cept of the approach is speaker’s meaning; and the approach includes a semantical component that characterizes semantical matters (which would include matters about denotation) in terms of conventions governing the performance of communicative acts. Each of these three aspects of the approach could prove to be of value in the problem situation I have sketched. A question therefore worth exploring is whether it lays the basis for an account of referential intentions. Such an account may help us articulate the extent to which the framework tenets are embodied in communicative practice.

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DESIRING THE BAD: AN ESSAY IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY *

DESIRING the bad and not desiring the good are ordinary features of our everyday life. Because of their solutions to the problem of weakness of will, many philosophers disagree with this, thinking it very problematic, if not incoherent. But such solutions pose at least as large a question about philosophy as that problem poses in philosophy.

Important questions have been conflated, and important and all too common psychological phenomena have been misunderstood or ignored. As Amelie Rorty argues,1 typical discussions of that problem conflate the question of (i) how people can “fail” to do or even try to do what they decide/d or intend/ed to do, and the question of (ii) how people can “fail” to decide or intend to do what they believe good or best or right or.... Rorty deals illuminatingly with (i), explaining how such “weakness” is all too common, not merely possible.

In this paper, I examine (ii), explaining how this “weakness,” also, is all too common, not merely possible, and that if such weakness, desiring the bad, is problematic, then so is the corresponding strength, desiring the good. I shall argue that motivation and eval-

* My thanks are owed to the many people who have discussed these issues with me; and to the philosophy departments of the following universities to which I read versions of this work: Australian National University, La Trobe University, Macquarie University, State University of New York at Stony Brook, University of Adelaide, and University of Sydney.

1 In her unpublished “Weakness, Imagination, and the Self.” I owe her my warmest thanks for discussing these issues with me.

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uation do not stand in a simple and direct relation to each other, as so often supposed. Rather, they are interrelated in various and complex ways, and their interrelations are mediated by large arrays of complex psychic structures, such as mood, energy, and interest. Philosophical theories have ignored or misunderstood these structures and the corresponding all too common psychological phenomena. They have depicted the psyche, especially the interrelations between motivation and evaluation, as far too simple, far too unified, and far too rational.

I. SOME TRADITIONAL LINKINGS OF MOTIVATION AND EVALUATION

Since my main concern is working toward an adequate moral psychology, I shall ignore questions of exactly how and why so many philosophers have held that, of necessity, the good or only the good attracts us. It should be sufficient merely to list some exponents and allude to various theories.

Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and such followers as Aquinas hold this because of their "metaphysics" of psychology. Spinoza, Perry, Sartre, many contemporary social scientists, and want-satisfaction utilitarians hold this since they hold that the good is constituted by attraction. Hare and various internalists hold it since they hold that to assent to a moral principle or judgment involves being attracted to the relevant act. Various action theorists hold that this view is analytic of acting: to act involves preferring, one prefers the preferable, and 'preferable' is another name for 'better'. Leibniz holds that such a connection is a principle of reason of a normative sort:

If the will of God did not have for a rule the principle of the best, it would either tend toward evil which would be the worst of all, or else it would be in some fashion indifferent to good and evil and guided by chance.2

Other philosophers see the connection between values and desires or choices as essential underpinnings to liberalism, for respect for individuals and individual moral freedom.3

To be sure, the psychological phenomena and structures I shall discuss have not gone entirely unnoticed by other philosophers, not even by all those mentioned above.4 Nonetheless, it is hardly

4 Cf. Aristotle on spite and envy, the Rhetoric, II, 2 and 10; Augustine on stealing the pears; Aquinas in 2a2ae of the Summa Theologica on anger and hatred (34, 6), on spite (rancor) and malice (malitia) (35, 4), and on envy (36, 2);
unfair, if unfair at all, to suggest that the philosophical view is overwhelmingly that the good or only the good attracts. At the least, this is how I am forced to interpret so many philosophers. This affords me no pleasure, since that view, as argued below, is clearly and simply false. I would welcome contrary interpretations.

II. SOME TERMS OF MY CLAIM

For some purposes it will be important to specify what sorts of good or bad are involved in the claims that the good or only the good attracts. It may, for example, be important to determine whose good is involved, the agent's or someone else's; whether the good is an important good or not; whether 'good' would better be replaced by 'best' or 'right'; whether what is supposedly desired is a good thing or the thing-as-good or its goodness; whether in all or some cases believed goodness, not goodness, is in question. When it is important, I shall so specify.

