Main.TrolleyProblem History
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!!Deriving "ought" from "is"
* "It is the case that p" does not entail "It ought to be the case that p".
* Science tells us how things actually are, not how things ought to be.
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!!Psychological questions
Why do people have these (widespread) intuitions about these two situations?
# The connection question - Does the answer to the psychological question have any bearing at all on the moral question?
** No. Empirical facts have no implications about morality.
** Greene - Yes.
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!!Psychological and other issues
* What do people think in general? Are the intuitions widespread?
* Why do people think that way? What cognitive mechanisms underlie our moral judgments?
* The connection question - Do findings in psychology and neuroscience have any bearing on the moral question?
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!!The implications of "Neuroscientific moral psychology"
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* A utilitarian might disagree - You ''should'' in both cases.
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* A utilitarian might disagree - You ''should'' flip the switch and you ''should'' push the fat guy.
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The problem was first posed by Phillipa Foot (1967) "Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect". Discussed further and expanded by Judith Jarvis Thomson.
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** In the first case the death of the bystander is an unintended consequence, but in the second case the death is part of the plan.
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** One answer: In the first case the death of the bystander is an unintended consequence, but in the second case the death is part of the plan.
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!!Three questions
# The moral question - What should we do in these two situations?
** Standard answer - You ''may'' flip the switch in the bystander case, but you ''may not'' push the fat guy.
** A utilitarian might disagree - You ''should'' in both cases.
** Thomson (2008)'s new position - You ''should not'' in both cases. (on the basis of the bystander three options case)
# The psychological question - Why do people have these (widespread) intuitions about these two situations?
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!!The moral question
The moral question - What should we do in these two situations?
* Standard answer - You ''may'' flip the switch in the bystander case, but you ''may not'' push the fat guy. Why?
** In the first case the death of the bystander is an unintended consequence, but in the second case the death is part of the plan.
* A utilitarian might disagree - You ''should'' in both cases.
* Thomson (2008)'s new position - You ''should not'' in both cases. (on the basis of the bystander three options case)
!!Psychological questions
Why do people have these (widespread) intuitions about these two situations?
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* Use fMRI to check brain activity when dealing with the trolley problems.
* In the fat guy case,
** areas associated with emotions are more active - medial frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, angular gyrus.
** areas associated with working memory less active - right middle frontal gyrus, bilateral parietal lobe.
* People who are willing to push the fat guy over took significantly longer to respond - they have to override their emotional response.
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!!The implications of "Neuroscientific moral psychology"
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!!The implications of "Neuroscientific moral psychology"
[[Category.Philosophy]] [[Category.Mind]]
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* [required] http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/
* [required] A. Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press. See the chapter "The case against intuition". [1-day reserve]
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!!Greene's two process theory
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!!Greene's dual-process theory
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* Moral judgment is a product of two systems:
** an impersonal / rational / utilitarian system, associated with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain associated with "cognitive control" and reasoning
** a personal / emotional system,
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* Moral judgment is a product of two systems: a more rational and impersonal abstract reasoning system applied to morality, and an emotional system that is less rational.
@@@personal moral dilemmas, as compared with impersonal and non-moral dilemmas, produced increased activity in areas associated with social/emotional processing: medial frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral STS (originally labeled ‘angular gyrus’). By contrast, impersonal and non-moral dilemmas as compared with personal dilemmas produced increased activity in areas associated with working memory: dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal areas. They found comparatively little difference between the impersonal-moral and non-moral conditions, suggesting that impersonal moral judgment has less in common with personal moral judgment than with certain kinds of non-moral practical judgment.@@@
* The two systems can come into conflict, as in the crying baby case.
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!!Greene's two process theory
* Moral judgment is a product of two systems:
** an impersonal / rational / utilitarian system, associated with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain associated with "cognitive control" and reasoning
** a personal / emotional system,
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# The bystander case - [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-13-202.png]]
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# The bystander (two options) case - [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-13-202.png]]
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** Thomson (2008)'s new position - You ''should not'' in both cases.
to:
** Thomson (2008)'s new position - You ''should not'' in both cases. (on the basis of the bystander three options case)
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* Thomson, J.J. 2008. Turning the trolley. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36: 359–74.
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** Standard answers - You ''may'' flip the switch in the bystander case, but you ''may not'' push the fat guy.
to:
** Standard answer - You ''may'' flip the switch in the bystander case, but you ''may not'' push the fat guy.
** A utilitarian might disagree - You ''should'' in both cases.
** Thomson (2008)'s new position - You ''should not'' in both cases.
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#
# [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
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# The bystander case - [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-13-202.png]]
# The fat guy case - [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
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** Standard answers - You ''may'' flip the switch in the bystander case, but you ''may not'' push the fat guy.
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!!Deriving "ought" from "is"
* "It is the case that p" does not entail "It ought to be the case that p".
* Science tells us how things actually are, not how things ought to be.
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# [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
to:
# [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
!!Three questions
# The moral question - What should we do in these two situations?
# The psychological question - Why do people have these (widespread) intuitions about these two situations?
# The connection question - Does the answer to the psychological question have any bearing at all on the moral question?
** No. Empirical facts have no implications about morality.
** Greene - Yes.
!!The implications of "Neuroscientific moral psychology"
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Comics - [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-13-202.png]] [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
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Comics
# [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-13-202.png]]
# [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
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!!In a nutshell
Comics - [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-13-202.png]] [[http://www.chrishorner.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2007-08-16-991.jpg]]
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* [required] A. Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press. See the chapter "The case against intuition".
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* [required] A. Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press. See the chapter "The case against intuition". [1-day reserve]
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* http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/
* A. Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press. See the chapter "The case against intuition".
to:
* [required] http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/
* [required] A. Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press. See the chapter "The case against intuition".
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* A. Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press. See the chapter "The case against intuition".
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!The Trolley Problem
!!Readings
* http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/
*