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How does IBE actually work? How do we identify the "best" explanation?
Further discussion
@@@I start from the premise that ordinary inductive inference, ordinary inference from the observed to the unobserved is, although invalid, nevertheless a rational form of inference. I add that not merely is the case that induction is rational, but it is a necessary truth that it is so...We need an explanation of the rationality of induction. My own explanation is this. The sort of observational evidence which we have makes it rational to postulate laws which underlie, and are in some sense distinct from, the observational evidence. The inference to the laws is a case of inference to the best explanation...the inferred laws entail conditional prediction about the unobserved (if it is an F, then it will be a G)... Suppose however, that laws of nature are conceived of as mere Humean uniformities. Then, I contend, this explanation of the necessity of the rationality of induction must fail. On that view, the law is nothing more than the conjunction of its observed manifestations with its unobserved manifestations. Such a law is not an explanation of the observations. ... To tie up the argument it is necessary to ask why inference to the best explanation is rational. But that I think is analytic in a fairly obvious way. If making such an inference is not rational, what is? It may still be asked why the inference to underlying laws is the best explanation of our inductive evidence. The only answer to that is to challenge the questioner to find a better explanation. (p53) @@@
@I start from the premise that ordinary inductive inference, ordinary inference from the observed to the unobserved is, although invalid, nevertheless a rational form of inference. I add that not merely is the case that induction is rational, but it is a necessary truth that it is so...We need an explanation of the rationality of induction. My own explanation is this. The sort of observational evidence which we have makes it rational to postulate laws which underlie, and are in some sense distinct from, the observational evidence. The inference to the laws is a case of inference to the best explanation. ..the inferred laws entail conditional prediction about the unobserved (if it is an F, then it will be a G) ... To tie up the argument it is necessary to ask why inference to the best explanation is rational. But that I think is analytic in a fairly obvious way. If making such an inference is not rational, what is? It may still be asked why the inference to underlying laws is the best explanation of our inductive evidence. The only answer to that is to challenge the questioner to find a better explanation. (p53)
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@@@I start from the premise that ordinary inductive inference, ordinary inference from the observed to the unobserved is, although invalid, nevertheless a rational form of inference. I add that not merely is the case that induction is rational, but it is a necessary truth that it is so...We need an explanation of the rationality of induction. My own explanation is this. The sort of observational evidence which we have makes it rational to postulate laws which underlie, and are in some sense distinct from, the observational evidence. The inference to the laws is a case of inference to the best explanation...the inferred laws entail conditional prediction about the unobserved (if it is an F, then it will be a G)...Suppose however, that laws of nature are conceived of as mere Humean uniformities. Then, I contend, this explanation of the necessity of the rationality of induction must fail. On that view, the law is nothing more than the conjunction of its observed manifestations with its unobserved manifestations. Such a law is not an explanation of the observations. .....To tie up the argument it is necessary to ask why inference to the best explanation is rational. But that I think is analytic in a fairly obvious way. If making such an inference is not rational, what is? It may still be asked why the inference to underlying laws is the best explanation of our inductive evidence. The only answer to that is to challenge the questioner to find a better explanation. (p53)@@@
@@@I start from the premise that ordinary inductive inference, ordinary inference from the observed to the unobserved is, although invalid, nevertheless a rational form of inference. I add that not merely is the case that induction is rational, but it is a necessary truth that it is so...We need an explanation of the rationality of induction. My own explanation is this. The sort of observational evidence which we have makes it rational to postulate laws which underlie, and are in some sense distinct from, the observational evidence. The inference to the laws is a case of inference to the best explanation...the inferred laws entail conditional prediction about the unobserved (if it is an F, then it will be a G)... Suppose however, that laws of nature are conceived of as mere Humean uniformities. Then, I contend, this explanation of the necessity of the rationality of induction must fail. On that view, the law is nothing more than the conjunction of its observed manifestations with its unobserved manifestations. Such a law is not an explanation of the observations. ... To tie up the argument it is necessary to ask why inference to the best explanation is rational. But that I think is analytic in a fairly obvious way. If making such an inference is not rational, what is? It may still be asked why the inference to underlying laws is the best explanation of our inductive evidence. The only answer to that is to challenge the questioner to find a better explanation. (p53) @@@
Armstrong What is a Law of Nature
@@@I start from the premise that ordinary inductive inference, ordinary inference from the observed to the unobserved is, although invalid, nevertheless a rational form of inference. I add that not merely is the case that induction is rational, but it is a necessary truth that it is so...We need an explanation of the rationality of induction. My own explanation is this. The sort of observational evidence which we have makes it rational to postulate laws which underlie, and are in some sense distinct from, the observational evidence. The inference to the laws is a case of inference to the best explanation...the inferred laws entail conditional prediction about the unobserved (if it is an F, then it will be a G)...Suppose however, that laws of nature are conceived of as mere Humean uniformities. Then, I contend, this explanation of the necessity of the rationality of induction must fail. On that view, the law is nothing more than the conjunction of its observed manifestations with its unobserved manifestations. Such a law is not an explanation of the observations. .....To tie up the argument it is necessary to ask why inference to the best explanation is rational. But that I think is analytic in a fairly obvious way. If making such an inference is not rational, what is? It may still be asked why the inference to underlying laws is the best explanation of our inductive evidence. The only answer to that is to challenge the questioner to find a better explanation. (p53)@@@
Issues
The argument
A pragmatic justification of induction - that induction is the best method for achieving our aim.
The argument for (2).
Reichenbach
Reichenbach (see http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mjr318/btk08/BTK%2014%20-%20Reichenbach.pdf)
Compare - Doctor : "If any treatment can cure this cancer, this operation also can."
Compare - Doctor : "If any treatment can cure this cancer, this operation also can."
Compare: Doctor "If any treatment can cure this cancer, this operation also can."
Compare - Doctor : "If any treatment can cure this cancer, this operation also can."
Problems
Reichenbach
The argument
Compare: Doctor "If any treatment can cure this cancer, this operation also can."