I shall not, however, offer an account of goodness and badness, nor of what it is to believe something good or bad, nor of the nature of motivation. My reasons for not attempting these vital tasks are, first, that my arguments are meant to be very general: to apply to any plausible accounts of evaluation and motivation, especially but not only as these figure in practical or moral reasoning and action as engaged in by us and as studied by philosophers.

Second, in order to give an adequate account of these notions, we need an adequate moral psychology. And there seem good heuristic reasons for arguments like those below to precede that psychology or those accounts. For it is unclear how successful they could be until those notions are freed from their traditional misunderstandings.

How are we to understand the relation between the good and attraction? It is too weak to require only that the attractive act or act-feature is, e.g., (believed) good in some respect or over-all or even best. For unless such acts or features are (believed) absolutely...
good—i.e., with no aspects that are (believed) bad or neutral in any respect—they can attract because or only because they are (believed) bad or neutral in some respect or other. Thus this requirement does not give an interesting version of the thesis that the good always attracts or that only the good attracts, that we always act sub specie boni. These require that the (believed) goodness or the (believed) good qua good is somehow essential to the attraction: e.g., that acts or features attract because or only because they are (believed) good. It remains problematic exactly how to specify this requirement.

However, in order to show that we can “fail” to be attracted to the (believed) good and that we can be attracted to the (believed) bad, not only to the (believed) good, it is unnecessary to sort out this problem. It will be sufficient to show that there are clear and unproblematic cases where what attracts us to do an act is attractive because it is (believed) bad or in spite of its being (believed) bad, where the act or feature is not attractive because or only because it or some other relevant act or feature is (believed) good. Showing this shows neither, first, that we ever perform an act that is in no way (believed) good; nor, second, that we ever perform an act that does not attract us at least in part because it is (believed) good. It is not, however, necessary to show either in order to establish that the (believed) good need not attract, that not only the (believed) good, but also the (believed) bad, can attract, and that the interrelations between motivation and evaluation are various and complex.

III. THAT THE GOOD MUST ATTRACT

Recently, I read a story of what might be taken as typical of one course of life. It was said of this political figure that, in his youth, he cared a lot about the suffering of people in all parts of the world and devoted himself to making their lives better. But now he concerns himself only with the lives and fortunes of his close family and friends. He remembers his past, and he knows that there is still a lot he could do to help others. But he no longer has any desire so to do.

We can fill out this story in any number of ways. Perhaps he calculated that he could do the most good close to home. This

6 The first quickly leads to questions of absolute (believed) badness. As to the second, although the cases below do not establish such complete lack of motivation by the (believed) good, they make it extremely plausible, even if such acts would not attract were they (believed) absolutely bad, or even simply worse than they are.
completion of the story need pose no problem for the thesis that the (believed) good must attract: it must allow for choices between various goods. Variants of the thesis deal differently with such choices. For example, some hold that it is always the (believed) best that attracts or attracts most.\(^7\) Others hold that it is merely some (believed) good or other, whether or not it is (believed) best, that must attract.\(^8\)

Perhaps the politician is not attracted to helping those people now because he believes he has already done enough for them or because he plans to help them a very great deal in the near-enough future. Such a completion of the story does confute many variants of the thesis that the (believed) good must attract. But just as we previously allowed for synchronic choices between goods, perhaps we should allow for diachronic choices. If we do not, that thesis would require far too rigorous a dedication to the good and its increase for it to be part of a plausible moral psychology of all people at all times.

It may not be clear exactly how to state the thesis to avoid such excessive dedication—e.g., how to include a principle that allows considerations of justice to explain, and justify, non-attraction to a (believed) good. But this internal problem of the thesis need not detain us. For the thesis is clearly wrong for reasons entirely unconnected with such, or other, choices between goods.

Suppose it is because of bitterness at the way the politician was treated that he does not desire to help those people. He has ceased caring about or for them. Perhaps he dislikes them. His non-attraction—his indifference or hostility—to the (believed) good confutes the thesis that the (believed) good must attract.

