We looked at the dream passages yesterday. I took skepticism and argued that these passages should not be interpreted in ways that lead to Western skepticism of the senses. The other interpretive perspectives more naturally took a linguistic point of view. These, coming at the end of the argument, do not play the role of initiating doubt about sense-data. Reflecting on dreams extends the earlier skepticism of linguistic perspectives based on the ways we make distinctions.
We learn the dream/reality distinction from our parents and older siblings. They teach us to take part of what happens as belonging to a category called dreaming. Because we learn it in phrases like "No, you're only dreaming!" we learn to treat the things that happen in those circumstances as of lesser importance than the things we assign to 'reality'. The learned category, like all linguistic categories, could be otherwise deployed. We may or may not extend it to hallucination (as sense skepticism does), visions, imagination, fantasy, planning etc. We may make the distinction and still assign dreams greater importance (as Freudian psychology or divination do).
The earlier passage implies that we can interpret dreams within dreams. This looks like an attempt to imbed infinite perspectives in each "world". It may be an implicit hint at how Zhuangzi might respond to attempts justify the distinction. Suppose we could give some way to distinguish dreaming from waking (say its coherence or color or the presence of writing) Zhuangzi would could argue that the feature could be found in dreams (some people have coherent colorful dreams) or that we still presuppose something about reality in using, e.g., coherence as a guide.
It is only when we "wake up" that we make the classification-shift our perspective back. This leads to two interesting element: 1) The great awakening which we may think of as the mystical insight. (Notice Plato made a similar argument for rational insight in his cave analogy.) As you argued in the debate, the dream is then treated as an analogy to our world divided by language. It also take the dream/reality distinction very seriously, and this makes it (as usual for mysticism) somewhat incoherent. 2) The possibility of reversing the perspective shift. Thus Zhuangzi's momentary teetering on the point of perspective flipping when he wonders if transformation between the two worlds is symmetrical. This, as usual, is embellished by Zhuangzi's loving, rich presentation of his butterfly existence. The perspective is linked to values-he liked being a butterfly.
Normally I have limited Zhuangzi's relativism to justification relativism. This left skepticism as a possibility because we assume there is a real world. Zhuangzi either is a butterfly or he is not. We could toy with ontological relativism. Maybe he really is both. There are many real worlds and Zhuangzi's dream-world is a parallel world. There is not much else in the text, however, to support that line of thought and his skeptical themes and reasonably consistent focus on the question of standards for ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this judgments make it safer to limit our attribution of relativism to the justification realm.
Now we face a problem ought to worry interpreters of Zhuangzi more than it does. I call it the "So what?" problem. Others formulate it as what I call the Hitler problem. What follows practically from Zhuangzi's reflections on language, knowledge, ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this and perspectives? The most common assumption is that relativism is an argument for tolerance and open mindedness. Two objections: 1) there are perfectly good realistic arguments for tolerance and 2) it is not clear how we can get a prescription for tolerance from a premise that all prescription presupposes something. We can't get absolute conclusions from relative premises. If all perspectives are right, then isn't Hitler as right as Mother Theresa. They make different assumptions and have different backgrounds, but they are equally natural perspectives.
Even if we switch from relativism to skepticism, we still can't draw any obvious practical advice. If we are totally skeptical, then why not be skeptical of our beliefs about what would happen if we jumped from the China Bank building? Shouldn't we be skeptical of arguments for tolerance, for Hitler, against Hitler? It seems that by its nature, skepticism can not endorse any prescriptive conclusion-at least cannot claim to know that any such advice is ¬O shithis:right:approve.
At first glance, it may seem that mysticism is best off here. It is a positive, absolutist position. And almost all Daoist mystics are quite ready to tell us how to live our lives. But similar reflections undermine mysticism's advice as well. The seeming basis for practical implication evaporates as soon as we formulate it. It also bars us from refusing to formulate it. And as we noticed earlier, we can't fall back on thinking it but not saying it since thinking it involves making distinctions as much as does saying.
