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Topics in Analytic Philosophy

Skepticism

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Crispin Wright (2002)

“(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E Moore
and John McDowell”

Recent

Real

Raw

Goal

Moore's "proof" is not acceptable

Wright's goal: Explain why

Further goal: show that skepticism looms...

Warrant

warranted belief

reasonable belief

rational belief

justified belief

Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the number of correct responses. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses in all cases. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses in all cases.

Wright's version of Moore's argument

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

Wright's version of Moore's argument

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

Assume: 3 follows from 2

Assume: know that 3 follows from 2

What's wrong with Moore's argument

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

You can't gain warrant for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.

What's wrong with Moore's argument

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

You can't gain good reasons for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.

What's wrong with Moore's argument

Moore's argument does not transmit warrant from premise to conclusion.

A valid argument

2 There is an external world.

3 There is an external world.

A question begging argument

2 There is an external world.

3 There is an external world.

You can't gain good reasons for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.

This argument does not transmit warrant.

Closure

If you know p , and
you know q follows from p , then
you know q .

Different kinds of closure

If you know p , and
you know q follows from p , then
you know q .

If you have warrant to believe p , and
you know q follows from p ,
then you have warrant to believe q .

A valid argument

2 There is an external world.

3 There is an external world.

If you have warrant to believe 2, and
you know 3 follows from 2, then
you have warrant to believe 3.

Closure vs Transmission

If you have warrant to believe p , and you know q follows from p , then you have warrant to believe q . (Closure)

If you know q follows from p , then you can gain warrant for q by reasoning from p to q . (Transmission)

What's wrong with Moore's argument

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

You can't gain warrant for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.



What's wrong with Moore's argument

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

You can't gain warrant for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.

WHY?

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- 1 I am having an experience as of a hand.
 - 2 Here's a hand.
 - 3 There is an external world.

1 I am having an experience as of a hand.

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

1 doesn't warrant 2, unless 1 already warrants 3.

So I can't gain warrant for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.

A skeptical consequence

1 I am having an experience as of a hand.

2 Here's a hand.

3 There is an external world.

I can't gain warrant for 3 by reasoning from 2 to 3.

But any warrant for 2 comes from my experience.

Any warrant for 3 comes from reasoning from 2
(or something like 2).

So I can never gain warrant for 3!

Wright's answer

I have unearned warrant to believe that there is an external world.