Citing the politician's bitterness or dislike or lack of care might naturally suggest two claims that sustain the thesis: First, if he does not help those people because of those feelings or moods, then his reason for not helping them must be (something like) to preserve his own peace of mind and happiness, to satisfy or at least not to displease himself. Second, these “psychic states” are (believed) good. This objection, then, is that my completion of the story involves competing (believed) goods, and thus really concedes

\(^7\) Cf. Donald Davidson's principle P2: “If an agent judged that it would be better to do x than to do y, then he wants to do x more than he wants to do y” [“How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,” in Joel Feinberg, ed., Moral Concepts (New York: Oxford, 1969), p. 95].

the truth of the thesis. Discussing this objection should help both recapitulate and advance my argument.

The objection may pose a special problem for the claim that the (believed) better attracts more. Sustaining this variant of the thesis often requires imputing to the agent an implausibly weighting of values. But here—because those states would have to be (believed) better than the good involved in helping the others—an implausibly egoistic weighting must be imputed.

This objection to my claim is problematic, however, whether the thesis is taken in a comparative or noncomparative form. Rejecting its first suggestion, I would argue for the following: what the politician wants can be simply that those people not be helped by him or that they not have that good. Dislike or bitterness or not caring for or about are all sufficient explanations of such non-attraction to the good of someone. They need not be supplemented by some other state or condition, in particular some egoistic state or condition, to make the non-attraction intelligible. To be sure, each of these replies needs further discussion. But for reasons concerning the second suggestion, we need not pursue them.

The second suggestion must be considered. For it can be taken in a general way, independent of the first: if the attractive feature is avoiding displeasing himself, then that is (believed) good; but if the attractive feature is simply that those people not be benefited by him, then that is (believed) good. In its full generality, then, this suggestion is just what is in question: that the (believed) good must attract.

This evokes my original claim: the completion of the story in terms of dislike, bitterness, lack of care for or about does not involve competing (believed) goods; and, thus, it confutes the thesis that the (believed) good must attract. Since this objection need concern us only insofar as it raises again the question of whether the (believed) good attracts, I shall continue my argument that it need not.

I offered different explanations of the politician's indifference or hostility to the good of those people: he no longer cares for or about them, or he dislikes, is bitter toward them. Both can be expanded in various directions: e.g., to involve annoyance, hatred, fury, disgust, and the like. They can also be expanded in another direction,

by considering people who are training themselves not to be affected by cares or considerations of this world. If one does not care for others, or is not interested in them, why should it be imagined that one will desire to benefit them?

Lack of this desire is commonplace. Through spiritual or physical tiredness, through accidie, through weakness of body, through illness, through general apathy, through despair, through inability to concentrate, through a feeling of uselessness or futility, and so on, one may feel less and less motivated to seek what is good. One's lessened desire need not signal, much less be the product of, the fact that, or one's belief that, there is less good to be obtained or produced, as in the case of a universal Weltschmertz. Indeed, a frequent added defect of being in such "depressions" is that one sees all the good to be won or saved and one lacks the will, interest, desire, or strength.

Let us note another consideration that shows that the (believed) good need not attract. The concept of selfishness may encompass the "metaphysical" egoist who believes that something is good only if it is good for, or a good of, him/herself. Selfishness may also encompass the "evaluative" egoist who recognizes that things can be good even insofar as they affect only others, but who ignores or discounts (his/her beliefs about) what is good for, or a good of, others. Perhaps it is "lexically" discounted—i.e., any of his/her self-regarding good is desired more than any amount of others' good; perhaps it is more modestly discounted. Families, clans, friends, classes, nations, races, . . . can play the same role as the person of these egoists. A metaphysical familist would hold that if something is good, it must be good for a family member; an evaluative familist would ignore or discount the good of those not in the family.

That the believed good must attract is consistent with the metaphysically selfish, family-ish, . . . . Such people see no good elsewhere; nor therefore do they desire it elsewhere. But evaluative egoists, familists, . . . do see value outside their area of concern. They simply may not be attracted to it.

I have not so far discussed the egoistical claim that the agent's own (believed) good must attract. There are some special problems with this claim: e.g., we often forego good for ourselves in order to benefit others. As well, there are problems strictly analogous to those presented above. Self-abnegation and self-denial can be successfully implemented. One can feel, and be disposed accordingly, that one is of no worth, and thus not be at all moved to benefit
oneself, to get or keep self-regarding good. So too, the various maladies of the spirit, as they might be called, such as despair, accidie, weakness, tiredness can play their role even in regard to self-regarding good and even to the point of extinguishing all desire for good for oneself, even to the point of making such goods repulsive.