Is there any solution? Well, let's, as Zhuangzi says, go back to the beginning. Zhuangzi starts with the observation that there are natural sounds. We do naturally make judgments (arguably must make them while alive). Without them there would be no "me." ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this , Zhuangzi says, is what I call ±¡ qingreality:feelings. (15/5/57) As we noted before "not yet beginning", Zhuangzi recognizes his perspective on perspectives as itself a perspective. It is not pure, i.e., absolute relativism-not a transcendental perspectivalism. So any advice has to be from Zhuangzi's actual perspective on perspectives, not on some ideal or abstract one.
Zhuangzi's has a rich personal perspective that is different from each of ours. As he says, "Nonetheless, let me share it. . . ." If you pick it up and it changes your perspective then, one supposes, Zhuangzi would be gratified. His perspective is one which he wants to (enjoys? does?) share. He recommends ¬O shithis:right:approve's it. He teaches it and intends that we learn it. We may each draw different conclusions-how far is that acceptable from Zhuangzi's perspective? At one level, since he realizes this, he must also intend it. Still, he does not (need not) intend all the possible ways we might take his teaching. It is clear that he does not intend us to stop making judgments (As Shen Dao did) but expects that after sharing and partly incorporating his perspective, we will make some different ones. Now which ones should he intend (from his perspective)?
Clearly Zhuangzi favors open mindedness-whether or not it is an implication of relativism. He gives us many hints about his view of the importance of flexibility. We noticed this in his description of the "all too human" rush to old age and death through inflexible judgments and his association of youth and flexibility. But it cannot be an absolute recommendation that we avoid learning because his very reason for valuing youth is that we can absorb learning. We understood this as advice to learn and still stay open to new perspectives-to stay young at heart-mind. This is not a consequence of pure relativism but of Zhuangzi's concrete, personal perspectivism.
Why? Is it better for Zhuangzi? Is it better absolutely? Is it better for you? Zhuangzi's advice suggests that from his perspective on your perspective, he thinks it would be better for you from your perspective. As we noted before, we have to judge from our present perspective that another perspective offers something that we presently value to justify our being open to it. We would not be open to every perspective. We don't have to experiment with genocide or Christian fanaticism since from our present perspective (and presumably from Zhuangzi's) it has no plausible advantages.
Suppose we did find Hitler appealing-given a pre-existing racist perspective. We should still note a difference between Zhuangzi recommending and your choosing. He does and would not recommend Hitler. But we have to grant that his advice cannot simply rule Hitler out or make Hitler condemnation a dogma. Zhuangzi could and probably does disagree with Hitler and «D feinot-this:wrong:disapprove s him. He has to be skeptical enough to acknowledge that there may be perspectives, though not his, from which it seemed right. That is simple realism or naturalism. It amounts to a prescription only if we make the core mistake that starts the Zhuangzi line of reasoning-the assumption that if it is natural it is right.
In any case, as we will note frequently, we must take this item of advice "with a grain of salt." The other two, accepting ordinary points of view and skill transcendence both pull a little in the opposite direction.
I have asked you to look at a series of articles in which Lee Yearley, Herbert Fingarette and David Nivison reflect on Zhuangzi's attitude toward convention-the usual. It is in the context of a view of the relation between Zhuangzi and Xunzi. We have noted the crucial phrase occurs several times in Chapter 2. The usual is the interchangeable (for communication and exchange) and hence the useful. We cannot reasonably ask for more of a system of language. We can't ask for absolute right and wrong, so we settle for pragmatic utility. Again, we have to emphasize the pragmatic point presupposes your present point of view. (And the "usual" is the usual from where and when you exist.)
Now Xunzi drew the conclusion that the usual is the only standard of "right" for language, and from that he became an intolerant dogmatist. In order to preserve the useful order of conventional language, we should ban philosophical speculation (ÅG biandistinction:dispute ). Confucian tradition and the learning of Confucian "Gentlemen" is the standard of dao. For Zhuangzi, by contrast, judgments of "right" are perspectival-you had one earlier one arising from your history, background and conventions. You have a different one now after having studied Zhuangzi. For none of the relevant conventions, in particular not for the one you probably have after learning Zhuangzi, is it correct that what is conventional is right. For that matter, this is not true for Chinese thinkers in general-except Confucius, Xunzi, and Lee Kwan Yew. It is not true Mencius or Mozi, the Daoists, the Legalists, the Buddhists or the Neo-Confucians.
