See William James, 'The Dilemma of Determinism', in The
Will to Believe, and other essays in popular philosophy, New York : Dover,
1956, pp. 153-55:
Summary
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The dislike of chance
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Chance is a negative notion
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Not everything in the Universe is connected
The stronghold of the deterministic
sentiment is the antipathy to the idea of chance. As soon as we begin to
talk indeterminism to our friends, we find a number of them shaking their
heads. This notion of alternative possibility, they say, this admission
that any one of several things may come to pass, is, after all,only a roundabout
name for chance; and chance is something the notion of which no sane mind
can for an instant tolerate in the world. What is it, they ask, but
barefaced crazy unreason, the negation of intelligibility and law ?
And if the slightest particle of it exist anywhere, what is to prevent
the whole fabric from falling together, the stars from going out, and chaos
from recommencing her topsy-turvy reign ?
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Remarks of this sort about chance will
put an end to discussion as quickly as anything one can find. I have already
told you that 'chance' was a word I wished to keep and use. Let us
then examine exactly what it means, and see whether it ought to be such
a terrible bugbear to us. I fancy that squeezing the thistle boldly
will rob it of its sting.
The sting of the word 'chance'
seems to lie in the assumption that it means something positive, and that
if anything happens by chance, it must needs be something of an intrinsically
irrational and preposterous sort. Now chance means nothing of the
kind. It is a purely negative and relative term, giving us no information
about that of which it is predicated, except that it happens to be disconnected
with something else - not controlled, secured, or necessitated by other
things in advance of its own actual presence. As this point is the
most subtile one of the whole lecture, and at the same time the point on
which all the rest hinges, I beg you to pay particular attention to it.
What I say is that it tells us nothing about what a thing may be in itself
to call it 'chance'. It may be a bad thing, it may be a good thing.
It may be lucidity, transparency, fitness incarnate, matching the whole
system of other things, when it has once befallen, in an unimaginably perfect
way. All you mean by calling it 'chance' is that this is not guaranteed,
that it may also fall out otherwise. For the system of other things
has no positive hold on the chance-thing. Its origin is in a certain
fashion negative: it escapes, and says, Hands off! coming, when it comes,
as a free gift, or not at all.
This negativeness, however, and this
opacity of the chance-thing when thus considered ab extra, or from
the point of view of previous things or distant things, do not preclude
its having any amount of positiveness and luminosity from within, and at
its own place and moment. All that this chance character asserts
about it is that there is something in it really of its own, something
that is not the unconditional property of the whole. If the whole
wants this property, the whole must wait till it can get it, if it be a
matter of chance. That the universe may actually be a sort of joint-stock
society of this sort, in which the sharers have both limited liabilities
and limited powers, is of course a simple and conceivable notion.
Nevertheless, many persons talk as if the minutest dose
of disconnectedness of one part with another, the smallest modicum of independence,
the faintest tremor of ambiguity about the future, for example, would ruin
everything, and turn this goodly universe into a sort of insane sand-heap
or nulliverse, no universe at all....
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ON CHANCE