Another variant of the claim that the (believed) good must attract is that if people are not attracted to what they believe good, then they are, so far at least, irrational. I would suggest that the same objections apply here. Not all cases of selfishness, callousness, uncaringness, and the like are irrationalities. The case for irrationality may be stronger if the (believed) good is the agent's own. But, again, what of demands of morality requiring giving up one's own good? What of manifestations of despair, loss of will, accidie? And what of passing up innocent goods such as the goods of amusement and the like? Are all these irrationalities?

Now we may think irrational those people so sunk in despair as not even to try to get anything of value for themselves out of life. (People are, for better or worse, locked away for such.) Some care and esteem for oneself may be, ceteris paribus, near enough to necessary for rationality of purpose and action, at least for certain sorts of people. However, not the care suggested by any of these variants on the theme that the good attracts.

It might be suggested that some goods or great goods play one or other of the attractive roles sketched above. Perhaps Plato's view was that people could not but seek the goods constitutive of self-esteem. Many medieval Christian philosophers held that God or the vision or presence of God or perhaps salvation was an irresistible good. I shall leave these claims and similar claims about more mundane goods to others.

So far, then, I have argued that (believed) goods, at least some obvious and important (believed) goods, can "fail" to attract us, at least at times. One need not forget what is (believed) good, e.g., for a person, nor that it is good that a person have health, wisdom, and the like, simply because one no longer cares for that person. More generally, something can be good and one can believe it to be good without being in a mood or having an interest or energy structure which inclines one to seek or even desire it.

Let us here note a related point which sustains both my claim

10 I thank Kim Lycos for this suggestion and many others.
11 I thank Ben Gibbs for this suggestion and many others.
that the (believed) good need not attract, and my more general claim that where the (believed) good does or does not attract, this is due to complex arrays of psychic structures. It is often held that something's being good or believed good—its being rational, given the agent's values and beliefs—makes intelligible (explains) why a person seeks or desires it. If what I have said above is correct, then this is mistaken. For in at least many, if not all, of the cases mentioned, just as the person may well not seek or desire the (believed) good, so, were that person to do what would produce (believed) good, that fact might well not make intelligible why the person so acted. If I am known to be sunk deeply into despair or some other depression or to have long ago ceased caring about someone's welfare, then citing the (believed) goodness of my act will not make intelligible my act which benefits that other person.12

To be sure, citing the (believed) good may suggest an explanation—e.g., that the despair or depression has lifted, that I now care. But this is another way of putting my point: only against a certain assumed background of agent mood and interest does citing the (believed) good make an act intelligible. We can be as mystified by a selfish person's gratuitously benefiting a stranger as by a kindly person's gratuitously harming a stranger. Given certain assumptions about the latter's moods and interests—which do not make the harm a good or a believed good—such gratuitous malice is intelligible. So too, given certain assumptions about the former's moods and interests, such gratuitous helping is unintelligible. In all cases, the relevant moods and interest structures must be understood if the desire and act are to be intelligible.

Of course, citing the (believed) good may always be a reason in the sense of being a justifying reason. But this is only to say that what serves as a justifying reason may not help make an act intelligible, and what may help make an act intelligible may be not a justifying reason, but a "dysjustifying" one.

IV. THAT ONLY THE GOOD ATTRACTS

To establish my general contentions about the interrelations between motivation and valuation, it is insufficient to establish that the (believed) good need not attract. It is necessary to show that

12 Thus, rationality in the sense of value maximization against the background of an agent's beliefs is not the form of all action, nor even all intelligible action. Nor is the correspondingly rational person the form of all people, nor even all intelligible people. Trying to understand people as if they were such rational beings involves inadequate moral psychologies and ignores or misunderstands the important and all too common psychological phenomena discussed in this paper.
not only the (believed) good attracts. Some of the examples mentioned above—e.g., gratuitous malice and repulsive goods—suggest this; for they involve the attractiveness of the (believed) bad. I shall now argue explicitly for this: that we have desires and appetites for the (believed) bad.

I may desire or have an appetite for this food. But it may be the wrong amount or sort of food, it may be poisoned, spoiled. . . . Thus, the actual object of attraction is bad. To this it might be replied that desires and appetites are intentional, they may aim at what could be called the “proper” object of attraction: viz., perhaps only some aspects of a concrete object, and even an object or aspects that are mistakenly believed available. Thus, it could be held, were I aware of the nature of that food, I would see that the proper object of my desire or appetite is absent, and thus not be attracted to that food.

