Philosophy seminars 2009

*TUESDAY Oct 27TH  5:00-6:30pm*
‘Jacques Derrida on Pain of Death’
Joint Seminar with Comparative Literature
Prof Tom Dutoit
Université de Lille 3 

Thursday Oct 29th  4:00-6:00pm
‘State Perfectionism vs. Neutrality in Liberal Theory’ 
Dr Chris Lowry
Chinese University of Hong Kong 

Thursday Nov 5th 4:00-6:00pm
‘Civil Disobedience as a Moral Right’
Dr Will Smith
PPA, University of Hong Kong 

Thursday Nov 12th *3:00-5:00PM*
‘Re-centering Political Thought: The Promise of Mobile Locality’
Dr Leigh Jenco
National University of Singapore 

Thursday Nov 19th  4:00-6:00pm
‘Mohism and Motivation’ 
Dr Chris Fraser
University of Hong Kong 

Thursday Nov 26th  4:00-6:00pm
‘Grounding, Border-Sensitivity, and Intrinsicality’
Dr Kelly Trogdon
Lingnan University 

Thursday Sept 24th 4:00-6:00pm
Kicking Away the Livelihoods of the Global Poor? Thomas Pogge on Harming the Poor
Dr  Gerhard Overland
CAPPE, University of Melbourne 

Thursday Oct 8th 4:00-6:00pm
‘Kant, General Deterrence, and Economic Hardship’
Dr Hon-Lam Li
Chinese University of Hong Kong 

Thursday Oct 22nd  4:00-6:00pm
‘Racism: A Conceptual Exploration’
Prof Neven Sesardic
Lingnan University 

Philosophical Method: The Role of Intuitions

4-6pm, Thursday 27th August
Herman Cappelen
Arche Professor of Philosophy, University of St Andrews
Acting Director of Arche
Research Director, CSMN, University of Oslo

Contemporary methodological debates are focused on the question of what intuitions are and how they can serve as evidence (or sources of evidence) for philosophical theories. It is often argued that without a proper theory of intuitions, philosophy, as currently practiced, has no solid foundation. As an alternative to this picture I argue that philosophers not only shouldn't appeal to intuitions in their arguments, but they don't. Philosophers use of 'intuitive' (and cognate terms) is, I argue, a defective usage. These terms denote nothing. That, however, isn't a serious defect. We can stop using these defective terms without it making much of a difference to our philosophical practice.

A Criticism of the Later Rawls and a Defense of a Decent (Confucian) People

Friday May 22nd 3:00-5:00PM
Dr Tongdong Bai
Department of Philosophy
Xavier University, Cincinnati

Abstract : Rawls in The Law of Peoples argues that decent peoples should be tolerated by liberal peoples, but he offers few considerations that may show the merits of decent peoples in comparison to liberal peoples. In this article, I will offer these considerations, and will point out that many of these considerations may be shared by Rawls and other liberal democratic thinkers. However, they fail to consider a crucial fact of modern democracies, and an imagined decent society, the society of Confu-China, may handle this fact better than a liberal democracy. In spite of the difference between Confu-China and Rawlsian liberal democracy, I will argue that the former shares many ideals of the latter, and may be a more realistic utopia for realizing these ideals than Rawlsian liberal democracy.

Thursday Mar 12th 4:00-6:00pm
“Unsavory Implications of A Theory of Justice: The Denial of Human Rights and the Justification of Slavery”
Dr Uwe Steinhoff
Department of Politics and Public Administration
University of Hong Kong 

Thursday Mar 19th 4:00-6:00pm
“An Ethics of Fiction: Beckett’s Disarticulations”
Dr Timothy O’Leary
Department of Philosophy
University of Hong Kong 

MONDAY May 4th 4:00-6:00pm
“Strengths and Weaknesses of Plato’s Concept of Justice”
Professor Thomas Robinson
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto 

Plato on the Power of Ignorance
Tue 20 Jan 4:00pm - 6:00pm
Professor Nicholas Smith 
Professor of Humanities
Lewis & Clark College, Oregon

Thursday Feb 5th 4:00-6:00pm
Inner and Outer Truth
Dr Iris Einheuser
Department of Philosophy
Duke University 

Thursday Feb 19th 4:00-6:00pm
A Counterfactual Reference Theory of Fictional Names
Siu-Fan Lee (Ms) 
PhD candidate, King's College London