). The nature of emotions - Comments on Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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* Lau (forthcoming). The nature of emotions - Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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** Fear trigger→thalamus→amygdala→sub-cortical structures→autonomic, hormonal responses→motor changes
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* Implications for cognitivism - Emotions are never conscious. What we are conscious of are emotional feelings.
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* Implications for cognitivism - Emotions are never conscious. What we are conscious of are emotional feelings, which are different.
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* Implications for cognitivism - We should draw a distinction between emotions and emotional feelings.
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* Implications for cognitivism - Emotions are never conscious. What we are conscious of are emotional feelings.
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* Jackendoff: Thoughts are not conscious, but we are indirectly aware of them through mental imagery. See [[LOTAndNaturalLanguage]].
* Implications for cognitivism - We should draw a distinction between emotions and emotional feelings.
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!!Occurrent thoughts and mental imagery
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* Objection #1 - Seems to leave out the intentional elements of emotions.
* Objection #2 - Are bodily feelings necessary?
** Disembodied agents with emotions?
** The packaging problem - Which package of feelings constitutes an emotion?
** Paralysis after spinal-cord injury does not diminish emotions. (Reisenzein (1983), Cobos P, Sanchez M, Perez N, et al. (2004))
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* Lau (forthcoming). The nature of emotions - Comments on Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
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!!Issues
* What are emotions? How are they related to thoughts and rationality?
* Are there universal emotions, or are emotions culturally specific?
* What is the best way of studying emotions? Philosophical / sociological / psychological approaches.
!!Emotions as feelings
* James Lange theory - emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. James:
@@@My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, and angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequnce is incorrect ... and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.@@@
!!Cognitivist theories
* Emotions are propositional attitudes - judgements, beliefs, cognitive evaluations.
* Typical objections
# Emotions without objects, e.g. depression
# Reflex emotions, e.g. fear
# Emotional responses to imagination, e.g. fiction
# Evaluations independent of feelings
[[Category.Mind]]
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* Martha Nussbaum. (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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* Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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* Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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* Martha Nussbaum. (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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!Readings
* Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.