But there seems little justification for this claim. Actual desires and appetites may not conform to the evaluative sense of ‘want’ or ‘lack’ found in philosophers since Socrates and still in our language: “He was examined and found wanting.” Given certain moods, interest structures, energy levels, and the like—e.g., my having ceased caring about my well-being—what I want is this food, even though, perhaps even because, I realize it is the wrong amount, the wrong sort, . . . i.e., bad for me.

But of course, it is difficult to identify the real object of attraction. I may have wanted that food because I wanted something else, e.g., pleasure, which other thing may be consistent with the view that only the (believed) good attracts, that we always act sub specie boni. This can be brought out by considering the following interchange between me and supporters of that view.

To confute that view, I instanced the case of a man who wanted to and did burn himself to see if he could emulate the famous Roman. I suggested that whatever (believed) good there might be in what attracted him, such (believed) good need not be the whole or even part of what attracted him. My interlocutors said that since the act was motivated by the desire or appetite for knowledge, perhaps self-knowledge, the feature of the actual object of attraction which attracted him—viz., the knowledge—was wholly good. But, I contend, some knowledge is bad or harmful, some is simply not worth having, the desire to know some things is shameful, and so on. (This is so even if some knowledge is good in itself.) Thus, it seems that we can take the desire or appetite to know as having proper objects which are (believed) good, bad, or neutral.
Consider also our desires to harm others. To save the thesis that we desire only the (believed) good, it must be maintained either that such harming is (believed) good or that it is not the direct or proper object of desire. The former is too implausible. My interlocutors maintained the latter, holding that harming others is only an intermediate desire of, say, the desire to get pleasure for oneself, power over others, showing oneself powerful, getting things to go one’s way, getting revenge.

Even if they are correct, however, what reason is there to take such (instances of those) desires to be aimed at what is (believed) good—apart, that is, from saving the thesis that only the (believed) good attracts? It might be objected that, apart from my contrary thesis, I have no reason to deny that they are (believed) good. As this paper shows, that claim is false. Even if it were true, I would be content for the issue to be put: Which thesis is better able to account for important and common psychological phenomena and structures?

But I do not think they are correct. Just as helping another can be the direct and proper object of desires and appetites, so can harming others. (Arguments to the contrary are quite similar to traditional arguments for egoism.) One way to see this is that in certain loving or caring moods, helping is precisely what is desired. So too, in other moods, harming is precisely what is desired. When we feel furious, hurt, envious, jealous, threatened, frustrated, abandoned, endangered, rejected, and so on, what we often seek is precisely the harm or destruction of someone, and not always the “offending party”: “If I can’t have her, no one will.” “So, you are leaving me after all I have done for you. Well then, take that.” “You stole her from me, now it’s my turn to get even.” “The whole day has gone so badly, I might as well complete it by ruining the little I did accomplish.” “I let him have it with the horn; he was the millionth Sunday driver who cut in front of me.” “Watch out for him today, he just had an awful fight with his wife.”

Given such moods and circumstances, harming another can be the proper and direct object of attraction. There is no need to posit another object, especially not an egoistic object like pleasure, power over others, showing oneself powerful, getting things to go one’s own way, getting revenge.

Just as there are desires and appetites directed at harming others, there are desires and appetites directed at harming oneself. In certain moods, such as the self-directed modes of disgust, hatred, guilt, shame, I may seek to humble, abase, or harm myself.
Agents, even in the planning and doing of such acts, and certainly afterwards, can believe or know that what is desired is bad. Moods, interest structures, and the like can make us unconcerned about achieving the (believed) good. In such moods, . . . , we not only do not care, we are filled with "uncare."

Perhaps we have such moods, . . . and thus bad-seeking desires or appetites only under certain, mainly adverse, conditions. Perhaps having such moods, . . . , desires, and appetites shows some moral or psychological defect in us or some defect in our circumstances or society. This suggests what seems correct in any case: First, desiring the (believed) bad and not desiring the (believed) good raise serious practical problems about moral education and personal and social conditions, not just conceptual problems. Second, if it is irrational to have bad-seeking desires and appetites, the relevant sense of 'rational' evaluates not only the agent's means and ends and character but also the agent's situation in society and that society as well.

