Science and the indeterminism of phenomena




If the change of forms were to take place at all times and places according to a single well-defined pattern, the problem would be much easier; we could then set out, once and for all, the necessary order of the change of form (or systems of forms) in the neighbourhood of any point (e.g. as a table or a graph), and this would then be at least an algorithm giving a prediction of phenomena, if not an explanation. Very probably the mind would become used to considering this necessary order of change of forms as imposed by a causality or even a logical implication.



The fact that we have to consider more refined explanations - namely, those of science - to predict the change of phenomena shows that the determinism of the change of forms is not rigorous, and that the same local situation can give birth to apparently different outcomes under the influence of unknown or unobservable factors. It is ironical to observe here that this science which, in principle, denies indeterminism is actually its ungrateful offspring, whose only purpose is to destroy its parent! Thus classical mechanics, a strictly quantitative and deterministic theory, was created in order to remove the indeterminism found in all instances of moving bodies (e.g.: Is this bullet going to hit its target or not ? Will this weight stay in equilibrium or not?); conversely, if some disciplines, like social sciences and biology, resisted mathematical treatment for so long, even if they have succumbed, this is not so much because of the complexity of their raw material, as is often thought (all nature is complicated), but because qualitative and empirical deduction already gives them sufficient framework for experiment and prediction.



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