Phil. 2220, The Mind

Drs. Deutsch and Mallon

Lecture 8, The anti-materialist thought experiments

07/10/02

 

Some review:

 

1. Dualism faces serious difficulties stemming from (among other things) the fact of mind-body causation.

 

(Things to know: a. What is dualism and what motivates it? b. What are the difficulties for dualism stemming from M/B causation (and what are its other problems)?

 

2. But the varieties of materialism face their own difficulties.

 

(Things to know: a. What is materialism, what motivates it, and what are its varieties? b. What are the problems with the various versions of materialism: type-materialism, token-materialism, supervenience, and functionalism?)

 

More problems for materialism: the new wave of anti-materialist arguments:

 

Background: Recent philosophy of mind has been preoccupied by questions concerning the nature of phenomenal consciousness, i.e. with question concerning the nature of those mental states such that there is something it is like to be in them (the sensations). 

 

The reasons for this:

 

a. Many philosophers are satisfied with a functionalist/materialist account of the propositional attitudes.

 

b. But such an account seems inadequate when it comes to the feel or qualitative character of the sensations.  Functionalist accounts of the sensations seem to “leave out” their characteristic feel.  This seeming inadequacy has led to a revival of dualism—at least with respect to the sensations—and to an outbreak of new arguments that seem to show that not just functionalism, but no variety of materialism can account for phenomenal consciousness.

 

The Knowledge Argument (See ‘The Knowledge Argument’ powerpoint presentation.)

 

P1. Mary (before her escape) knows everything physical there is to know about seeing red.

 

P2. Mary (before her escape) does not know everything there is to know about seeing red because she learns something about it after escaping.

 

Therefore,

C. Materialism is false (and property dualism is true).

 

Materialist replies to the Knowledge Argument:

 

            1. Deny that Mary learns something new.

 

2. The ability reply: Mary gain know-how, or an ability; she does not acquire knowledge of new facts.

 

3. The mode of presentation reply: Mary gains a new mode of presentation for a fact she already knew--but no new facts are learned.

 

4. Deny that it’s possible for Mary to learn all of the physical facts about seeing red.