In conclusion, it seems at best unjustifiable optimism or complacency to accept the liberalism and relativism of values embodied in the claim that we always act sub specie boni, that we desire or have an appetite for only what is (believed) good.13 "I don't know what is good, but I know what I want" contains more truth than many seem to believe. A desire for what is bad need not make it good; on the contrary, its badness may infect the desire, making it bad.

V. SOME PROGRAMMATIC CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that what is (believed) good can "fail" to attract us and that what is (believed) bad can attract us. This argument is about us, not about people with radically different psychologies from ours, like those portrayed in Kosinski's novels or like psychopaths or sociopaths.14 Even we have moods, interest and energy structures, . . . which "allow" us not to be attracted to a (believed) good or to be attracted to a (believed) bad.

The argument was not intended to show that those moods, interest and energy structures, . . . could operate—could lead to desire, intention, action—without a background structure of evaluation, as hating may require desiring the bad for the hated. Rather, it was intended to show that value structures are only complexly

13 This optimism has clear implications for social policy, education, and so on. I thank Graeme Marshall for discussing this and other issues with me.
14 Who we are is, of course, a question. But for the present purposes, we should readily enough be able to identify ourselves.
related with those structures and other structures such as those of motivation. To what extent moods and the like could operate without such background value structures needs discussion in any adequate moral psychology. Also needing discussion is the related problem of the extent it is possible for people—and for what sort of people—not to be attracted to what is (believed) good or to be attracted to what is (believed) bad. (As Rorty argues, other reasons, roles, group encouragement, . . . also account for such attraction and non-attraction.)

My arguments, then, must be understood as having a limited purview. But within that purview, it has been argued that motivation and evaluation need not point in the same direction, that they are related only through complex structures of mood, care, energy, interest, and the like. Upon even brief reflection, we see that those complex structures are, themselves, not of one natural, psychic kind. For example, desire arising from pique is very different from desire “failing” to arise from lack of energy. But since this paper is concerned with a role played by these disparate structures—mediating between evaluation and motivation—treating those structures as if of one sort is not harmful.

My claims about such mediation can be divided into two subclaims, the first about cases that controvert, and the second about cases that might seem consistent with, the alleged necessary connection between motivation and evaluation. This paper has been concerned almost exclusively with the controverting cases. I shall now comment directly on the “consistent” ones. Even in them, I suggest, motivation and evaluation are mediated by those psychic structures. This, if correct, helps show that the controverting cases are not exceptions, aberrations, mere anomalies or mere counterexamples, but rather that they exhibit deep and general relations between motivation and evaluation.

My comments about the “consistent” cases have been and will be brief for various reasons. To establish my contention about the lack of simple, direct, or necessary connections between motivation and evaluation, the controverting cases are sufficient, and more easily handled. A discussion of the “consistent” cases requires far more psychological, sociological, and anthropological information than I have. To explain these cases requires an adequate moral psychology: a brief paper like this can at best show the inadequacies of various moral psychologies and point the way toward an adequate one.

That moods, care, interest, energy, . . . account for disconnec-
tions between motivation and evaluation would not, of course, prove that they play a similar role in accounting for connections. But it should alert us to that possibility. If we do look at cases of such connection, at least in many of them we do find moods, care, interest, energy, and the like. It is not noteworthy if a mother gives her son something (she believes) good for him. But typically, mothers stand to their sons in ways constituted by exceptionally complex arrays of mood, interest, energy, and the like. Similarly, there are complex arrays in at least many cases of a friend helping another, of people doing what they believe obligatory, and so on. (The presence of such arrays, I take it, is the subject not so much of philosophical argument as of psychological, sociological, or anthropological study.)

Of course, the mere presence of such arrays of structures does not establish that they play the same mediating role—now with a different “polarity”—between motivation and evaluation as is played by those arrays in accounting for disconnections between motivation and evaluation. But I suggest that they do, as the following, related points might indicate.

It is now a truism that men and women of our culture have different motivational “orientations” to (believed) good. Men, archetypically, seek their own good and through that the good of their families; women, archetypically, are more self-sacrificing, more altruistic, directly more eager for the good of their families. To the extent that this and similar claims are correct, such differences are explained, at least in a constitutive, if not a generative, way by the very different mood, interest, energy, . . . structures of men and women in our culture.

