Reading

[Required] Section 1, chapter 2 of Churchland, Paul M. (1999) Matter and Consciousness : A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. [Accessible from www.netlibrary.com]

Background

Many if not most cognitive scientists accept some version of physicalism or materialism.
Physicalism is the view that everything in the universe is physical in nature - physical objects or physical energy, or whatever our best theories in physics tell us.
There are two versions of dualism - substance dualism and property dualism.
Physicalism is incompatible with substance dualism (SD) - the view that the mind is a non-physical object.
The relationship between physicalism and property dualism (PD) is more complicated. PD says that the objects in the universe possess both physical and non-physical properties.
In our discussion we shall focus on SD - the more popular version that most people have in mind when they think about dualism.
What's important : distinguish between unjustified religious dogma and superstition on one hand, and SD as empirical hypothesis on the other.

Arguments from imagination / doubt http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/courses/intro/notes/leibniz2.html
1. I cannot doubt that my mind has this property P.
2. I can doubt that my brain has this property P.
3. So my mind is not identical to my brain.
Arguments from brute intuitions
1. It does not seem to be true that the mind has property P (e.g. depends on brain processes).
2. Therefore the mind does not have property P.

1. It does not seem to be true that computers can have property P (e.g. be creative).
2. The mind has property P.
3. Therefore the mind cannot be explained computationally.
Arguments from paranormal phenomena.
Inference to the best explanation :
1. We observe phenomenon X.
2. The theory that best explains X is T.
3. Therefore, T is more likely to be true of X than any other theory.

The argument from conservation of energy.
The chief drawback of dualism is its failure to account adequately for mental causation. ... how can the nonphysical give rise to the physical without violating the laws of the conservation of mass, of energy and of momentum? (Jerry Fodor (1994) "The Mind-Body Problem" in Warner and Szubka (eds.) The Mind-Body Problem Blackwell. )

If Descartes is right that a nonphysical mind can cause the body to move, for example, we decide to go to a concert and go, then physical energy must increase in and around our body, since we get up and go to the concert. In order, however, for physical energy to increase in any system, it has to have been transferred from some other physical system. But the mind, according to Descartes, is not a physical system and therefore it does not have any energy to transfer. The mind cannot account for the fact that our body ends up at the concert. (Owen Flanagan (1991) The Science of the Mind, 2nd edition, MIT Press, p. 21.)
The argument from causal interaction between the mind and the body. (see Churchland)
The continuity argument : http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/courses/intro/notes/continuity.html
The argument from over-determination : http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/courses/intro/notes/causalargs.html