Further Readings:

Please note that the readings on this list are optional. You can perfectly well write a paper for this class (and get a good grade on it) simply by reviewing the assigned readings, consulting your class notes, and considering the issues carefully. But if you would like to do some further reading, this list will help.

Personal identity

1. Noonan, Harold. 1993. Personal Identity. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co.

2. Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon.

3. Perry, J. 1975. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.

4. Rorty, Amelie. 1984. The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press.

5. Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, R. Personal Identity. Oxford. Blackwell.

The mind-body problem and phenomenal consciousness:

1. Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press

2. Descartes, R., 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy, in Cottingham, et al. (eds), The

Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes, Cambridge, 1985.

3. Davidson, D. 1970 . ‘Mental Events’. In Davidson, D (1980) Essays on Actions and

Events. Oxford.

4. McGinn, C. “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?,” Mind, 98 (1989): 346-366.

5. Jackson, F., 1982, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127-36.

The identity theory and functionalism

1. Armstrong, D.M. 1968: A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London, Routledge. Second

Edition with new preface 1993.

2. Block, Ned (1980). "Troubles with Functionalism" in Readings in Philosophy of

Psychology, N. Block (ed.), Vol.1, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980.

3. Lewis, D. 1983: ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’ and ‘Postscript’. In Lewis D.

Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

4. Putnam, H., "The Nature of Mental States", in Mind, Language and Reality:

Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975

5. Smart, J.J.C. 1959: ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review, 68, 141-

156.

Externalism (and internalism)

1. Boghossian, Paul (1989a) “Content and Self-Knowledge” Philosophical Topics 17,

pp.5-26.

2. Burge, Tyler (1979) “Individualism and the Mental” in French, Uehling, and Wettstein

(eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,

pp. 73-121.

3. Fodor, Jerry (1980) “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in

Cognitive Psychology” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:1.

4. Putnam, Hilary (1975) “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ” Philosophical Papers, Vol. II :

Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Chinese Room and AI

1. Boden, M., ed., The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press.

2. Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S. 1990. Could a machine think? Scientific

American 262(1):32-37.

3. E. Dietrich, ed. 1994. Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.

4. Hofstadter, D. R. 1981. Reflections on Searle. In (D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett, eds)

The Mind's I, pp. 373-382. Basic Books.

5. Rey, G. 1986. What's really going on in Searle's `Chinese Room'. Philosophical

Studies 50:169-85.

The emotions

1. Calhoun, Cheshire and Solomon, Robert C. 1984. What is an emotion? : classic readings in philosophical psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Griffiths, Paul. 1997. What Emotions Really Are. the problem of psychological categories. Chicago, Ill. : University of Chicago Press.

3. Rorty, Amélie. 1980. Explaining emotions. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1980.