If this is correct and if my earlier claims are correct, then both some disconnections between motivation and evaluation and also some—e.g., sex-role-linked—connections between motivation and evaluation are mediated by arrays of structures of mood, interest, energy, and the like. It would be surprising, then, if the generalized connection between motivation and evaluation were not also so mediated. Indeed, if all people who have so far lived have had arrays of such structures mediating the particular ways their motivation and evaluation were connected, what can be made of the claim that motivation and evaluation are directly and simply connected?

This raises the second point. Very frequently at least, only what is unusual or wrong is thought to need an explanation. If our cultural archetype or ideal of a person has certain arrays of such struc-
tures, they might well go unexplained, even unnoticed. Cross-cultural studies may help us recognize and understand these structures—thus, ourselves. The point can be brought out this way: When I consider people who have been defeated by life, the wretched of the earth, those who see no hope for themselves or those they care for, who lack physical and spiritual energy, I am not at all surprised that—as political and anthropological data suggest—they may not seek even what little good they do perceive. Life may be too much for them. We, on the contrary, see the world as open to us, and more importantly, open for us. We can progress. We can make it. We see ourselves out there to be won. We have self-confidence and hope. Indeed we have more than this: we have an optimistic certainty. We have energy. We know we are worthy. We know that, barring bad luck, our enterprise will be rewarded. And so on. Such an array of structures of mood, interest, energy, . . . makes it natural, almost inevitable, that we seek the (believed) good for ourselves or others. And it seems at least arguable that such an array must be posited to give an adequate account of how, at least according to our cultural ideal, motivation and evaluation are related in us.

If this is right, then, first, even in the “consistent” cases, the connection between motivation and evaluation is mediated by those complex arrays. And, second, moods and the like cannot be understood as “deflections” from our normal—and mood-free—orientation to value, nor can values be understood as what we would desire were we not in a mood.

Four brief and interrelated points should be made. It might be argued that those who are unlike us in their orientation to the (believed) good suffer from some defective or pathological condition of their psyche or society. Certainly, were we to become like them, while still in our life and society, we would very likely be said to be in such a condition. (But were they to become like us, while still in their life and society, might they not, too, be said to be in such a condition?) However, for their being in such a condition to bear on whether motivation and evaluation can be connected without the mediation of those arrays, any array playing such a mediating role would have to be, as such, pathological or defective.

Second, it will not have gone unnoticed that in indicating “our” cultural ideal, what I sketched was the successful and striving man. It may well be no accident, as various critiques put it, that this psychology is presumed, perhaps unknowingly, to be the natural
or healthy human psychology by philosophers. For after all, to put it far too crudely and quickly, philosophers, at least those we now read, have been successful and striving—and with few exceptions—men. Current cultural critiques—e.g., by some feminists and Marxists—argue, first, that such an array is not inevitable, nor clearly desirable; and, second, that such an array does play the mediating role I have been urging, even in our culturally ideal cases where we “naturally” desire and seek the (believed) good.

Third, even within our culture and in regard to attraction to the (believed) good, there is not just one, but rather many significantly different, though interrelated, ideals and archetypes for men, and of course also for women and children. Just as our personality does not “fit” a defeated person, even in our society “exchanges of personality” would produce strange fits. Consider such exchanges between an American and English academic, or between a successful business man and a factory worker. Thus, even for only our culture, there will not be one array, but rather many arrays, of those mediating structures. We will need not one, but many moral psychologies.

Fourth, understanding these moral psychologies requires not only philosophy, but also psychology, sociology, and anthropology. We will need typological descriptions of different human psyches and also accounts of these differences. These would involve both interrelations among various moral-psychological notions and interrelations between these and class, culture, nationality, occupation, sex, status, region, religion, and the like—the subjects of psychology, sociology, and anthropology.

The implications of these last points are very large. Let me conclude on a smaller scale, by returning to the opening themes of the paper: If weakness of will, desiring the (believed) bad, is problematic, so is strength of will, desiring the (believed) good. We must replace those moral psychologies which generate the traditional philosophical problems about weakness of will. We need moral psychologies that recognize, in general, the complexities of the psyche and, in particular, those complex arrays of psychic structures of mood, interest, energy, . . . and also the complex mediating roles played by these arrays between motivation and evaluation.

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