Again we must sprinkle a grain of salt on this advice too. It pulls in the other direction of flexibility advice. That suggests experimenting with deviations form conventional wisdom.
The best known advice comes in the famous description of Ding the butcher. Graham argues that most "rationalists" think too much-so, he says, Zhuangzi thinks (too much?). We should instead be like the cicada catcher, the wheelwright, the dancers and artists who simply respond to the situation with perfect awareness. Ding is the detailed model of this attitude and the details of his skill and explanation are much richer so we will focus on butchering.
I agree with the general thrust of Graham's account. The exercise of an acquired capacity or skill is a deep source of human satisfaction. It blends kinesthetic and aesthetic satisfactions even if the activity itself seems not to be. Almost any athletic activity could be an example. Ding is described as butchering the way ritual dancers perform. His description of his state highlights the main features of this familiar experience. We have to abandon conscious guidance. We are not good at doing a thing as long as we are talking ourselves through it. Your calligraphy is neither natural nor satisfying if an inner voice is still going, "left stroke first!" When we reach that level of ability, inner dialogue is likely to detract from smooth, effective performance.
The hallmark of reaching that level is that what was hard comes to look and feel both easy and natural. We may even lose the sense that "we" are doing it. It seems as if "the world" is simply inviting us in-like the spaces between the bones. It is as if the dao has shifted from being in us as a guide to being out there pulling us effortlessly through. We often express this as a sense of oneness with our instrument (for a musician) or tool (for a craftsman). The absorption in the activity is total-so complete that we lose awareness of our ego or self. We cannot be skillful while focused on what we gain from it. If we stop seeking for the gratification, the activity itself will be gratifying-we will experience a kind of absorbing tranquillity and with satisfaction "strop our blade and put it back in the scabbard."
The text invites us to revisit out interpretive alternatives. Standard interpretations to what I call Star Wars Daoism. The idea is that if we have a mystical religious experience it will make us good butchers. "Feel the force, Luke! Let go of your conscious mind!" This makes the outcome of skill transcendence radically independent of any learning phase. In the cultural revolution, Red Guard ping-pong players alleged that political sessions made them better ping-pong players because they learned to imagine that the ball was Chiang Kai-shek's head. We call this "volunteerism."
But Ding clearly had a learning phase and in a crucial section, suggests that learning is ongoing. When he comes to a "hard part" his previous background and training cause him to pause and assess. He is no longer guided by his learned ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this in this new situation. Still he has a background on which he draws for the solution. In solving this unique, situational problem, he extends his perspective (his dao). And this gives him great satisfaction.
Now is there any basis for Graham's suggestion that philosophers cannot participate in this natural satisfaction? (Notice Wittgenstein made a parallel mistake. He forgot that philosophical language games were as "ordinary" as were those of brick masons.) I treat the choice of a butcher for the story as significant. It would be even more significant in a Buddhist context-rather like using a garbage collector as one's model today. Also, as Don Munro once suggested, Ding may not be the butcher's name but his grade or rank (fourth in the traditional ranking system). I think these facts should be taken along with Zhuangzi's observation that there is nowhere dao is not.
We can achieve this kind of artistry/satisfaction in archery, chess, motorcycle maintenance, fashion design, computer programming, mathematics, logic, debate, and in philosophy.
Again, we have to douse this advice with our guarded "grain of salt". The implicit specialization required for this level of achievement wars with flexibility advice and with the persistent theme in Chapter two of the mutual implication of perfection and defect. It is no more an implication of perspectivalism that we should specialize than that we should be a jack-of-all-trades. We could , supposedly, do that in an artistic, accomplished way. Imagine being good at learning things. We might reach a satisfying, second-nature level of skill in many things. We can never reach it in all of them. But there is not general reason for preferring one such skill to many.
Zhuangzi's perspective is that, from our perspective, we may find
such satisfaction. Should we do so? I assume he would say, (from
his actual, detailed perspective) "not if the activity were
genocide" From Zhuangzi's concrete point of view that would
be forbidden and it is not entailed that you should do that merely
from his guarded advice from his perspective recommending the
value of "skill transcendence". What about doing philosophy?
From his perspective, it must look fine--if done with elegant
humor.