MIDTERM REVIEW QUESTIONS
Phil. 2220, The Mind
(The midterm will be held Mon. the 28th)
SHORTER ANSWER QUESTIONS
1. What is ‘the puzzle of the epistemology of the mental’? Do you think it is a genuine puzzle? Why/why not?
2. Distinguish between bodily and psychological continuity for personal identity.
3. Bodily identity is not as straightforward as it might first appear. Why not?
4. Explain the differences between the sensations and the propositional attitudes.
5. What is ‘the argument from doubt’ for dualism?
6. Explain two ways in which one might criticize the dualist’s response to the mind-body problem.
7. What is the overdetermination/epiphenomenalism dilemma for dualism?
8. Give two reasons why one might be attracted to the materialist’s response to the mind-body problem.
9. What is functionalism?
10. What does it mean to say that the mental ‘supervenes’ on the physical?
11. What is an a posteriori theoretical identification?
12. Suppose that Mary does learn a new fact about color when she escapes from the Black & White Room. Why is this damaging to materialism?
13. What is ‘the ability reply’ to the knowledge argument?
14. What is ‘the mode-of-presentation reply’ to the knowledge argument?
15. Explain what Nagel means when he says that materialist analyses of the mental leave out what it is like.
16. I can imagine hanging upside down in caves, catching insects in my mouth, navigating via echolocation, etc. Why, according to Nagel, does this not qualify as being able to imagine what it is like to be a bat?
17. Nagel insists that the physical facts are objective. What does he mean by this and why is it a problem for materialism?
18. What is ‘the explanatory gap argument’? Is it an anti-materialist argument?
LONGER ANSWER QUESTIONS
1. In the future, suppose that scientists develop a device they call a ‘Transporter’. This device takes a careful scan of a person’s brain and body, destroying them in the process. The device then sends the data to another Transporter which rebuilds the brain and body (out of new molecules). The resulting person is molecule for molecule identical with the original person, and seems to have exactly the same beliefs, desires and personality as the original person.
Suppose that the notorious space pirate Captain D’Arby is fleeing the Police and enters a Transporter on Earth. Moments later, a duplicate of him exits a Transporter on Mars. Fortunately, the Police are in hot pursuit and they too enter the Transporter on Earth, and duplicates of them exit the Transporter on Mars.
“Ah hah! We’ve got you at last, D’Arby,” the police declare as they take him into custody. “You’ll pay for your crimes.”
“I do not know what crimes you are referring to,” said the duplicate of D’Arby, “for I have only just come into existence. While it is true that I seem to have memories of someone you call ‘D’Arby’, I myself was newly constructed by the Transporter only moments ago here on Mars. Therefore, I could not possibly be guilty of any criminal acts prior to that time.”
Should the man that Police have in custody be punished for the past crimes of the notorious pirate D’Arby?
2. What is the mind-body problem? What are the traditional replies to the mind-body problem, and what are some of the arguments both for and against those traditional replies?
3. Explain why functionalists find the type identity theory inadequate. Does a functionalist token identity theory offer a better alternative?
4. Does functionalism run into the same causal overdetermination problem as dualism?
5. Briefly but clearly reconstruct the knowledge argument. Describe at least two replies to the argument and explain some of the difficulties with those replies. What do you think is the best reply to the knowledge argument?
6. Nagel argues that there is a problem with the analogy that materialists draw between theoretical identifications and the supposedly soon-to-be-discovered identities between the sensations and physical/functional states. What is the problem according to Nagel? Do you think he is right to regard it as a problem?